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Sumário Executivo

Constitui objectivo geral da pesquisa averiguar quais os Conceitos e Praticas Predominantes, Áreas de Intervenção Privilegiadas e Principais Impactos dos programas de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial implementados no âmbito da Industria Extractiva em Moçambique.
A Política de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial (PRSE), não é mandatário e permite que outras regras internacionais seja usadas e as multinacionais conciliam com a PRSE, e actuam na filantropia, investimento social, conservação ambiental, serviços básicos, formação superior, capacitação, formação técnico profissional e vocacional e assistência técnica a PMEs.
A PRSE deve ser complementada por outros instrumentos de regulação e o guião de implementação ainda está em preparação. Paralelamente, está em preparação a lei de conteúdo local e a PRSE sendo esta uma dimensão típica de conteúdo local. A sustentabilidade e as expectativas dos beneficiárias, são resolvidas através de continua consulta e participação.
As multinacionais tem maior pujança (pessoal e recursos) contrário não acontece com os parceiros locais, o que põe em causa a sustentabilidade a todos os níveis e sectores. Mesmo assim, a sustentabilidade é garantida pela intervenção do governo e dos beneficiários.
No ano de 2015, as OSCs tem uma oportunidade para acompanhar e influenciar não só o surgimento de futuros instrumentos legais que irão guiar a PRSE e a lei de conteúdo local.
A RSE e o capital humano, operacionaliza o conteúdo local. Porém, as PMEs ocupam um lugar de destaque e se propõe por sua vez, critérios de avaliação periódica e regulação de RSE.
As OSCs que se interessarem em participar nos processos de seguimento de PRSE Conteúdo Local ou Participação Nacional devem faze-lo apaixonadamente e visionária e procurar que o sector da industria tenha uma forte liderança, responsável, transparente e obedecendo boa governação. E que o sector siga uma caminho mais desafiador de industrialização para o desenvolvimento.

Introdução e contexto

Objectivos
Constitui objectivo geral da pesquisa averiguar quais os Conceitos e Praticas Predominantes, Áreas de Intervenção Privilegiadas e Principais Impactos dos programas de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial implementados no âmbito da Industria Extractiva em Moçambique.

(ii) Objectivos Específicos;

Em particular, a pesquisa deve produzir conhecimento consistente sobre os seguintes assuntos:
a) O que diz a Politica da Responsabilidade Social Empresarial moçambicana, vis-à-vis instrumentos internacionais de referência sobre a matéria?

b) Que tipo de intervenções consideradas de Responsabilidade Social têm sido privilegiadas pelas empresas que implementam projectos extractivos em Moçambique?

c) Que processos de consulta são seguidas pelas empresas até decidirem implementar uma determinada actividade no âmbito da sua responsabilidade social?

d) Qual a proximidade ou distância entre este tipo de intervenções e aquelas preconizadas pela Politica de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial em vigor em Moçambique?

e) Que medidas são tipicamente tomadas para garantir a sustentabilidade destas iniciativas de responsabilidade social empresarial?

f) Qual é, de um modo geral, a apreciação que o governo faz da maioria das iniciativas empresariais de responsabilidade social (sua relevância socioeconómica, sua localização, sua sustentabilidade, etc).

(iii) Metodologia;

O pesquisa foi realizado em três momentos seguidos e distintos que são: levantamento, revisão e preparação; entrevistas; e compilação do relatório e validação. Os três momentos serão ainda apoiados por observação do sector da industria extractiva. A Pesquisa se beneficiou da realização da Cimeira de Gás que ocorreu em Maputo de 3 a 5 de Dezembro.
Foi feito um levantamento de referências
Analise da literatura e das referências levantadas
Revisão dos termos de referência (aprofundamento dos objectivos específicos) e da metodologia.

(iv) Resultados Esperados

Um relatório da pesquisa em Português (entre 15 a 20 páginas), com um sumário executivo, cujas conclusões e recomendações deverão ser discutidas com o SEKELEKANI ao longo do calendário de implementação da pesquisa.

