Economic and Social Impacts of the Mozambique / EU Fisheries Agreements
Tuna Seiner, photograph courtesy of N. Ansell
Final Report, April 2008
Contents
Nomenclature……………………………………………………………………………………………………. iii
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
2. The Fisheries Sector……………………………………………………………………………………… 1
Structure of the Marine Fishing Industry…………………………………………………………………… 1
Production………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2
Contribution to GDP…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2
3. Genesis of Agreements………………………………………………………………………………… 3
Justification……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3
Typology……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
Rational…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6
Existing agreements…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
Comment……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 7
History of Mozambique / EC Fisheries Agreements…………………………………………………….. 9
Execution 1987-93…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
4. Analysis of Agreements (2004, 2007)………………………………………………………….. 12
Provisions, obligations and fulfilment……………………………………………………………………… 12
Opportunities, uptake and catches………………………………………………………………………………………. 12
Reference catches…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
Financial contribution & licensing…………………………………………………………………………………….. 14
Reporting………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
VMS………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
Employment………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
Infractions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 17
Compliance………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17
Resource management aspects…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
Summary of costs and benefits…………………………………………………………………………………… 18
Joint enterprises……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 24
Impacts on other National Fisheries…………………………………………………………………………. 24
5. Compensation Mechanisms……………………………………………………………………….. 25
Objective………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 25
Effectiveness……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 26
Fair rent?…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 27
Alternatives to financial compensation……………………………………………………………………. 28
6. Negotiating Capacity…………………………………………………………………………………. 29
7. Participation & Partnership Options…………………………………………………… 29
8. Policy and Strategy options……………………………………………………………………. 31
9. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33
Annex 1 Detailed Tables………………………………………………………………………………….. 35
Annex 2 – Terms of Reference……………………………………………………………………….. 37
Tables
Table 1 – Fisheries Sub sectors…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Table 2 – Principle Fisheries……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Table 3 – Artisanal Fisheries Catch………………………………………………………………………………………. 2
Table 4 – Industrial and Semi-Industrial Fisheries Catch………………………………………………………….. 2
Table 5 – Structure of GDP and Exports………………………………………………………………………………. 3
Table 6 – Changes from FAs to FPAs…………………………………………………………………………………… 5
Table 7 – Agreement Details……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10
Table 8 – Rents 1987-93…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
Table 9 – Uptake and Production 2004-7……………………………………………………………………………. 12
Table 10 – Rents 2004-7…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14
Table 11 – Summary of Principle Costs and Benefits…………………………………………………………….. 18
Table 12 – Detailed Costs and Benefits……………………………………………………………………………….. 20
Table 13 – Scenario for differential tuna compensation………………………………………………………….. 28
Table 14 – EC Agreements currently in force……………………………………………………………………….. 35
Figures
Figure 1 – Existing Fisheries Agreements………………………………………………………………………………. 7
Figure 2 – Timescale of Mozambique / EU Fisheries Agreements…………………………………………….. 9
Figure 3 – Comparison of rents from tuna fishing, 2004 and 2007………………………………………….. 15
Figure 4 – Designated fishing area (2007/11)……………………………………………………………………….. 36
Nomenclature
ACP Afro Caribbean Pacific
CFFA Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements
EC European Community
ECU European Currency Unit (parity with Euro)
EU European Union
FA Fisheries Agreement
FPA Fisheries Partnership Agreement
FTE Full Time Equivalent
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoM Government of Mozambique
GRT Gross Registered Tonnes
GT Gross Tonnes
ILO International Labour Organisation
IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
JE Joint Enterprise
MCS Monitoring Control and Surveillance
MoF Ministry of Fisheries
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organisation
SADC Southern African Development Community
SWIOFC South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
WTO World Trade Organisation
WWF World Wildlife Foundation
1. Introduction
Since independence Mozambique has signed three fisheries agreements with the European Community, which have provided some significant economic benefits to the country as well as raised questions about impacts on national fisheries, environmental costs and secondary benefits such as employment.
This report presents a brief overview and history of the three agreements and the protocols that have defined the technical and financial details during execution. Focussing on the last two agreements (2004-6 and 2007-11) an analysis is made of the economic and social impacts of the agreements, and areas are identified where improvements could be made, including increased partnership options, enhanced participation of civil society and strategic / policy issues. The terms of reference for the study are presented in Annex 2.
Most of the study has been compiled on the basis of data from public sources, as only a very limited amount of information was made available through the Ministry of Fisheries.
2. The Fisheries Sector
The fisheries sector in Mozambique is very important both in terms of contribution to GDP, protein supply for national consumers as well as employment. Some 80.000 Mozambicans are mainly occupied with fisheries related activities, while coastal communities all along the 2500 km coastline rely on fisheries as their main economic activity[1].
Structure of the Marine Fishing Industry
The industry is divvied into three sub sectors, namely Artisanal, Semi-Industrial and Industrial the differential being made primarily on the technical characteristics of the means of production.
Table 1 – Fisheries Sub sectors
|
Sector
|
Vessel size
|
Propulsion
|
Conservation
|
Max range
|
|
Artisanal
|
< 10m
|
Sail, oar, motor <100hp
|
None, some with ice
|
12nm
|
|
Semi-industrial
|
10-20m
|
Motor <350hp
|
Ice
|
30nm
|
|
Industrial
|
>20m
|
Motor <1500hp
|
On board freezing
|
EEZ
|
The principle fisheries in each sector are as follows:
Table 2 – Principle Fisheries
|
Sector
|
Fishery
|
Location
|
Product
|
Market
|
|
Artisanal
|
Beach seine
Handline
|
Shoreline: Sofala Bank
Near shore: Sofala Bank, Nampula, C-Delgado
|
Small pelagic fish
Demersal fish
|
National
National
|
|
Semi-industrial
|
Bottom trawl
|
Near shore: Sofala Bank (South of Beira)
|
Shallow water shrimp
|
National + Export
|
|
Industrial
|
Bottom trawl
Bottom trawl
Seine
Long line
|
Near shore: Sofala Bank (North of Beira)
Offshore: Inhaca, Sofala Bank
Offshore: Cabo Delgado, Nampula
Offshore
|
Shallow water shrimp
Deep water shrimp
Tuna
Tuna, Swordfish, Sharks
|
Export
Export
Export
Export
|
Note that there are no national vessels exploiting large pelagics (tuna, swordfish and sharks) and the fishery is utilised by foreign flagged vessels fishing either via direct license or under a fisheries access agreement. None of the vessels in this fishery (whether under private license or a fisheries agreement) have any interaction with the national economy, neither providing employment, fish for national consumption, raw material for processing or any other form of added value. The fleets are generally unseen, as they operate some distance from the shore, and they will generally only use Mozambican port facilities for emergency repairs. Their catch is transhipped at sea to a supply vessel which will renew on board supplies and even change crews.
Production
Official production statistics for 2005 and 2006 are shown in the following tables. Total catch (all subsectors) is reported as 83,000 – 91,000 tonnes but it should be noted that the artisanal sector is not completely covered by the statistical system and officers estimate total catch (all subsectors) to be in the region of 100,000 – 120,000 tonnes per year.
Table 3 – Artisanal Fisheries Catch
|
|
Tonnes
|
US$’000
|
|
|
2005
|
2006
|
2005
|
2006
|
|
Crab
|
161
|
175
|
482
|
508
|
|
Fish
|
50,024
|
57,457
|
125,060
|
143,643
|
|
Shallow water shrimp
|
1,759
|
1,367
|
8,795
|
6,835
|
|
Cephalopods
|
240
|
247
|
600
|
618
|
|
Sharks
|
892
|
776
|
2,230
|
1,940
|
|
Lobster
|
12
|
5
|
132
|
35
|
|
Others
|
4,660
|
3,946
|
2,330
|
1,973
|
|
Total
|
57,748
|
63,973
|
139,629
|
155,552
|
Source: Ministério das Pescas, Relatório do Balanço do PES 2006
Table 4 – Industrial and Semi-Industrial Fisheries Catch
|
|
Tonnes
|
US$’000
|
|
|
2005
|
2006
|
2005
|
2006
|
|
Lobster
|
1
|
8
|
11
|
88
|
|
Crab
|
158
|
107
|
474
|
321
|
|
Deep water shrimp
|
1,774
|
1,803
|
8,870
|
9,015
|
|
Fish
|
660
|
665
|
1,650
|
1,663
|
|
Shallow water Shrimp
|
8,520
|
7,393
|
68,160
|
59,144
|
|
Nephrops
|
149
|
94
|
1,490
|
940
|
|
Cephalopods
|
165
|
114
|
413
|
285
|
|
Kapenta
|
12,991
|
16,017
|
15,589
|
19,220
|
|
Bycatch
|
1,830
|
1,725
|
915
|
863
|
|
Total
|
26,248
|
27,926
|
97,572
|
91,539
|
|
Tuna
|
5,396
|
6,691
|
10,792
|
13,382
|
Source: Ministério das Pescas, Relatório do Balanço do PES 2006
Contribution to GDP
The fishers sector makes a small contribution to GDP but shrimp exports make an important contribution to total national exports:
Table 5 – Structure of GDP and Exports
|
Sector
|
Av GDP 2000-6
109MT
|
|
Principle Exports by Sector, 2004
|
|
Agriculture
|
25,864
|
23%
|
|
Manufacturing
|
16,022
|
14%
|
|
Trade
|
11,302
|
10%
|
|
Transport
|
10,839
|
10%
|
|
Rents
|
10,800
|
10%
|
|
Water/Electricity
|
5,431
|
5%
|
|
Financial sector
|
4,514
|
4%
|
|
Administration and defense
|
4,110
|
4%
|
|
Education
|
3,839
|
3%
|
|
Construction
|
3,680
|
3%
|
|
Fisheries
|
2,109
|
2%
|
|
Hotels
|
1,675
|
1%
|
|
Heath
|
1,355
|
1%
|
|
Mining
|
787
|
1%
|
|
Other
|
2,364
|
2%
|
|
ISFIM
|
-2,582
|
-2%
|
|
Total
|
102,109
|
91%
|
|
Tax
|
10,057
|
9%
|
|
Grand Total
|
112,167
|
100%
|
Sources: INE, EIU Mozambique Country Report 2006
3. Genesis of Agreements
Justification
The justification for Fisheries Agreements lies in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. The Convention gave States control over the waters within 200 miles their coast, as a step to stop a recognised decline in global fish stocks and limit the ability of one country to fish the resources of another without management or rent. In Article 62, the Convention simultaneously opened up the possibility that a coastal State may concede access to another State in order to fish surplus, subject to conditions which may include compensation:
“Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements…… give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch” [2]
Article 62 provide the founding justification for the negotiation of access agreements (Fisheries Agreements) on behalf of European industrial fishing vessel owners, the first of which was concluded in 1979.
Typology
The model for Fisheries Agreements changed little between 1980-2003. Essentially the European Commission negotiated access for a certain number (or Gross Tonnage) of vessels for the period of the agreement and compensation was negotiated on the basis of a reference catch, detailed by fishery. The reference catch was an estimate of how much the fleet was predicted to catch during the period. Catches above the reference catch would result in additional compensation and license payments, but there would be no refund for catches below the reference weight. Financial contributions were divided up into Compensation proper and Support for Targeted Actions. Through the latter the Commission sought to contribute directly to sustainable fishing practises, and other development related goals. In addition to compensation and support for targeted actions, Fisheries Agreements carried obligations related to:
- Vessel licensing
- Fishing zones
- Reporting of catch, entry and exit, position
- Allowable by-catch
- Taking on of observers
- Satellite based vessel monitoring
- Landing and transhipment of product
- Employment of national crewmembers
- Committees related to the Agreement
It should be noted that the license fees paid by vessel owners under the FA were generally lower than those that would be paid by an owner operating outside of an access agreement and often linked to reference catches (in the first instance) and catch declarations (should catch surpass reference values). The financial contributions effectively subsidised vessel operators and provided an environment that was attractive to EC owners.
The resource rent that accrued to the third country was therefore partly made up of license revenues and partly of the financial contributions. The basis of the rent is guaranteed through the use of a reference catch value, which dictates not only compensation but also license fees. Additional compensation and license fees are however payable should catches exceed reference levels: if the TOTAL fleet catch exceed the reference catch, additional compensation will be payable by the commission; if an INDIVIDUAL vessel’s catch exceeds the reference amounts implicated in the license payment, then additional license fee will be payable by the vessel owner. Payments of both incremental compensation and license fees are integrally linked to catch declarations – should catches be incorrectly declared, there is a real risk of underpayment of revenues due. The seriousness of this risk is determined by the ability (or lack thereof) of the coastal state to independently verify declared catches and the level at which the reference catch has been set. If the latter is very low then it becomes very important that the coastal state has the ability to verify catches.
From 2003 the Commission started to replace Fisheries Agreements with Fisheries Partnership Agreements partly as a response to criticisms of lack of sustainability[3] and negative impacts on the development of local fisheries[4]. Anticipating new WTO rules on fisheries subsidies, the Commission also changed the perspective of the financial contribution which now “cannot be considered as a subsidy to the European fishermen. For the future, the Community financial contributions will have to be regarded as investments for the improvement of responsible and rational fishing and therefore based on new considerations”.[5] Whilst differential (preferential) licensing conditions still prevail between vessels licensed under a FPA and those licensed by direct individual application it is difficult to see how the subsidy has in reality changed.
The main changes between FAs and FPAs are summarised in Table 6 below[6],[7]:
Table 6 – Changes from FAs to FPAs
|
Main elements
|
FAs
|
FPAs
|
|
EU fleet operations
|
For the determination of the level of fishing opportunities, no reference was made to international scientific recommendations.
No exclusivity clause (stipulating that all EU-flagged boats fishing in the zone should operate under the FA).
General principle of EU fleets accessing only surplus stocks that cannot be caught by local fleets (so de facto discrimination between local and EU fleets).
|
For the determination of the level of fishing opportunities, reference is made in tuna agreements to RFMOs’ scientific recommendations.
Existence of an exclusivity clause.
Principle of non-discrimination between different fleets fishing in the fishing zones concerned, although the principle of access to surplus was reiterated in the Council’s conclusions.
|
|
Financial contribution
|
Determination of the level of the financial compensation based on fishing opportunities, and including specified amounts of the financial compensation to be devoted to particular initiatives (‘targeted actions’), often unconnected from the fisheries policy of the ACP country concerned.
The ACP country concerned sent an annual report about how money had been spent to implement targeted actions.
A reduction or an increase in the fishing opportunities granted to EU vessels leads to a reduction or increase in the financial compensation.
|
Determination of the level of the financial compensation based on fishing opportunities, and including EU financial support for the definition and implementation of a sectoral fisheries policy in the ACP country concerned. The EU and the ACP country concerned undertake prior consultations, in particular as regards implementation of the ACP sectoral fisheries policy.
The EC monitors the results against the objectives, rather than looking at the spending of the monies.
A reduction or an increase in the fishing opportunities granted to EU vessels leads to a reduction or increase in the financial compensation.
|
|
Shipowner contributions
|
Shipowners pay for licences. Mixed agreements: amount varies; Tuna: €20-25 per tonne
|
Shipowners pay for licences. Advance payment generally higher than FAs. Mixed agreements: amount varies; Tuna: €35 per tonne
|
|
MCS
|
MCS activities may be supported under targeted actions
|
MCS activities may be supported under partnership actions
|
|
VMS
|
Few FAs include a VMS protocol for satellite monitoring of EU vessels
|
Most FPAs include a VMS protocol for satellite monitoring of EU vessels (although the necessary conditions for implementation do not always exist)
|
|
Scientific cooperation
|
Not formally included.
|
Provisions for a joint scientific committee.
|
|
Seafarers’ employment
|
Employment of local crew; no social clause included.
|
Employment of local or ACP crew; a social clause is included defining minimum employment conditions (ILO).
|
|
Provisions for investments
|
No
|
Yes, particularly through the setting up of fishing joint ventures, transfer of technology, vessels, etc.
|
|
Impact evaluation
|
No ex-ante impact evaluations. Ex-post impact evaluations carried out since 2003 (not public)
|
Impact evaluations carried out for all FPAs (not public)
|
Rational
To understand why the European Community and third countries might be interested in entering into Fisheries Agreements it is necessary to look at some of the key problems facing both European and third countries, and the potential benefits that an agreement could bring to both parties:
European Community:
- Dwindling fisheries resources, and increasing demand for fish products
During the latter part of the 20th century there was a significant decline in some key European fish stocks, notably North Sea Cod. Demand for fish products however continued to rise, not only due to population growth but also due to greater awareness of health related benefits from increased fish consumption. Economic growth also fostered demand for important higher value products, the most significant of which is shrimp.
- Underutilisation and over-capitalisation in European fleets
As part of management measures to adjust to dwindling resources, attempts were made to reduce effort in key European fisheries, whilst at the same time subsidies were available to encourage investment in other fishing sectors and maintain national shipbuilding interests. A partial solution to the problems associated with capital & investment, growing demand and dwindling local resources is to secure access to resources further a-field through such instruments as Fisheries Agreements.
- Important employment and added value derived from the fisheries sector
In addition to the economic value of the employment opportunities created in the European fleet, there are significant benefits from employment and added value derived from to the processing of fish products. Many third countries, especially developing nations do not have the capacity to process products for EC markets and the assurance of supply of raw material for European processing industries thus becomes an important benefit associated with a fisheries access agreements.
FA’s have established a preferential environment for European vessel owners, including licensing costs, conditions regarding product origin and administrative assistance amongst others. It is therefore in the financial interest of the owners to operate under an FA and benefit from such subsidies.
Third Countries:
The basic tent of Article 62 is that a third country may have resources that it does not have the capacity to harvest, and this in turn will represent an economic loss for that country. An access agreement should be an opportunity for the third country to extract some form of rent from an otherwise under utilised asset. Compensation payments made under an access agreement may be an important contribution to third country government income and balance of payments.
- Under capitalised fishing industries
Third countries which lack the technical and capital resources to fully exploit their own fisheries resources often aim to encourage investment in national fishing enterprises through the terms of an access agreement. Should this be successful, the agreement becomes a means to its own end.
Un and under employment is a serious problem in developing nations and the creation of employment opportunities either on board vessels licensed via conditions stipulated in access agreements or in associated shore based industries is seen as an important potential benefit to third countries. Through this there may also be some additional benefits of training and transfer of know-how..
- Difficulties in managing and controlling access to resources
The alternative to an access agreement may be to grant a series of individual licenses to foreign vessels. This may be seen as administratively more onerous than dealing with one single entity in order to give and control access to a whole fleet. This is perceived to be the case with respect to licensing and infractions, where the third country will not, in the first instance, deal directly with vessel owners.
- Cooperation in resource management
In principle both vessel and resource owners will have vested interest in sustainable management of a given fishery. However rational self interest and a compliance quandary similar to the classical prisoners dilemma[8] results in very limited self compliance with rules when owners are left to act individually. The situation is improved when there is some level of group responsibility, where an entity (in this case the Commission and the Owners Associations) acts for the collective (rather than individual) interests of owners. This has been manifested through the linking of access agreements with support for resource management and research via targeted actions.
Existing agreements
The agreements in force at the time of writing are detailed in Table 14, Annex 1 and illustrated in Figure 1 below. Note that there is no protocol currently in force in Angola, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal.
Figure 1 – Existing Fisheries Agreements
Source: MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements 2007
Comment
Fisheries Agreements have been the subject of extensive criticism from various agencies including NGOs and public pressure groups. The most prominent of these being the World Wildlife Fund and the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA). In addition critical issues have been raised in documents commissioned by the European Commission itself. Points that are raised include:
- The existence of under exploited resources is the basis of UNCLOS Article 62. A costal state should have information related not only to the potential yield of the resource but also current levels of exploitation before such a conclusion can be reached. Not only may this analysis be illusive but, as indicated in Table 6, fishing possibilities under FAs have been negotiated without reference to international scientific recommendations – a critical issue in the case of highly migratory species;
- There has been inadequate financial and political support for RFMOs both through FAs and directly by Coastal States. Their role is fundamental to the management of highly migratory species;
- Unsustainable fishing practices by fleets licensed under Fisheries Agreements, including non-reporting of catch data, non reporting of position, entry and exit, non adherence to fishing zones, poor by-catch management practices. The under declaration of catches will affect resource management, and potentially result in underpayment of compensations and license fees;
- Inadequate will amongst coastal states to establish & enforce regulatory frameworks and information management systems to ensure sustainable fishing practices. This may be further exacerbated by a fundamental lack of human and technical capacity in the costal state to effectively manage & monitor foreign fishers in their waters, including the ability to deploy observers and implement VMS systems. In spite of this, agreements still go ahead. WWF takes an explicit stand on the issue:
“Fisheries partnership agreements should only be granted under the auspices of a fully developed fisheries management plan and after conducting environmental impact assessments”[9]
- Financial contributions have a triple focus, and cover (i) compensation for access granted to the resource, (ii) contribution to the cost of sustainable management and (iii) development aid. These three objectives are not necessarily coherent, and touch on the fundamental dilemma as to whether FAs should be seen as a trade agreement or aid;
- Subsidies inherent to the FAs result in unequal access conditions between operators under the FA and those from other nations;
- Negative impacts on national fisheries, both at artisanal and industrial levels. This is especially the case when exclusion zones for artisanal fisheries are either not defined or not observed;
- Coastal states have found it difficult to account for expenditures on targeted actions, and the allocations set out in the FA may not necessarily reflect the priorities of the beneficiary government through out the life of the agreement. Changing of budget allocations was a drawn out administrative process. The net result was that targeted action were not as effective as they should have been and there were often significant delays in disbursement;
- There is a general lack of transparency regarding the terms and benefits of FAs. Contrary to various recommendations[10],[11] the evaluations of individual fisheries agreements made by the Commission remain outside of the public domain;
- The distribution of employment and added value benefits is very skewed and estimated at between 10:90[12] and 23:77[13] in favour of the European Community.