O relatório deverá incorporar os anexos de todas as constatações ou evidencias consideradas relevantes no apuramento da realidade actual, ilustrativa da qualidade, oportunidade, utilidade pública e sustentabilidade da lista de iniciativas de responsabilidade social empresarial que tiver coberto durante a pesquisa.

O relatório deve formular de forma estruturada e consistente as principais constatações da pesquisa, conclusões e recomendações, incluindo:

Breve descrição do processo de pesquisa: (i) Introdução e contexto; (ii) Objectivos Gerais; (iii) Objectivos Específicos; (iv) Metodologia; (v) Resultados Esperados; (vi) Diferentes Secções ou partes; (vii) Conclusões e Recomendações.

1. Contextualização: panorama económico

Moçambique manteve em 2013 uma taxa média de crescimento que vinha registando nos anos anteriores acima de 7% , apesar de um ambiente económico global desfavorável, a economia de Moçambique regista um impressionante crescimento do PIB. Os principais determinantes desse desempenho notável incluem factores nacionais e internacionais, tais como políticas macroeconómicas sólidas, uma redução significativa da taxa de inflação, reformas estruturais, uma abertura para a economia global, e estabilidade política, bem como o rápido crescimento das exportações estimulado por um grande volume de Investimento Directo Estrangeiro (IDE), melhoria dos termos comerciais e um enorme fluxo de ajuda externa.

É grande, a preocupação que o diferentes intervenientes de desenvolvimento várias vezes levantam, e se a riqueza mineral recém-descoberta não for gerida de forma adequada e sucumbir à chamada doença holandesa . Sendo que devido aos recursos naturais as receitas podem crescerem e fortalecer o Metical em relação as outras moedas estrangeiras, encarecerem as exportações e assim tornando-os menos competitivos no mercado.

Se Moçambique sofresse desta doença económica, a bênção aparente dos recursos naturais recém-descobertos, seria, para outros sectores da economia, uma maldição. Alguns vêem a proposta de utilizar as receitas de indústrias extractivas para a diversificação das exportações como um antídoto contra a doença holandesa. Investir em sectores alternativos de exportação o que pode ajudar a sustentar o crescimento e diversificar o risco, com vista a maximizar a criação de emprego e redução da pobreza, a fim de que os recursos naturais não renováveis sejam mais uma bênção do que uma maldição.

Porém, apesar das altas taxas de crescimento, Moçambique ainda está entre os países mais pobres do mundo, com um PIB per capita de US$650 em 2012 . Através de uma classificação, está entre os mais pobres dos pobres: Moçambique se classificou a 178ª posição de 187 países em 2013 no Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano do PNUD . Após uma redução significativa na incidência da pobreza alcançada no final de 1990 e início de 2000, a redução da pobreza parece ter desacelerado e mais de metade da população ainda vive abaixo da linha da pobreza nacional. A desigualdade de renda, medida pelo alto coeficiente de Gini é 0,41) continua a ser um problema.

1.1 O crescimento e o emprego

Uma das principais falhas no crescimento económico de Moçambique tem sido a criação de empregos. De acordo com o EDIC 2014 Moçambique tem uma alta taxa de crescimento populacional de 2,8%, o país deve acomodar cerca de 300.000 jovens no mercado de trabalho a cada ano, este numero é impressionante tendo em conta que se as políticas e plano de desenvolvimento, que no geralmente duram 4 a 5 anos devem incluir provisões para acomodar mais de 1 milhão de trabalhadores, se tal não for cuidado a relevância desses planos estará em causa. As altas taxas de crescimento económico que são estimuladas principalmente por projectos de capital intensivo ainda têm de gerar muitos empregos. E ainda o mesmo estudo, revela que a taxa de desemprego é de 27%, e a economia formal representa apenas um terço do emprego total.
A necessidade mais premente de Moçambique para já e para o futuro próximo é de garantir que a criação de novas oportunidades de emprego mantenham o ritmo de crescimento com o tamanho da expansão do mercado de trabalho. Esta é uma meta para a qual o comércio, o investimento e, principalmente, os mega projectos de energia devem contribuir, contudo ainda não atingiram a força e o impulso necessários.

As tendências recentes oferecem um incentivo limitado apenas. Sendo verdade que, por um lado, os mega projectos e outros novos investimentos no país têm criado novas oportunidades de emprego. De acordo com o Centro de Promoção de Investimentos (CPI), mais de 1000 novos projectos de investimento foram aprovados durante os anos 2010-2013, no valor de US $12,5 bilhões (Godinho 2014) no capital estrangeiro com o potencial de criar 110 mil novos empregos.

A falta de mão-de-obra qualificada representa uma séria limitação na capacidade do país para aproveitar ao máximo as oportunidades que são apresentadas pelos novos mega projectos. Isto pode ser visto, por exemplo, pela necessidade de trazer mão-de-obra qualificada e até mesmo semi-qualificada de fora do país, a fim de construir as instalações de Gás Natural Liquefeito (GNL). Esta é uma dura realidade que pode gerar ressentimentos por parte dos jovens moçambicanos que se encontram desempregados. O “efeito” mais positivo sobre esta observação é que há altos índices de demanda por pessoal qualificado em Moçambique e, consequentemente, o retorno sobre o investimento na educação também é elevado. Moçambique corre, portanto, menos risco de sofrer de uma fuga de cérebros do que muitos outros países em desenvolvimento. Na verdade, o inverso também pode acontecer.

1.2 A corrupção

A corrupção é um problema persistente em muitos países em desenvolvimento, impondo uma gama de encargos para as empresas, cidadãos e até mesmo para o estado. Estes incluem o aumento dos custos para as empresas legítimas, diminuição de receitas para o governo, distribuição deficiente e não equitativa dos serviços públicos, uma reputação internacional má para o país, e uma crescente percepção de que o país não está aberto ao comércio e ao investimento.

No entanto, grau de corrupção mostra que Moçambique não está na pior posição, mas que o seu registo não deixa de ser alarmante. Em 2013, Moçambique estava no 119º lugar entre 177 países na lista do Índice de Percepção de Corrupção (IPC) compilado pela Transparência Internacional. A tendência também não é favorável: em 2004, Moçambique estava na concorrência com outros seis países para o 90º lugar na lista do IPC. A corrupção continua a ser um grave problema que ameaça sufocar o investimento estrangeiro e roubar o país de ganhos da produção e expansão dos investimentos (EDIC 2014).
Algum progresso está a ser feito em relação a ética publica, pelo menos em termos formais. A Lei da Probidade Pública (nº 16/2012) aprovada em 2012, juntamente com a Lei de Protecção a Testemunhas (nº 15/2012), coloca as ferramentas necessárias no seu devido lugar. Moçambique também tem atingido plena adesão a Iniciativa de Transparência nas Indústrias Extractivas (EITI), e foi declarado em conformidade com as suas normas.

2. A Responsabilidade Social Empresarial: conceitos e antecedentes

Tem que se dar razão a Thomsen B, que diz que, concorda com Votow “responsabilidade social corporativa significa algo, mas nem sempre a mesma coisa para todo mundo “(em Crane et all, 2008). Tudo indica que ele estava certo, pois passam mais de 5 décadas e a RSE gerou e tem gerado em ampla variedade de discursos. E os entrevistados e a literatura consultada das empresas que actuam em Moçambique mostra esta variedade, reforçam esta tendência, e ainda o alinham com outras abordagens tais como o conteúdo local e a participação nacional.