- In spite of the negative criticisms cited above, FPAs may yet be preferable to other alternatives: “from a development perspective FPAs are largely preferable to private arrangements between developing countries and companies. FPAs are a better deal for development than the agreements which are offered by other nations, such as China”[14].
History of Mozambique / EC Fisheries Agreements
There have been three fisheries agreements between Mozambique and the European Community, the first of which entered into force on 1 January 1987. This was subsequently renewed twice, but each time with a different protocol, changing some of the technical conditions, including the fishing opportunities made available. The second renewal expired at the end of September 1993.
Figure 2 – Timescale of Mozambique / EU Fisheries Agreements
There was then a space of 10 years with no agreement, the second agreement only coming into force on 1 January 2004 and lasting three years. The third, a Fisheries Partnership Agreement, entered into force in January 2007, but was only passed through the European Parliament in October of the same year, some 10 months later.
The principle difference between the three agreements (and their protocols) is in the fishing opportunities that each made available to EC fishers and the financial contribution:
The 1987 Agreement on Fisheries Relations and its first protocol (1987-9) allowed for 40 tuna vessels (with no differentiation between longliners and purse seiners), an annual average of 3700 GRT/month of capacity (equivalent to about 15-18 vessels) in the shallow water shrimp fishery and 1100 GRT/month of capacity (equivalent to 3-4 vessels) in the deepwater shrimp fishery. Financial contribution: 2.5m€/yr (2.3m€ compensation, 0.2m€ targeted actions)
The second protocol (1990-1) increased the opportunities for tuna vessels to 44, without change to the opportunities for shrimp vessels. Financial contribution: 3.425m€/yr (2.15m€ compensation, 1.275m€ targeted actions)
The third protocol (1992-3) reduced the opportunities for tuna vessels to 42 and withdrew all shrimp opportunities for both shallow and deep water. Financial contribution: 0.275m€/yr[15] (0.172m€ compensation, 0.103m€ targeted actions)
The 2004 Fisheries Agreement established opportunities for 49 tuna vessels (35 seines + 14 longliners) and 10 deepwater shrimp vessels. Financial contribution: 4.09m€/yr (4.09m€ targeted actions)
The 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement reverted again to only tuna, but increasing the number of opportunities to 89 vessels (44 seiners + 45 longliners). Financial contribution: 0.9m€/yr (0.65m€ compensation, 0.25m€ targeted actions)
The most fundamental change in the evolution of the protocols was the withdrawal in 1992 protocol of shallow water shrimp opportunities, after Mozambique passed a new fisheries law (3/90) which set aside the shallow water shrimp fishery for exploitation by national individuals or companies.
The details of the opportunities and compensations are set out in the following table:
Table 7 – Agreement Details
Execution 1987-93
Very few details are available regarding the execution of the first agreement and protocols (1987-93), although it can reasonably be assumed that the uptake of shallow water shrimp opportunities (1987-91) would have been high. The execution of the agreement would have been influenced by the establishment of joint venture companies in the shallow water shrimp sector (notably Pescamar, a JV between Mozambique and Pescanova of Spain and Efripel, a JV with Taiwo of Japan). Pescamar has existed in Mozambique since 1980 and it would have been in the interest of both the company and the State to strengthen the position of Pescmar and other JVs in the sector rather than rely on a fisheries agreement for full exploitation of the resource. By 1990 Mozambique had tabled a new fisheries law (3/90) which included a specific clause setting aside the shallow water shrimp fishery for national exploitation only. As a result of this the third protocol to the agreement included no shallow water opportunities and Mozambique proposed that national companies should charter EU vessels in order to carry on fishing, but the EU did not agree. The agreement was then terminated in 1992[16], before it had run its course.
Following the withdrawal of shallow water shrimp opportunities, it became important to establish national capacity to exploit the resource and the Fisheries Law now allowed the of leasing (afreitamento) of vessels, which become commonplace amongst smaller quota holders in the fishery. Meanwhile the larger companies continued to invest to maintain and expand capacity. Of note is the 6m€ loan for the renewal of Pescamar’s fleet made by the European Investment Bank in 1994, sponsored by the Government of Mozambique[17].
The first fisheries agreement will have brought both positive and negative benefits for the economy of Mozambique:
ü The total rent payable, being the financial contribution plus licence fees, was at or above expected values for government rents on the basis of estimated value of reference catches and full utilisation of fishing opportunities. Normally these might be expected to be in the order 7-10%, plus other added value from employment, port services and processing:
Table 8 – Rents 1987-93
|
From
|
1/1/87
|
|
1/1/90
|
|
1/1/92
|
|
|
To
|
31/12/89
|
|
31/12/91
|
|
30/9/93
|
|
|
Total Rent as % of catch value
|
16%
|
|
29%
|
|
10%
|
|
It is worth noting that the second protocol was a very much improved deal for Mozambique, whereas the third, following the withdrawal of shallow water shrimp from the opportunities was less attractive. In the light of the fact that the financial contribution + license revenue was the only economic benefit from the agreement (there being no appreciable on-shore value added and limited employment opportunities), 10% could be considered low total economic rent.
ü The shallow water shrimp fleet will have contributed some by-catch to national markets, although this would probably have been in very limited quantities as by-catch collection was not widespread amongst artisanal fishers at that time. In addition the agreement states that by-catch should be landed in Maputo, and it is most unlikely that this took place in the shallow water shrimp fishery considering the distance from the main fishing grounds.
û Reference catches in the shrimp fishery (1500t) are considered low in the context of the capacity allowed. 3700 GRT/mth implies an average of 15-18 vessels and these would have be able to catch about 1650-2000tonnes total catch per year. Although there is an allowance for incremental compensation for catches above the reference catch, this is at a very low rate (50€/t, about 0.6% of catch value)
û Reference catches in the tuna fishery at 6000t/yr for the first protocol and then 3000 and 3400 for the subsequent protocols are considered low, especially if the deployed fleet consisted of many seiners. For the 1990 protocol the tuna reference catch is a mere 68t/vessel, equivalent to 4-5days of fishing in Mozambican waters per vessel per year. Although this value appears low, there is no data to indicate whether it is in fact unrealistic.
û There will have been competition for resources between vessels licensed under the FA and national fleets, to the detriment of both parties.
û At the time the area set aside for the exclusive use of artisanal fisheries was only 1nm from the coastal base line and the presence of additional industrial vessels will have aggravated conflicts. Typically these would be in the form of interruptions to artisanal fishing operations, whereby artisanal fishers would be unable to set gear in the area where shrimp trawlers are operating, or gear conflicts. In the latter case, artisanal fishing gear could be damaged or destroyed by shallow water trawlers. No information was available as to whether this actually happened.
û Penalties were set at a maximum of 100 000 ECU, rather than making reference to a penalty scale defined in national legislation.
û The employment of Mozambican seaman was not obligatory.
û Although the protocol stipulates that all vessels should take a (compliance?) observer on board, it is unlikely that this ever happened in the tuna fishery due to logistic considerations, as the main tuna fishing grounds are in the extreme north of the country, and the fisheries administration was based in Maputo/Beira.
û No entry or exit inspections were required and all catch declarations in the tuna fishery were therefore not subject to any verification by national authorities.
4. Analysis of Agreements (2004, 2007)
The second and third agreements with the European Commission were quite different in nature not only from the first agreement (set out more than 15 years earlier) but also from each other. The 2004 agreement followed the pattern of the later Fisheries Agreements, whereas the 2007 agreement is a Fisheries Partnership Agreement (see Table 6). In addition to the change in the typology of the agreements, the 2004 agreement created fishing opportunities in the tuna and deepwater shrimp sectors, whereas the 2007 agreement only allows for tuna fishing.
Provisions, obligations and fulfilment
In this section the principle provisions of the two agreements are outlined, together with any available information on the execution of those provisions.
Opportunities, uptake and catches
Table 9 – Uptake and Production 2004-7
|
Segment
|
Year
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
|
Seiners
|
Uptake/Opportunities
|
33 / 35
|
35 / 35
|
35 / 35
|
39 / 44
|
|
Longline
|
Uptake/Opportunities
|
10 / 14
|
14 / 14
|
14 / 14
|
27 / 45
|
|
|
Catch
|
11,213
|
2,00018
|
1,500[18]
|
2,00018
|
|
Deepwater shrimp
|
Uptake/Opportunities
|
0 / 10
|
0 / 10
|
0 / 10
|
–
|
|
|
Catch
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Sources: MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
Delegation of the European Commission, Mozambique
The uptake of tuna fishing opportunities under the 2004/6 agreement was very high, with an average utilisation of 94%. This reflects not only the favourable conditions set out in the protocol but also the importance of the Mozambique protocol to the EU fleet in the Western Indian Ocean completing the puzzle of available fishing areas in the region. High uptake will also have been influenced by the western shift in stocks in the region seen in the 2003-4 and high concentrations of pelagic mantis shrimp (natosquilla investiatoris) leading to increased catchability[19], both of which significantly increased the importance of fishing opportunities in Tanzania, Mozambique and to a lesser extent Kenya.
Production in the tuna sector exceeded the reference catch (8,000t/yr) in 2004 and would have resulted in additional license and compensation payments (see below), but in 2005 returned to normal level of around 2,000 tonnes.
In contrast, the uptake of the deepwater shrimp fishing opportunities was zero, suggesting that the agreement was not well negotiated and opportunities did not reflect the demand from EC vessel owners[20]. The unduly high proportion of compensation attributable to the deepwater shrimp opportunities (see below) indicates that either negotiators really believed that the deepwater fishery was of great importance to EC operators or they were somehow mistaken. The reasons attributed to the lack of uptake are as follows:
- High license fees payable by EC operators. The original protocol set license fees at 600€/t and this is certainly very high in the context of the landed value of deepwater shrimp (around 5,000€/t) and the high operational costs.
- Most of the national operators who fish the deepwater shrimp fishery usually do so on the back of a shallow water shrimp license. When productivity in the shallow water fishery declines mid year, vessels are taken out to the deepwater fishery, returning inshore towards the end of the year. Operators report that this is the only way that they are able to maintain viable operations and it would be difficult or impossible to fish all year round only on a deepwater license, especially in the light of rising fuel prices. It appears as if the Commission’s negotiators did not appreciate this, and negotiated fishing opportunities that were financially unviable.
- The agreement imposed a sanitary inspection on Community vessels, to the same standards as those imposed by the EC on the Mozambican national fleet fishing for export markets. It is possible that this may have discouraged vessel owners.
- EC legislation regarding subsidies payable to EC vessel owners for the transfer of ships to distant water fisheries[21] made participation in the fishery less attractive. In particular, the legislation established a deadline of 31 December 2004 for the ending of such benefits and it is unlikely that an operator would have been able to get a transfer affected within the first year of the agreement.
For the 2007/11 agreement, the opportunities in the tuna segment were increased by 25% for seiners and tripled for longliners. This appears to be a direct consequence of the inclusion of an exclusivity clause in Fisheries Partnership Agreements, forbidding EC vessels intending to fish in the waters of a third country with an FPA with the European Community to enter into direct agreements outside of the FPA. Mozambique has long standing contracts with the European tuna associations (Anabac and Opagac) and issued private licenses in addition to those under the 2004 FA[22], a practise that is now not permissible.
The uptake of fishing opportunities for 2007 was low relative to the previous years (74% compared to 94% under the previous agreement). Although it is impossible to make any genuine analysis on such a short term piece of data, this may be due to factors including: natural variations in the migratory cycle of target species temporarily reducing the interest in fishing in Mozambican waters; the increased costs on vessel owners under the current protocol (43% increase in initial license fees as well an increase in incremental fees from €25/t to €35/t); over estimate of the interest of vessels previously licensed under agreements with Anabac/Opagac.
Reference catches
The correct estimation of reference catches is of great importance as it is used as the key multiplier in the calculation of base compensation and licence fees.
For the 2004 agreement the reference catches in the tuna average at 163t per vessel per year which would be high for longliners and probably low for seiners. Without access to the actual catches for the sub-segments of the tuna fleet, the reference catch seems to be a reasonable starting value for compensation estimates.
The deepwater shrimp reference catch of an average of 100t (plus 54t of by-catch) per vessel per year is again considered reasonable.
The per vessel reference catch for tuna was reduced for the 2007 agreement. The total increased by 25% over 2004 values to 10,000t/yr, reflecting an equal increase in the number of seiner fishing opportunities. However the number of opportunities for longliners increased three fold and this not reflected in the reference catch. The annual catch of a longliner will however be only about 1/8 to 1/6 of that of a seiner and a more appropriate figure for the reference catch would have been about 11,000 tonnes per year.
Financial contribution & licensing
The revenues from the financial contribution and licensing are important to the Mozambican Fisheries Agreements as they are the only economic benefits that the country gains through the agreement.
The financial contribution under the 2004 agreement was unusual in that the total payment was allocated against targeted actions. Under these condition, the agreement pre-defined how the base contribution was to be spent and any variations had to be previously agreed with the Commission. In the 2007 partnership agreement, the Government of Mozambique has gained much greater autonomy in the application of the financial contribution. Part of the payment (72%) is set against access and not subject to control via the agreement, whilst the balance is for “objectives identified by common accord…. in the context of the sectoral fisheries policy”.
The level of compensation in the 2004 agreement is extraordinarily high in the context of the value of reference catches (especially in the deepwater shrimp sector), and even higher still considering that there was no uptake of opportunities in the deepwater shrimp sector.
Table 10 – Rents 2004-7
|
Segment
|
Year
|
2004/6 protocol
|
2004
actual
|
2005
actual
|
2006
actual
|
2007/11
protocol
|
2007
actual
|
|
Seiners & Longliners
|
Compensation
increment
|
600,000
|
600,000
241,000
|
600,000
–
|
600,000
|
900,000[23]
|
900.000
|
|
|
License fees
Est increment
|
126,000
86,000
|
114,000
171,000
|
126,000
–
|
126,000
|
300,000[24]
133,000
|
234,000[25]
–
|
|
|
Total
|
726,000
|
1,126,000
|
726,000
|
|
1,333,000
|
1,134,000
|
|
|
Est Catch Value
|
7,000,000
|
9,700,000
|
1,750,000
|
|
9,700,000
|
1,936,000[26]
|
|
|
Rent as % of catch value
|
12%
|
12%
|
42%
|
|
14%
|
59%
|
|
Deepwater shrimp
|
Compensation
|
3,490,000
|
3,490,000
|
3,490,000
|
3,490,000
|
–
|
|
|
|
License fees
|
600,000
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
–
|
|
|
|
Total
|
4,090,000
|
3,490,000
|
3,490,000
|
3,490,000
|
–
|
|
|
|
Est Catch Value
|
4,000,000
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
–
|
|
|
|
Rent as % of catch value
|
101%
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
|
|
Total
|
Rent as % of catch value
|
44%
|
47%
|
240%
|
|
14%
|
59%
|
For the 2004/6 protocol, the level of rent in the deepwater shrimp sector was extremely high, and marginally exceeded of the value of the reference catch. High tuna catches in 2004 kept the overall rent at 47%, a little above the overall rent foreseen in the protocol. However in 2005 low declared tuna catches and no uptake of deepwater shrimp opportunities implied that Mozambique received a rent almost two and a half time the value of the catch.
The conditions set out in the 2007/11 protocol imply a rent of about 14% of value based on the reference catches which is considered reasonable. This should be considered a minimum value as should catches exceed the reference catch the rent will rise slightly. If catches fall below the reference values, the rent as a percent of catch value will be considerably higher as the minimum compensation does not change with catch. In 2007 unconfirmed catch declarations (circa 2000t) are considerably below the reference value of 10,000t and imply a payment to Mozambique of 59% of catch value.
For the European Community as a whole it makes no economic sense at all to pay such high percentages of catch value for access to fish in Mozambican waters. The fact that the situations seems to be perpetuated over the years indicates that the Mozambican agreement has other value to EC, most likely linked with under or non-declaration of catches either systematically or periodically (i.e. every few years when there is a significant boom in productivity in Mozambican waters, such as 2004).
Between the 2004 and 2007 agreements here has been a slight change of the sharing of costs on the European side with the Commission reducing payment from 75 to 65€/t whilst owners have an increased licensing burden up from 25 to 35€/t. This results in a slightly improved agreement from Mozambique’s perspective as additional payments under the licence conditions will be payable at lower total catches than under the compensation conditions. The change is illustrated in Figure 3 which compares the variation of rent with total declared catch in the tuna sector for the two agreements:
Figure 3 – Comparison of rents from tuna fishing, 2004 and 2007
The figure indicates that for this sector the 2007 agreement represents a better deal for Mozambique than the 2004 agreement especially at lower catch levels, but neither are considered unreasonable. The down side is that benefits accruing to Mozambique are now more dependant on correct catch reporting, thus increasing the risk of underpayments described in section 3.
Although overall rents appear reasonable, both the 2004 and 2007 agreements apply similar fees (license and compensation) to seiners and longliners whereas the market value of their catches are very different. Seiners catch yellow fin and skipjack tuna in bulk for canning industries and have catch values estimated at around 800€/t. Longliners will catch considerably less per vessel as indicated above, but the catch is made up of higher values species (swordfish and better quality tuna) with an average value per tonne 3-5 times that of purse seiners. With such significant differences in values it would be justified to establish differential licensing and compensation rates for the two fleet segments to ensure that rents are a true reflection of catch values (see section 5 below).
Reporting
Reporting is a key aspect of compliance within the fisheries agreement and will have direct implications for resource management and compensation payments. Reporting obligations in the 2004 and 2007 agreements cover entry and exit, catch and position information. According to the Ministry of Fishers there has been very limited compliance with any of the reporting obligations from the EC fleet. Catch reports should have been communicated directly to the Ministry, but appear to have been communicated to member states, then the Commission / Delegation and finally to the Ministry. In some cases the format of the catch reporting was not as defined in the conditions of the agreement. Entry and exit reports were not made, making it impossible to cross check catch data.
It is interesting to note that these constitute infractions under the terms of the agreement and could have resulted in license suspension. The Ministry however took no such initiative.
The long line segment made no declarations either to Mozambique or to the IOTC (the IOTC database of long line catches[27] has no data from Spanish vessels at all for the period for Mozambican waters). It seems contradictory that the 2007 agreement enhances long line opportunities whereas there is apparently no fishing taking place. It is considered that either activity is unreported, or the fleet finds it worthwhile to pay for opportunities that it does not use, probably due to current low swordfish catches in Mozambican waters. This may change whereupon the opportunities would become very valuable.
It should be noted that the basic structure of the agreements encourage un- or under reporting of catches[28] as, should reference levels be surpassed, additional license and compensation amounts are payable. The increase of financial burden on the vessel operator in the 2007 agreement will aggravate this problem. The agreement sets out deadlines for the submission of catch data to the Commission (31st July of the following year) and the payment f additional compensation & license fees to Mozambique (30th August), but it is clear that these are not being adhered to – at the time of writing of this document (December 2007) the delegation was not able to confirm final catch data for 2005 or 2006. Not only is this breaking the provisions set out in the protocol, but it also makes it impossible to quantify any additional compensation or license payments that may be due.
Legislation recently proposed by the Council[29] (modifying the 2007 agreement) includes a provision that “The Commission shall evaluate each year whether Member States whose vessels are covered by the Protocol have complied with reporting requirements. Where this is not the case, the Commission shall withhold their requests for fishing licences for the following year”. This is considered to be a significant step forward in the promotion of sustainable fishing.
VMS
Both the 2004and 2007 protocols require the use of satellite based vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and the passing of such information to Mozambique’s VMS centre. This is an important way to confirm the presence of vessels in the country’s fishing zone, compliance with fishing areas and as a basis of catch estimates. In addition it can be used to target surveillance activities. During the 2004 agreement this was never successfully implemented and no data was successfully passed to the Mozambique system. This was due to long standing problems with Mozambique’s VMS system, which has never become fully functional, and the lack of development of an interface between Mozambique’s system (based on Inmarsat) and the system used by EC vessels (based on Argos). The issue has not yet been resolved and to date there is still not data being received by the national VMS centre. It should in principle be possible to back up an automated system with faxed or emailed positions, but again this has not happened.
Employment
Both the 2004 and 2007 agreements open up the possibility for employment of Mozambican seamen on EC vessels. During the 2004 agreement no crewman was employed and it is considered unlikely that any will be employed under the 2007 agreement. Principle problems include:
- the migratory nature of the resource and hence unpredictable and transitory presence of EC tuna vessels in Mozambican waters, making pre-planning very difficult. Had there been uptake of deepwater shrimp opportunities it would have been considerably more likely that jobs for Mozambican seamen would have been created;
- Language;
- Lack of suitable experienced seamen;
- The cost in terms of lost fishing days of coming to port to pick up seamen. However this could be made part of entry inspection requirements.
Infractions
There are no infractions registered under the 2004 agreement.
Compliance
As indicated above, the key areas of non-compliance by the EC with the agreement were:
- Non or late reporting of catches
- Deficient entry/exit declarations
- Handing over of VMS information
No infractions were reported.
From the Mozambican side, unconfirmed reports indicate that Ministry had difficulty in complying with the reporting requirements on the application of targeted actions.
Resource management aspects
The 2004 agreement is clear that although the level of fishing opportunities made available under the protocol may be reassessed by the Joint Committee, (Article 11, §4 of the Agreement), the protocol is makes it clear that the review will be the competence of Mozambican authorities (Article 4 of the Protocol). It is therefore not considered that the agreement takes away any dominion of Mozambique over its own resources.
Deepwater shrimp resources in Mozambique are estimated to have a potential yield of 3,500t/yr[30] whilst current levels of exploitation are around 1,000-1,800t/yr[31]. The attribution of a reference catch of 1000t to the EC via the 2004 agreement is therefore in keeping with UNCLOS Article 62.
Resource management in the tuna sector does not effectively fall under the dominion of Mozambique per se, although there are principles which should be followed in order to avoid contributing to unsustainable fishing practices. The highly migratory nature of the target species of seiners and longliners (tuna, swordfish and sharks) makes it in practise impossible for any one State to effectively manage the resource, both in terms of scientific research and catch or effort management.