Historicamente, a Responsabilidade Social Empresarial (RSE) iniciou como sendo meros e pontuais actos de ajuda ou solidariedade, mas com o andar de tempo tomou muitas direcções. Começando como um mero elemento filantrópico, onde uma empresa tipicamente suporta um bom caso com uma doação, tem crescido para se tornar um conceito mais amplo, que também leva em consideração temas como a social, ambiental, ética e de intervenientes.

Porém, a avaliação tradicional de desempenho empresarial começaram a incluir informações de desempenho em factores não financeiros. E sendo assim, maior atenção neste momento inclui-se a boa governação, transparência, impacto ambiental e ética corporativa. E em Moçambique paralelamente a adopção de instrumentos para orientar a RSE está se desenvolver instrumentos para orientar o conteúdo local e participação nacional.

A. A Política de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial (PRSE) para a Industria Extractiva de Recursos Minerais

Moçambique aprovou a PRSE para a Industria Extractiva de Recursos Minerais através da resolução nº21/2014, vis-à-vis instrumentos internacionais de referência sobre a matéria, a política está baseada no principio de alinhamento com as Normas, Convenções e Estratégias Internacionais e Regionais. Esta política defende que a sua interpretação e aplicação não permite o uso de normas, convenções e estratégias regionais e internacionais sobre a matéria.

Sendo assim, o Conceito de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial, para efeitos desta política é adoptado a Norma ISO26000, da Organização Internacional de Normalização, definido como:

“A responsabilidade de uma organização pelos impactos das suas decisões e actividades na sociedade e no meio ambiente, através de um comportamento transparente e ético, que:
– contribua para um desenvolvimento sustentável, incluindo a saúde e o bem-estar da sociedade;
– tenha em consideração as expectativas das partes interessadas;
– esteja em conformidade com a legislação aplicável e seja consistente com as normas internacionais de conduta; e
– esteja integrado com toda a organização e seja praticado nas suas relações.”

A Política de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial da Industria Extractiva se enquadra, por sua vez na Resolução nº89/2013 de 31 de Dezembro, que aprova a Política e a Estratégia dos Recursos Minerais. Este instrumento assegura a implementação de acções de responsabilidade social do sector empresarial envolvido em actividade mineira e petrolífera. E define que estrategicamente deve-se elaborar a política de RSE para industria extractiva; assegurar que os contrato e empreendimentos mineiros e petrolíferos incluam acções de RSE; e assegurem que as acções de RSE sejam devidamente integradas em planos locais de desenvolvimento.

Ao abordar as acções no âmbito de Licenciamento e Contrato, aquela resolução determina que se deve regulamentar sobre os compromissos no âmbito da RSE e sobre o envolvimento das comunidades, com base em directrizes da políticas de responsabilidade social empresarial; definir as modalidades para o enquadramento das acções de responsabilidade social empresarial em planos de desenvolvimento locais; e definir critérios de avaliação periódica da implementação das acções de responsabilidade social empresarial contidas nos contratos e memorandos de entendimento.
E finalmente encorajar as empresas mineiras e petrolíferas, no âmbito da sua responsabilidade social empresarial, a promoverem juntos dos seus trabalhadores e comunidades o uso de técnicas melhoradas de construção de habitações usando matérias localmente disponíveis.

O Conteúdo Local ou Participação Nacional
A Política de Responsabilidade Social da Industria Extractiva está ligada com conteúdo local ou participação nacional – ainda persiste esta dualidade entre o Governo e a ANADARKO que prefere usar a ultima designação. Porém , quando o Governo aprovar a referida lei tudo será esclarecido.

A maximização dos ganhos decorrentes de actividade extractiva através de geração de emprego e de rendimentos, e a estimulação de produção e desenvolvimento tecnológico são as razões que levaram o Governo a mandatar a Direcção Nacional de Estudos e Análise de Políticas do Ministério de Plano e Desenvolvimento para prepara um instrumento legal sobre o conteúdo local.
A proposta do MPD para a elaboração de um instrumento legal sobre o conteúdo local se fundamenta pelo facto de este poder permitir a participação activa de todos os intervenientes da industria extractiva na cadeia de produção e pelo potencial de gerar inúmeros benefícios em toda economia com maior ênfase no desenvolvimento do empresariado.
Desta forma, a necessidade de um papel activo do Governo nos próximos 5 anos para a criação da capacidade nacional, responder a demanda futura e tornar o instrumento de conteúdo local implementável. O que poderá permitir massificar a promoção das Pequenas Médias Empresas e Pequenas Médias e Micro Empresas (PMES/PMMEs).

Países como a Noruega, Brasil, Trinidad e Tobago, Cazaquistão, Indonésia, Malásia, Nigéria, Papua Nova Guiné, Venezuela, Angola, Rússia e Timor-Leste produtores de petróleo e gás adoptaram instrumentos legais sobre o conteúdo local.

O fornecimento de bens através do Conteúdo Local na Tailândia partiu de 0% para 54% até ano 2000, na Índia 50% depois de 3 anos, 70% depois de 5 anos e na China 40% a 90% dependendo do ano e do produto.

Prós e Contra a adopção de um Instrumento Legal sobre o Conteúdo Local

O fortalecimento da demanda direccionada ao Mercado doméstico, a expansão do emprego, a diversificação do sector industrial, o desenvolvimento de sectores intensivos em tecnologia e com elevado potencial de crescimento constituem argumentos a favor.

Enquanto que entre os argumentos contra são: a política limita os sectores beneficiados de se tornar mais competitivos em relação aos fornecedores estrangeiros; a tendência de redução do investimento em pesquisa e desenvolvimento e inovação; e o desincentivo para novos investimentos pelos investidores estrangeiros no país.

Porém os argumentos contra o conteúdo local desfavorecem em grande medida a primeira abordagem de conteúdo local que coloca ênfase no empresariado nacional e força de trabalho nacional.

E a Direcção de Nacional de Estudos e Análise da Políticas do Ministério de Plano e Desenvolvimento (MPD) considera os 2 seguintes conceitos:

O desenvolvimento de habilidades locais através do uso de empresas dos nacionais para a produção e fornecimento de bens e serviços e que construção de uma força de trabalho capacitada é uma base de fornecedores (oferta) competitivos nacionais; e
a perspectiva de incorporação de matérias primas e serviços locais. Quando uma empresa produz bens num país e todas ou parte das matérias-primas usadas forem produzidas no país e não importadas. E neste caso, não importa a origem da empresa mas sim o uso dos factores de produção nacionais.

Sendo assim, a adopção de um instrumento legal de conteúdo local poderá se basear numa combinação dos dois conceitos. E assim, O conteúdo local não só deve tomar em consideração o sector real da economia como também deve dinamizar o sector
financeiro.

Contudo, a adopção da segunda abordagem tem como pré-requisitos fundamentais, seja O fortalecimento do Instituto Nacional de Normalização e Qualidade para certificação, acreditação, definição dos parâmetros de conteúdo local a ser incorporado na produção de bens e serviços. A criação de uma instituição independente para monitoria e fiscalização do cumprimento dos parâmetros estabelecidos de modo a garantir a efectividade do instrumento de conteúdo local.

Como marco legal, a duvida surge, que tipo de instrumento será adoptado: uma política, um lei/decreto ou regulamento?

Os países que desenharam uma política ou estratégia que serviria de guião para as acções mais específicas do conteúdo local e/ou introduziram regulamentos que serviram de marco operacional tanto para o Governo como para as companhias petrolíferas.

A Noruega, Brasil, Trinidad e Tobago, Angola, Gana adoptaram uma política. Enquanto que a Nigéria é um dos poucos países que adoptou um decreto. Sendo assim, o Governo de Moçambique defende que é importante a adopção de um instrumento legal sobre o conteúdo local. Os instrumentos sobre o conteúdo local adoptados nos diferentes países foram, na maioria das vezes, exclusivamente para o sector de recursos minerais, hidrocarbonetos e petróleo.