In the case of the Indian Ocean this responsibility falls to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) which coordinates scientific research, publishes stock analysis & recommendations and retains a list of vessels authorised to fish in the area. This list is the basis for regional effort management. The EC is a member of the IOTC and thus any vessel fishing under an agreement will have to be already on the IOTC’s list of authorised vessels and therefore within the current allowance for regional effort.
It is important to note that unlike all of its immediate neighbours, Mozambique is neither a member of the IOTC nor cooperating party (a lesser but still binding form of membership) and is therefore not obliged only to license IOTC authorised vessels. In this respect the agreement has indirectly improved tuna resource management, especially since 2007 whereby it became impossible for Mozambique to license EC vessels by private agreement (outside of the FPA). Whilst the country remains outside of IOTC membership, Mozambique continues to have the ability to licence vessels in excess of the IOTC’s approved list (thus undermining regional resource management) as well as license vessels considered illegal by IOTC.
Observers are a key tool for biological monitoring of catches as well as to ensure compliance. The 2007 agreement introduces a new clause that observers taken on board shall be appointed by the IOTC (Annex to the Protocol, Chapter 7, §1). This is somewhat strange considering that Mozambique is not bound by any IOTC resolution and that IOTC observers would not have any legal powers over the vessel whilst in Mozambican waters, unless the IOTC appoints observers from the Ministry of Fisheries. The agreement therefore opens up the possibility that there will only be biological observation, and no onboard compliance monitoring. The ex-post evaluation of the 2004 agreement concluded that the continued absence of an effective observer programme contributed to the “limited” impact of the agreement on improved MCS[32]
Summary of costs and benefits
The following table summarises the key costs and benefits for both the EC and Mozambique during the execution of the 2004-6 agreement, and makes projections for the 2007-11 agreement. It is worth noting that the Commission makes a detailed final evaluation of each agreement shortly before it expires but these are not made public, contrary to the recommendations of ADE’s evaluation[33]. The Commission was requested to grant access to the Mozambique ex-post evaluation for this study, but this was refused.
Table 11 – Summary of Principle Costs and Benefits
|
Mozambique Costs
|
2004-6
|
2007-11
|
Comment
|
|
MCS
|
Increased direct costs
|
Increased direct costs
|
|
|
Impact on national fisheries
|
Very limited
|
Very limited
|
EC fleet fishes resources unused by national fleets, beyond area of interaction with artisanal fishers
|
|
Mozambique Benefits
|
|
|
|
|
Compensation
|
€4.10m/yr
|
€0.90m/yr
|
Varies with declared catch, negatively influenced by under declaration
|
|
License Fees
|
€0.13m/yr
|
€0.43m/yr[34]
|
Negatively influenced by under declaration of catches, more so under 2007-11 FPA
|
|
Employment
|
None
|
None
|
Protocol tries to guarantee employment, not practicable at present
|
|
Other Value Added
|
None
|
None
|
|
|
EC Costs
|
|
|
|
|
Compensation
|
€4.1m/yr
|
€0.90m/yr
|
Paid to MoF by European Commission
|
|
License Fees
|
€0.13m/yr
|
€0.43m/yr
|
Paid to MoF by vessel owners
|
|
EC Benefits
|
|
|
|
|
Projected Fish supply (t)
Projected Fish supply value (€)
|
9,500t/yr
Est €11m/yr
|
10,000t/yr
Est €9.7m/yr
|
On basis of reference catch
|
|
Actual Fish supply (t)
Actual Fish supply value (€)
|
Av 4,700t/yr
Est €4.2m/yr
|
Unknown (no declarations to date)
|
Declared data from EC fleet. Unverified by GoM
|
|
Employment
|
280 FTE
|
390 FTE
|
On basis of reference catch
|
|
Value Added
|
€3.3m/yr
|
€4.6m/yr
|
On basis of reference catch
|
Table 12 – Detailed Costs and Benefits
|
|
2004-6
|
2007-11
|
|
Mozambique Costs
|
|
|
|
Negotiation and execution costs
|
Partly covered by targeted actions
|
Now an overhead, supported by national budget
|
|
Increased MCS Costs
|
Difficult to quantify, but direct increment not high as there were no inspections of EC vessels. There may however be direct VMS related costs
|
Likely to be the same
|
|
Impacts on other Fisheries
|
Some increase in competition within the tuna fishery, though most vessels licensed outside of the EC FA are longliners, whilst most reported fishing effort under the FA is from Seiners. The two fish very different áreas.
No competition with National Tuna fleet (non-existent)
No deployment of deepwater shrimp vessels, therefore no impact on national deepwater shrimp fleet
No direct impact on artisanal fisheries as tuna vessels should have been operating well outside the range of artisanal vessels. Artisanal fisheries also do not target the same stocks as the tuna fleet
No catch was landed locally, thus there were not impacts on national markets
|
Less competition as more EC vessels have been brought into the FPA who were already fishing in Mozambican waters.
No deepwater shrimp opportunities, therefore no impact on national fisheries
As before, no impact on national artisanal fisheries providing there is adherence to stipulated fishing zones.
|
|
Increased Illegal Activity
|
Possible. Deficient catch reporting is an IUU infraction. The lack of entry/exit and VMS information implies that illegal activity could have happened. Most likely infractions: un/under reporting of catch, non-adherence to fishing zones, transhipment without notification
|
Catch reporting should improve, but the lack of VMS continues to be an issue
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mozambique Benefits
|
|
|
|
Compensation
|
At least 4.1m€ per year
|
0.9m€/yr at reference catch levels
|
|
Targeted Actions
|
As part of the above:
1.5m€ MCS
1.0m€ Instructional development
1.0m€ Research
0.4m€ Training
0.1m€ Quality control
0.06m€ Joint Committee & International Meetings
Application almost all base compensation directed via the protocol. Inflexible and not always in keeping with current priorities. Hampered by delayed disbursements.
Although not conformed by the MoF, it is reported[35] that funds have been reserved for the purchase of new MCS vessels and for the construction of a new building for the Ministry, with any balance being allocated to training – a significant variation on the allocation of funds under targeted actions foreseen in the protocol.
|
As part of the above:
0.25m€ Policy implementation support
More general support, following plan approved by the Joint Committee
|
|
License Fees
|
0.13m€ or more per year
Influenced by non or under declaration of catches
|
About 0.43m€ per year at reference catch levels
Even more influenced by non or under declaration of catches
|
|
Employment
|
None
|
Likely to be none
|
|
Added Value
|
Very small
There is no added value related to the processing of product as catch is not landed in Mozambique. The protocol obliges EC vessel owners to have local licensing agent who would have received commissions.
|
Further reduced
There is still no added value from processing / marketing and the protocol now permits, but does not oblige, owners to have a local agent.
|
|
Total rent
|
47%-240% of value of declared
Extremely beneficial for Mozambique in the context of declared catches, but raises doubts on the fidelity of declared catch data
|
14% of catch value at reference catch levels
Reasonable. The % increases if fleet fails to make reference catch
|
|
|
|
|
|
EC Costs
|
|
|
|
Agreement Administration
|
Unknown but real
|
Unknown but real
|
|
Compensation
|
At least 4.1m€ per year
|
0.9m€ at reference catch levels
|
|
Targeted Actions
|
4.1m€ per year (as part of compensation)
|
0.25m€ (as part of compensation)
|
|
|
|
|
|
EC Benefits
|
|
|
|
Fish Supply
|
11,000-2,000t/yr
|
10,000t/yr at reference catch levels
|
|
Employment[36]
|
280
|
390
|
|
Value Added36
|
3.3m€ (excl processing industry)
|
4.6m€
Note the difference in scale of total benefits between Mozambique and the EC under the 2007 agreement, and the implications for corresponding interests in its maintenance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EC Owner Costs
|
|
|
|
License fee
|
0.13m€ or more per year
|
About 0.43m€ per year at reference catch levels
|
|
Observers
|
0 (none were placed onboard)
|
Unknown
|
|
|
|
|
|
EC Owner Benefits
|
|
|
|
Reduced licence fees
|
If tuna vessels had been fishing outside of the agreement a license would have cost 16,000€/vessel, total 0.78m€/yr for the fleet. This could have been reduced to 0.45m€ through the use of local agents. The agreement thus represents a subsidy of up to 0.65m€/yr to the EC fleet (about 13,000€/vessel/yr).
In the (unutilised) deepwater shrimp sector, a license outside of the agreement would have cost around 89€/t plus 30€/t for the permitted by-catch, compared to 600€/t under the agreement. The agreement thus represented an additional cost per vessel of about 48,000€/yr. Under the agreement vessels were afforded levels of by-catch of 54% above the shrimp quota, considerably more than the norm of 10%(max)
|
If tuna vessels fish outside of the agreement a license will cost 14,000€/vessel, total 1.25m€/yr for the fleet. This could be reduced to 0.68m€ through the use of local agents. The agreement thus represents a subsidy of up to 0.82m€/yr to the EC fleet (about 9,000€/vessel/yr).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Contribution to Sustainable Fishing
|
|
|
|
MCS
|
+ 1.5m€/yr was allocated to MCS via targeted actions. No information is available as to how this was actually spent.
– The non-functioning of VMS will have contributed negatively to MCS
|
+ But only through policy implementation support (0.25m€/yr total)
? The use of only IOTC appointed observers implies that the Agreement has excluded on-board compliance observation
|
|
Research
|
+ 1m€/yr was allocated to research via targeted actions. No information is available as to how this was actually spent.
|
+ But only through policy implementation support (0.25m€/yr total)
|
|
Management
|
– Deficient catch and entry/exit reporting will have contributed negatively to the promotion of sustainable fishing practices
– The non-functioning of VMS will have contributed negatively to management, possibly allowing negative interactions with other fisheries.
– The failure to deploy onboard observers will have had negative compliance and management consequences and made way for economic losses to Mozambique through the under declaration of catches.
|
+ But only through policy implementation support (0.25m€/yr total)
+ Exclusivity clause will minimise the number of non IOTC authorised vessels that can be licensed.
+ Proposed Council legislation[37] will put more pressure on non-reporting vessels
|
| |
|
|
|
Joint enterprises
Both the 2004 and 2007 protocols make reference to the establishment of joint enterprises, being “a commercial company set up in Mozambique by vessel owners or national enterprises from the Parties to carry on fishing or related activities”. Such enterprises imply the transfer of vessels from the EC fleet to the national fleet.
From the Commission’s perspective joint enterprises are attractive as they would reduce fishing capacity and be seen as part of a genuine economic partnership with the third country in question. From Mozambique’s perspective they may be attractive as JEs would bring investment and would create more job opportunities and value added than European enterprises fishing under an agreement.
On the negative side, the establishment of a JE would imply total exposure of the EC vessel owner to the national regulatory framework, including conditional access to the European market dependant upon Mozambique’s current status on the lists of DG SANCO, and resource monitoring obligations. The latter, specifically the requirement to report VMS data directly to the Ministry was cited as one of the causes of the collapse of the Angolan fisheries agreement as it is contrary to EC policy[38]. In addition, the employment of foreigners would be subject to national regulations, and financial operations would be more difficult (increased license and fuel costs, tax burden etc). JEs have in the past brought with them old and inefficient technologies that can become an economic burden rather than a benefit.
Although the agreement sets out that the two parties will work towards the facilitation of joint enterprises, it is not clear exactly how this integrates with the fisheries agreement itself. Should an owner set up a JE in Mozambique, it would no longer be able to fish under the benefits of the agreement, and would therefore lose the benefit of implicit subsidies and market access.
The establishment of JEs in the tuna sector is considered highly unlikely. Not only is the fleet is highly mobile, but it also spends a relatively small part of the season in Mozambican waters. Mozambique can offer very limited facilities in terms of marketing, maintenance and bunkering and there is no obvious reason why it might be in the interests of an EC owner to set up a tuna JE in Mozambique.
Although no joint enterprises were established under the 2004 agreement, it is worth noting that the presence of Pescamar in Mozambique and the establishment of the joint venture between the Mozambique and Pescanova was a result of the 1987 fisheries agreement[39] and a previous bilateral agreement with Spain.
Impacts on other National Fisheries
Both the 2004/6 and 2007/11 agreements are considered to have had no significant direct impacts on national fisheries, either in the industrial or artisanal sectors. In the 2004/6 there could potentially have been some competition with national operators in the deep water shrimp fishery, but no vessels were deployed into this fishery under the FA, and there was therefore no negative impacts. Tuna seiners and longliners deployed under both agreements should have no impact on national fisheries as their principle fishing grounds are outside the fishing grounds exploited by national artisanal and industrial fleets. However the lack of VMS information means that it is not possible to verify whether EC vessels actually kept to the fishing grounds set out in the protocol[40].
5. Compensation Mechanisms
This section discusses the nature of compensation payments and proposes measures that might improve effectiveness.
Objective
Compensation payments are perceived to serve three distinct objectives, namely:
- Payment for access;
- Support for resource management and sustainable fishing, and
- Contribution to social and economic development.
In the absence of a fisheries agreement, fishery managers would generally aim to recover the access fees and resource management costs via license fees charged to vessel owners. Financing for social and economic development objectives might come from central funds or donor support.
Total payments due under an agreement take three separate forms, not necessarily related to the objectives outlined above:
- Compensation, calculated as a function of the expected value of finishing opportunities
- Support for targeted actions (either in addition to or as part of Compensation)
- License fees
The compensation is normally a direct payment by the EC to the third country as a general fiscal receipt. Under many agreements the EC did not seek detailed accounts as to how this money was applied, but tried to ensure that it was on-budget. The support allocated for targeted actions is made against specific objectives set out in the protocol which may cover both management and development related issues. Payment for targeted actions is normally made by the EC to accounts under the control of the Ministry of Fisheries, each disbursement being conditional on adequate reporting on the spending of the previous disbursement. License fees are paid by the vessel owners, usually in advance and at a rate lower than that paid by owners operating in the same sector outside of a fisheries agreement. Licenses form part of general sectoral fiscal receipts and the agreement does not seek to control how the revenue is applied.
From the 1980s, Fisheries Agreements evolved to allocate progressively more of the compensation against targeted actions, in response to pressure from parties including the European Parliament which sought to strengthen links between agreements and both sustainable fishing, and development agendas. In spite of the change of dogma from FA to FPA, such pressure is still very much in evidence today[41]. The 2004 agreement with Mozambique is typical of the final form of Fisheries Agreements, and all of the compensation was indicated against targeted actions. The 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement returned to allocating most of the EC payment to Compensation, and defining a smaller part to general policy support, rather than detailed actions. The agreement is also clear that the part of the compensation payment which is not destined for policy support is an access payment.
The inclusion of conditionality (such as targeted actions) in the fisheries agreements has both positive and negative outcomes:
ü It allows the Ministry to retain control of part of the total payments, rather than surrender all into central revenues and await disbursement.
ü It should increase the likelihood of an agreement contributing to specific ends, as per the details of the targeted actions set out in the protocol.
- Targeted actions become a way of “making commercial agreements contribute to [the EC’s] development objectives”[42]. This appears to have little justification especially in the light of the fact that similar rents would have accrued to the sector if vessels had fished under private agreements and these would have been at the entire disposal of the government of the third country, without conditionality.
û The fact that payments are made into accounts controlled by the Ministry rather than into central funds increases the possibility that they become off-budget
û The existence of targeted actions overrides national planning and budgeting processes.
û There are signs that in practise targeted actions seldom actually result in objectives set out in the protocol, and the 2004 FA with Mozambique is a good example. As indicated in Table 12 above, the final application of the revenue for targeted actions is very different from that set out in the protocol. As the Commission’s review of the relationship between country programmes and FAs pointed out “Targeted compensations dedicated to natural resource management or fisheries development at the request of the EC are less likely to fit in with government priorities”[43]
Fundamental to the issue of compensation and the details of form or delivery is the question of the objective of Fisheries Agreements. Should they be treated purely as a trade deal, and revenues be made available in the same way as any other commercial contract (such as the private sale of licenses outside of a FA)? Or should agreements be viewed as a means of delivering mixed “trade plus aid” benefits? The fact that FAs ventured to support specific objectives in the sector implies some lack of confidence that the government would, in the absence of targeting, allocate resources to promote the basic objectives of sustainable fishing and responsible resource management. So should the Commission take responsibility for national resource management? The answer is clearly no, and in this context the presence of targeted actions in FAs can be seen as a challenge to national governance.
The agreed structure of the 2007 FPAs is somewhat improved with only compensation (specifically in payment for access) plus general support for policy execution remaining, and no reference to either detailed targeted actions or development related initiatives. The Commission however will still have some influence as to how the monies allocated to policy execution are spent as this must be done against a plan approved by the Joint Committee. The Council to the European Parliament, which recently obliged the Commission to report on the impacts and whether “the compensation paid by the EU… does in fact promote the sustainable use of fishery resources in Mozambique”[44] clearly see that this is how the money should be used. The same Council proposal also sets out a conflicting objective for the same money:
“The European Community’s financial contribution should be used for the development of coastal populations living on fisheries and the creation of small industrial fish freezing and processing enterprises at local level”
This is an alarming return to the rhetoric of targeted actions and Fisheries Agreements, and more alarming still as such a change appears not to have been negotiated with the Government of Mozambique. More than anything else it hints at the existence of very divergent opinions in Europe as to the basic function of compensation.
Effectiveness
The Cotonou agreement requires that there is compatibility between fisheries agreements and development aid, but this does not necessarily mean that an agreement should take the role of or substitute aid delivered via the indicative country programme. Should an aim of the EC be to support development initiatives via an agreement certain steps can be taken to make this a more likely outcome:
- Ensure that the compensation is delivered in a way which results in it being clearly on-budget. Monies will therefore be subject to normal levels of accountability and by default will be integrated into national sectoral programmes and policy.
- Ensure that an adequate sectoral policy exists. Support for the development of this (if necessary) should be part of the Indicative Country Programme. In the case of Mozambique key documents exit (Masterplan 1994, Sector Development Plan 2002-6, Five year government programme 2005-9 and the Plan for the reduction of absolute poverty 2006-9) but both the MasterPlan and the Sector Development Plan require updating.
In principle, if policy reflects priorities such as the promotion of responsible fishing and the reduction of poverty (which is the case in Mozambique) then providing compensation is on-budget it should inevitably be used for this end. There is a certain dilemma in that if compensation is paid directly to the Ministry, there is a higher possibility that it will be off-budget but an equally higher possibility that it will be retained within the sector.
Fair rent?
Levels of compensation under the FA and the FPA are considered to be reasonable, and minimum total economic rents of 11% (2004 FA) and 12% (2207 FPA) are acceptable especially as the structure of the agreement is such that at below reference catches the rent remains fixed and therefore higher relative to actual catch values (see Figure 3).
The rate of compensation for both seiners and longliners in the tuna sector is considered to be an area where the basis of compensation could be improved. The value of the catches of the two sectors differs radically with that of seiners fetching approximately 880€/t[45], whilst longliners achieve 2,800€/t[46]. Overall rents of approximately100€/t (Compensation plus License Fee) is reasonable for Seiners (11%), but very low for Longliners (4%). If the same rate of rent were applied, together with the current 65/35 sharing between compensation and licenses, longliners should pay 318€/t total, being 207€/t in compensation plus 111€/t in license fees. Current overall rents from the FA are only reasonable because, as referred above, there are no declared catches from the long line sector.
From the owners perspective it could be argued that it is necessary to maintain low advance payments in the long line sector as vessels need to retain a large annual portfolio off licenses in order to be certain that annual fishing operations will not be interrupted, no matter where good fishing is to be found. It would be better to increase the rates of payment for the longliner sector to those indicated above but decrease the level of the reference catch / advance tonnage for these vessels such that there is no change in license and compensation at reference levels. At least in this way, reference compensation would be the same but should there be catch from this segment of the fleet, Mozambique would gain a more just rent.
A revised scenario might be similar that that set out in Table 13.
Table 13 – Scenario for differential tuna compensation
Note that the base costs of licenses for longliners remains constant compared to the 2007 FPA, but the basis catch weight is lowered to 32 and 15 tonnes respectively for large and small longliners. The rate of incremental compensation for the long line segment is raised to 320€/t and incremental license fees raised to 110€/t. The reference catch has been divided between the longliners and seiners, which together with differential levels of compensation for the two segments, implies a rise in base compensation from 650,000€ to 905,000€ per year. Under this scenario Mozambique would earn rents of at least 11% from both fleet segments.
A disadvantage of such a change would be that it would considerably increase the incentive for longliners to under or not declare catches, and it would therefore have to be accompanied by improved independent catch verification.
Alternatives to financial compensation
There are few viable alternatives to financial compensation, and the principles set out under the current 2007 FPA are considered to be favourable. The Ministry has indicated that it is beneficial to be able to control the application of revenues via targeted action and thus it might be desirable, from their perspective, to increase the percentage allocated to policy support. A primary concern however would be the retention of these value on-budget.
Apart from financial compensation, other options include :
The Northern European Fishing Agreements (with Norway, Iceland and Faeroe Islands) are compensated in the form of reciprocal access to EC resources. This type of compensation is not considered relevant as Mozambique has no specific interest in making EC fish resources available for national consumption, nor is there any national fleet that could fish European resources.
It would, in principle, to be possible to remove any form of compensation from the agreement and replace it with increased programme aid under the EC’s indicative country programme. Although this could result in greater impacts on poverty alleviation, this would detract from any sectoral based cost recovery objectives and reduce the possibility that monies would be available for fisheries policy implementation.
6. Negotiating Capacity
In principle there is a very great difference in capacity of the two teams that sit down to negotiate a fisheries agreement. On the European side, the team will be composed of officials whose work focuses on fisheries agreements, including both technical and legal aspects. They will bring with them an immense amount of specialised experience, covering not only Mozambique but also all other agreements in the region. On the Mozambican side the team was lead by the Permanent Secretary and composed of senior officials from the Ministry of Fisheries, who will sit down to negotiate an agreement only very rarely (see Figure 2, depicting the timescale of EC fisheries agreements with Mozambique).
The principle technical resource available to the EC negotiators was the Ex-post Evaluation of the 2004-6 FA, which under normal circumstances is not made available to either the third country or the public at large. The evaluation will normally include a sectoral analysis, a review of the costs & benefits of the outgoing agreement and projections of costs & benefits on the basis of various scenarios for a new agreement. The Ministry reported however that they managed to obtain access to the document, but it is unknown whether this was a complete version. Whatever the case it will have helped their negotiating position for the 2007 agreement.
The actual negotiation of the 2007 FPA was reported to have been very difficult, with several rounds of meetings without agreement. Major issues were:
- Low levels of financial contribution relative t the previous agreement
- No guarantee of jobs for Mozambican seamen
- Lack of reference to other regional management bodies apart from IOTC, such as SWIOFC and SADC
- A dispute with France over EEZs, resulting in the agreement refereeing to Fishing Zone rather than EEZ.
During the final phase of negotiations the Ministry of Fisheries did not reach agreement with the EC, the final issue being the amount of financial compensation. In the end it was decided at the level of the Council of Ministers that the agreement should be signed as it was, “taking into account the wider vision of partnership between Mozambique and the EC”[47].
What is clear is that Mozambique was well aware that the European Community had a much greater interest in the 2007 agreement than Mozambique, as is illustrated by the differential benefits outlined in TablesTable 11 and Table 12, even though they may not have been aware of the scale of potential EC benefits. The negotiating team maintained its position as far as they were politically permitted. The resulting agreement has similar rates of total benefit (100€/t) as Comoros, Madagascar and Seychelles.
The generally competitive atmosphere surrounding negotiations really does bring into question the concept of an agreement based on partnership. If both parties were serious about partnership they would at least share the available information and projections, and come to a mutual agreement on this basis. The fact that the Commission does not reveal key analytical documents not only raises questions as to whether the full story is being put on the table but also fosters doubts in Mozambique as to whether they have opted for a scenario that is truly pareto-optimal.
7. Participation & Partnership Options
The nature of agreements and the technical and legal level of negotiations makes for very few opportunities to increase the participation of civil society in the process. As indicated above the EC strengthens its negotiating position by keeping baseline information out of the public domain. If Mozambique were to take a position in negotiations based on a public process it is very likely that, under present circumstances, it would weaken its own position and come away with a less favourable outcome.
There may however be some scope for public participation in the evaluation of an outgoing agreement, and it could be seen that this should in fact be done as part of the governments accountability to civil society. This could take the form of either public consultations analysing any impacts of activities carried out under the outgoing agreement on stakeholders or more focussed meetings with representative bodies such as fisher associations or co-management groups. Towards the end of the 2004-6 agreement the Ministry did not conduct a wide reaching internal evaluation, and did not consult representative groups on the issue.
There are civil society organisations, such as WWF, with representations in Mozambique who have access to a considerable amount of international information and experience related to issues surrounding fisheries agreements and, if the appropriate opportunity were to be created, they could make positive contributions to a preparatory process prior to new negotiations. It was not possible to confirm whether the Ministry would consider taking such a step, and the way ahead might be to organise the meeting unilaterally but take care to ensure that there is participation from the Ministry. Note that WWF have sponsored a similar meeting[48] with a regional dimension, held in Dar es Salaam in 2005 under the East African Marine Ecoregion Project and Mozambique participated.
There are several changes that could be effected that would improve the partnership dimension of the current FPA:
- The Commission should make ex-post and ex-ante evaluations publicly available. This may only be possible though direct lobbying in Brussels.
- The recent move by the Council to introduce a clause obliging the Commission to take action against vessels which do not report catches is very welcome, but this should be extended to cover VMS and Entry/Exit related infractions;
- The recent move by the Council to dictate how compensation should be spent is against the partnership principles set out in the agreement and should be withdrawn;
- The distribution of benefits between the two parties would be more fair if differential rates for seiners and longliners were introduced, along the lines of those set out in Table 13;
8. Policy and Strategy options
The key policy and strategy options that could improve the execution and net benefits from the fisheries agreement with the European Community are considered to be as follows:
Towards the end of the current agreement it would be advantageous to make a thorough evaluation of the execution and impacts of the 2007-11 agreement and protocol. This should include civil society consultations with associations and other relevant focus groups and even create a forum whereby international organisations such as WWF might be able to participate. The danger that public consultation may weaken Mozambique’s negotiating position should be acknowledged.
It is clear that the Ministry has adopted a strong stance during 2006 negotiations for the 2007 agreement, made stronger by the knowledge of greatly differing interests in the FPA between Mozambique and the EC. It may however still have been possible to have achieved a marginally better position, especially considering the difference in information and experience available to two parties. In the past the World Bank has supported technical assistance to third countries specifically to help in FA negotiations and if available this sort of assistance could be beneficial to Mozambique.
At some stage there may be benefit in trying to develop a regional stance in the definition and negotiation of fisheries agreement conditions. A representative regional body could present a stronger negotiating position to the EC than individual countries. It would be worth investigating such possibilities via SADC and / or the SWIOFC .
Some agreement conditions could be improved in order to improve net benefits and to minimise the likelihood of unsustainable fishing practises. These include:
Entry / Exit Inspection: In the absence of on-board observers Entry and Exit Inspection is the only way to cross check the accuracy of catch declarations. Although inconvenient for ship owners, entry and exit inspections should be made mandatory through an appropriate clause in the protocol. In the case of seiners, it would be most convenient if capacity to carry out such inspections could be installed in Pemba.
Differential treatment of longliners and seiners: As discussed above fairer rents would be obtained from the agreement if there were differential treatment longliners and seiners, reflecting the differing catch values. However the increased incentive to under declare catches (especially in the longline segment) implies that such a change could only be effective if it were founded on a system which enable Mozambique to independently verify catches. This would include adequate surveillance, observation and inspection.
Observers: The 2007 agreement only makes allowance for IOTC appointed observers who will probably be biological rather than compliance focussed. It is considered that the agreement should make provisions for the boarding of Mozambican compliance observers, something which would be greatly facilitated by Entry/Exit inspections.
The Ministry has so far failed to act against catch reporting infringements. Under the terms of the protocol vessels failing to report could be have their licenses suspended. It is considered that the Ministry should take a stronger position against this infraction not only to support sustainable resource management but also to ensure that correct compensation and license fees are being paid.
The complete commissioning of the VMS system is already a priority in the Ministry, but after more than two years, the system is still not working adequately. The Ministry should be encouraged to continue with efforts to get the system fully operational, and it should be noted that this may have direct impacts revenues (as a basis for verification of catch declarations) as well as interactions with other fisheries.
Mozambique has a very limited remit in the management of highly migratory stocks, and within the Western Indian Ocean this is charged to the IOTC – an organisation of which Mozambique is not a member. It would be in the interests of the promotion of sustainable fishing if Mozambique could be encouraged to become at least a cooperating party. Should this happen Mozambique would then be obliged to submit catch data and comply with effort management and counter-IUU measures.
9. Bibliography
A Bioeconomic Analysis Of The Ghanaian Tuna Fishery (1980 – 2000). Mabel Borteley Bortier-Verstraaten Norwegian College Of Fishery Science 2002
A Handbook for Negotiating Fishing Access Agreements. WWF 2001
ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements – Fisheries. CFFA/CTA. European Centre for Development Policy and Management 2005
An Examination of Fisheries Relations between the European Union and ACP Countries. Béatrice Gorez and Brian O’Riordan. COMSEC / CTA 2003
Bycatch in the tuna purse-seine fisheries of the Western Indian Ocean. Romanov E. Southern Scientific Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (YugNIRO). Crimea Ukraine. Fish. Bull. 100(1): 90–105 (2002).
Case of West Africa (ECDPM Working Paper No. 52). European Centre for Development Policy and Management 1997
Coherence Between EU Fisheries Agreements and EU Development Cooperation: The
Coherence in ACP fisheries and EU market access: Report of Expert Meeting . EU Coherence. 2007
Comparative Study Of The Impact Of Fisheries Partnership Agreements Executive Report. MRAG 2007
Comparative Study Of The Impact Of Fisheries Partnership Agreements Technical Report. MRAG 2007
Economic Performance Of Selected European Fishing Fleets Annual Report 2004
Economic Performance Of Selected European Fishing Fleets Annual Report 2005
EPAs and Fisheries Negotiations,. Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute. SEATINI Bulletin 2006
EU Fisheries Subsidies. Significance for Development Countries. CFFA 2005
European Distant Water Fishing Fleet: Principles and data. DG Fisheries, European Commission 2001
Evaluation Of The Fisheries Agreements Concluded By The European Community. IFREMER 1999
Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements. ADE 2002
Experiences With Subsidies And Fisheries Management: The Case Of Eu-Acp Fisheries Access Agreements. B. Gorez. CFFA. nd
Fair Fishing Deals, June 2005. WWF.
Fisheries Access Agreements: Trade and Development Issues, ICTSD Natural Resources, International Trade and Sustainable Development Series Issue Paper No. 2, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland. 2006
Fisheries Agreements with Third Countries – is the EU moving towards Sustainable Development? N Sporrong et al for WWF European Fisheries Campaign. 2002
Fisheries Partnership Agreements – Rebranding or a real step towards sustainability? WWF Demark 2003
On-Going Research Activities On Trophic Ecology Of Tuna In Equatorial Ecosystems Of Indian Ocean. Potier e al. IOTC Proc 5 2002
Profile of the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique: with emphasis on tuna fisheries. Lichucha et al. IOTC 2003
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries (Partnership) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique for 1987, 1990, 1992, 2003, 2006
Report of the Third Special Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. IOTC 2006
Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). European Parliament 2007
SADC’S EPA Position On Fisheries. NFDS 2006
Seafood Price Indices SNF Working Paper 58/05. Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration 2005
Subsidies To The European Union Fisheries Sector. Institute for European Environmental Policy 2002
Summary report of the contributions to the ACP E consultation on IUU fishing issues. CTA/CFFA 2005
Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements – Phase Three* Rules of Origin in the Southern African Development Community Group 2006
The Economics of Fisheries Access Agreements: Perspectives on the EU-Senegal Case. Johnstone N. DP 96-02 IIED 1996
The European Tuna Sector. Economic Situation, Prospects and Analysis. Megapesca 2005
The plunder of bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean and East Atlantic in 2004 and 2005. WWF 2006
The Promotion of Sustainable and Equitable Fisheries Access Agreements in the Western Indian Ocean Region. WWF EAME 2005
Towards Sustainable and Equitable Fisheries Access Agreements in the Western Indian Ocean Region. East African Marine Ecoregion / WWF 2005
Tuna longline catch rates in the Indian Ocean. Polacheck. Journal of Marine Policy. 2005
Western Tuna and Billfish Fishery Joint Mac And Sag Workshop. Fremantle 2004
Annex 1 Detailed Tables
Table 14 – EC Agreements currently in force
|
Country
|
Duration of protocol
|
Type
|
EC contribution per year
|
Earmarked for support of sectoral fisheries policy (FPA) / targeted actions (FA)
|
|
Cape-Verde
|
5 years
(30.3.2007-29.3.2012)
|
Tuna FPA
|
385 000 €
|
80 %
|
|
Comoros
|
6 years
(1.1.2005-31.12.2010)
|
Tuna FPA
|
390 000 €
|
60 %
|
|
Côte d’Ivoire
|
6 years
(1.7.2007—30.6.2013)
|
Tuna FPA
|
595 000 €
|
100 %
|
|
Gabon
|
6 years
(3.12.2005-2.12.2011)
|
Tuna FPA
|
860 000 €
|
60 %
|
|
Greenland
|
6 years
(01.01.2007 – 31.12.2012)
|
FPA
|
15 847 244 €
|
3 261 449 €
|
|
Guinea
|
5 years
(1.1.2004-31.12.2008)
|
Mixed FA
|
3 400 000 €
|
1 400 000 €
targeted actions
|
|
Guinea- Bissau
|
4 years
(16.6.2007—15.6.2011)
|
Mixed FPA
|
7 000 000 €
|
35 %
|
|
Kiribati
|
6 years
(16.9.2006 – 15.9.2012)
|
Tuna FPA
|
478 400 €
|
30 % to be increased to 40 % the first year, later to 60 %
|
|
Madagascar
|
6 years
(1.1.2007 – 31.12.2012)
|
Tuna FPA
|
1 197 000 €
|
80 %
|
|
Mauritania
|
2 years renewable
(1.8.2006 -31.7.2008)
|
Mixed FPA
|
86 000 000 €
|
11 000 000 €
|
|
Mauritius
|
4 years
(3.12.2003—2.12.2007)
|
Tuna FA
|
487 500 €
|
195 000 €
targeted actions
|
|
Micronesia
|
3 years
(26.2.2007 –25.2.2010)
|
Tuna FPA
|
559 000 €
|
18 %
|
|
Morocco
|
4 years
(28.2.2007-27.2.2011)
|
Mixed FPA
|
36 100 000 €
|
13 500 000 €
|
|
Mozambique
|
5 years
(1.1.2007 – 31.12.2011)
|
Tuna FPA
|
990 000 €
|
100 %
|
|
São Tomé and Principe
|
4 years
(1.6.2006 – 31.5.2010)
|
Tuna FPA
|
663 000 €
|
50 %
|
|
Seychelles
|
6 years
(18.1.2005 – 17.1.2011)
|
Tuna FPA
|
1 425 000 €.
from 2008: 5 355 000 €
|
36 %
|
|
Solomon Islands
|
3 years
(26.02.2007 –25.02.2010)
|
Tuna FPA
|
400 000 €
|
30 %
|
No protocol currently in force in Angola, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal
The following countries have fisheries agreements based on an exchange of access to resources, rather than financial compensation:
|
Country
|
Period
|
|
Faeroe Islands
|
2.2.2006-1.2.2012
|
|
Iceland
|
15.12.2003-14.12.2009
|
|
Norway
|
2003-2009
|
Figure 4 – Designated fishing area (2007/11)
Source for EEZ data: Flanders Marine Institute, VLIZ Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase. http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound/
The above figure shows the deepwater limit of fishing areas (black line) defined in the 2007/11 protocol set against the Mozambican EEZ. The coastal limit is defined as 12nm from the costal baseline (not illustrated). The coordinates used in the protocol appear to permit fishing under the Mozambican FPA in parts of French EEZs of Bassas da India (c,b)and Juan de Nova, at the same time prohibiting fishing in a substantial areas of Mozambique’s EEZ between these two and between the EEZs of Juan de Nova and the Comoros EEZ (a).
Annex 2 – Terms of Reference
Project Objectives
To examine the existing legal and practical parameters of mandates of each part, identify institutional competences
To give an overview of the overall policy sectorial context that pertains to EU engagement in fisheries.
To examine the social, economic and geopolitics interest of the EU and Mozambique
To expose few EU member states which have a huge dependency on exploiting Mozambican marine resource at the environmental expenses
To expose the subsidies practices linkages with transitions to sustainable fisheries and responsible fishing practices
Reposes the control of the natural resources and the trade dialogue
To improve the understanding of the linkages between marine resources in the coastal waters and deep waters
To contribute for basis to compensate the loses of the folk fisherman caused by the deep sea catches by the EU large vessels
To contribute to secure folk fisherman’s and other stakeholders food security, employment and livelihood
To facilitate the interactions between the negotiators and the folk fisherman in order to create a path for sustainable fishery agreements
To facilitate the engagement of the fisherman organizations in EU and ACP relations and EPAs negotiations
Expected deliverables
Economic justice Coalition will deliver the following:
Establish a Reference Group (RG). EJC will select national organisations and/or individuals to act as a Reference group on the basis of established linkages with the trade unions, fisherman organizations and other relevant popular social movements that’ll will provide the popular participatory outreach of the project. Both government and the UE representatives will be invited to join the RG.
Convene and coordinate meetings/consultants with the Researchers and the reference group and keep OWA updated
Planning the implementation of national report back workshop as provided in the implementation plan and budget
Coordinate participation of the researcher team and the reference group in the consultations meetings
Researchers
The Economic Justice Coalition and the Reference group have the responsibility of identifying and contracting experienced researcher/academics to undertake the researcher component of the project
The paper
Will be 50-60 pages in length, single-spaced with a comprehensive bibliography
Will discuss the main national development issues pertaining to the topic using accepted theoretical paradigms an analytical analysis
Will be presented in a manner that will allow a general audience to grasp key issues and foster a sound discussion of possible alternative solutions to the problems and challenges raised
Will explore and suggest mechanism to enrich and develop the concept of creative Policy making at national level through alternative development strategies
The study will give a compare analyse of different fisheries agreements celebrated by the EU in three regions: north Europe, Mediterranean countries and the sub Saharan countries. In the last region, the sub-Saharan deep analyse 2 agreements compared with the current EU – Mozambican on its social, economic impacts.
The author will play a leading role during report back and RG and contribute to efforts to draw conclusions from each one.
Methodology
The project is not a defensive response fishery agreements but a broad initiative to root an alternative development paradigm within the achievements and lessons draw from earlier agreements and with other countries. Within this perspective we do not counter pose the state role but rather focus on defining appropriate role of all stakeholders in fighting against poverty.
At the same time EJC coalition would like to locate this project within civil society participation in Cotonou Agreement. In this sense it is more than a study and more than just a process of desk researcher but a project that combines desk research, with participatory research process.
The study is rigorous based on sound research, which combines it combines a national survey, with sectorial illustration that punctures the claims of trade liberalisations as well as responding to key issues and concerns in relation to development, the rights of people and their welfare.
The EJC intends by this work to set up a dialogue on the fishing sector, searching to raise joint contributions and build up an agenda of dialogue among the stakeholders, to share information and “network,” and in this way, to empower the policy-makers, activists and other actors of the civil society so that their participation is much more proactive.
The fishing sector has a potential to support the economic growth and the combat against poverty. The Mozambican government has been negotiating fishing agreements with the European Union (EU) and one of the challenges is related to the formulation of suitable negotiation positions and securing environment diversity, and also set up a legal framework to assure development based on the people’s needs.
Part of these challenges can make the policy and decision-makers, legislators, producers, and fishermen to be involved. The agreements´ provisions should be respected by the contracting parties, taking into account especially what the Cotonou Agreement prescribes on the participation of non-state actors in the relations between the ACP and the EU, which should be applied on that context.
Yet as part of challenges one should take into consideration the international trade regime run by the WTO, where the country should show a certain dynamism and rapidity at that level, but without colliding with the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the SADC Protocol on trade or other regional arrangement, as well as the movements of offers and applications from countries involved in trade negotiations at those levels.
In order to make a study like this to be much more valued it should not disregard an analysis of technical barriers and trade effects as well as the SPS (sanitary and pithosanitary measures) both countrywide and the constraints they cause to Mozambican fishing exports.
In this way, one should consider the following chapters:
Fishing sector in the economy and its production and productivity capacity;
Genesis of the agreements;
Negotiation capacity between the parties;
Analysis of the agreements and their evolution;
The EU subsides to the fishing sector and its impact on the competition between local and European fleets;
Participation and partnership options;
New areas of research;
Political recommendations;
Within chapters one should also analyze the following points:
Check the link with national development plans;
Present the profile of the nature of agreements on the scope of other agreements that the EU celebrates with other countries;
The compensation: its nature, effects and alternatives to it;
Lifting of the agreement provisions fulfilment level between the contracting parties and its impact in the relations between them;
Tentative analysis and comparison of compensations in toto and the fleet activity revenues in Europe, including the contribution on the economy, employment, and primary services;
Consultations between the parties on the reason why the agreements were fulfilled or not fulfilled and what have they produced;
Analysis of the existing or non-existing conservation measures on the light of Biodiversity Convention;
Analyze the joint enterprises. Did they exist? What did they do? What is their value?
Analyze the Joint committee. Does it meet? What does it discuss? Which conclusions? What has changed from negative to positive and vice-versa?
Analyze the EU policies on fishing agreements;
Type of benefits Mozambique could search to celebrate:
– Compensation
– Reciprocal agreements (rights)
[1] NORAD: A Study of the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique. 2001
[3] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002
[5] CTA Agritrade: “ACP-EU fisheries relations: Executive Brief” 2007
[7] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[8] Poundstone, W. (1992) Prisoner’s Dilemma Doubleday, NY NY.
[9] WWF: Fair fishing deals 2006
[10] WWF: Fair fishing deals 2006
[11] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002
[13] European Commission: European Distant Water Fishing Fleet, Principles & Data 2001
[14] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002
[15] Pro rata calculation. The protocol period was 1 year, 9 months.
[16] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[19] Report of the 8th session of the scientific committee of the IOTC. 2004
[20] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[21] Council Regulation (EC) Nº 2792/1999
[22] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[23] Including policy support
[24] Estimate based on full uptake of fishing opportunities. The protocol stipulates different fees for large and small longliners and the profile of the fleet has been estimated.
[25] Estimate, based on actual uptake
[26] Estimate based on unconfirmed declaration of catch (2,000t)
[28] CFFA: Summary report of the contributions to the ACP E-consultation on IUU fishing issues. CTA 2005
[29] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007
[30] NORAD: A Study if the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique. 2001
[31] Ministerio das Pescas
[32] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[33] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002
[34] On basis of full uptake of fishing opportunities (which did not happen in 2007)
[35] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[36] Estimated on basis of global EC tuna sector indicators, taken from Megapesca: The European Tuna Sector Economic Situation, Prospects and Analysis of the Impact of Liberalisation of Trade. SC 12. 2005. Note that these values do NOT include added value and employment benefits from the processing industry
[37] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007
[38] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[39] Source: Ministry of Fisheries
[40] Beyond 12 miles and bounded by the coordinates set out in the protocol, illustrated in Figure 4, Annex 1
[41] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007
[42] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002
[44] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007
[45] Based on values in Megapesca: The European Tuna Sector Economic Situation, Prospects and Analysis of the Impact of Liberalisation of Trade. SC 12. 2005
[46] Economic Performance of Selected European Fishing Fleets, Annual Report 2005.
[47] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007
[48] WWF: The Promotion of Sustainable and Equitable Fisheries Access Agreements in the Western Indian Ocean Region. Dar es Salaam 2005
Researching&Reporting 