O instrumento legal que for elaborado sobre o conteúdo local em Moçambique deve ser abrangente, e numa primeira fase com maior enfoque para os sectores de recursos minerais, hidrocarbonetos, petróleo e construção.

Porém, devem ser feitas análises isoladas para os outros sectores da economia. Devido existência de muitas especificidades entre os diferentes sectores de actividade, o que cria uma grande complexidade.

E a definição de metas/parâmetros de uso de matérias-primas locais não devem ser uniformes para os diferentes sectores.

A necessidade reforçar o papel das PMEs/PMMEs na industria extractiva tanto a montante como a jusante é um dos elos de ligação com a Política de Responsabilidade Social da Industria Extractiva, o conteúdo local e a participação nacional. Por outro lado, a responsabilidade social das PMEs/PMMEs deve ser reforçada, não apenas através de filantropia ou investimento social, mas também pelo respeito dos direitos dos trabalhadores, ética, protecção do meio ambiente. Este reforço pode ser feito não só pelas multinacionais e empresas através de medidas compulsivas mas pelas organizações da sociedade civil através de campanhas de consciencialização.

B. Alguns casos de práticas de RSE em Moçambique

Nesta secção se descreve um apanhado do levantamento das práticas de responsabilidade social em Moçambique e para tal foi escolhido 4 companhias diferentes mas que actuam na industria extractiva, o Projecto Ncondezi que possui também capitais do governo, a Vale uma multinacional de grande porte, a Anadarko que é responsável pela exploração de gás natural que poderá ter um grande impacto em Moçambique e a Eni também uma multinacional que actua em toda cadeia de produção petróleo e gás.

3. O Projecto Ncondezi

É um projecto de geração de energia com recurso carvão térmico, estrategicamente localizado na Província de Tete, que é capaz de suportar uma operação de longa vida, mineração a céu aberto e usina.

3.1 Responsabilidade Social Empresarial

Boa cidadania corporativa é parte integrante da forma Ncondezi opera. Responsabilidades ambientais, sociais, de saúde e segurança são uma prioridade para Ncondezi em todos os aspectos do seu negócio.

A política de responsabilidade social corporativa de Ncondezi (“CSR”) foi concebida para promover projectos de desenvolvimento social que facilitam o desenvolvimento sustentável e incidem sobre o envolvimento da comunidade. Ncondezi adere aos Princípios do Equador, os padrões de desempenho da IFC e com exigências legais moçambicanas.

3.2 Avaliações de Impacto Socio Ambiental

O Projecto Ncondezi completou uma Avaliação de Impacto Socio ambiental (“AIAS”) tanto da mina e da usina, que foram compilados para atender tanto a legislação Moçambique e exigências internacionais de melhores práticas.

A avaliação teve dois resultados: um abrangente Quadro da Política de Reassentamento e um plano de reassentamento preliminar focando nas famílias potencialmente afectados de duas comunidades.

3.3 Plano de Desenvolvimento Social

A três anos Plano de Desenvolvimento Social (SDP) está sendo implementado em jeito de parceria público privada (PPP) com o Governo e as comunidades locais que participam activamente. O SDP vai beneficiar as comunidades locais no Projecto Ncondezi, o Distrito de Moatize e outras comunidades. Foi atribuído um orçamento total de US$2 milhões e cerca de US$340.000 foram gastos em projectos sociais em 2012.

Os objectivos da SDP incluem:
Contribuir para o desenvolvimento sustentável em Moçambique em parceria com o Governo de Moçambique nos esforços de desenvolvimento; e
Criar oportunidades de compartilhar o sucesso da Ncondezi com as comunidades locais.
O SDP é composta por 10 iniciativas sociais e é o resultado de uma ampla consulta das partes interessadas.

O Governo tem descrito SDP de Ncondezi como um “… modelo incomparável de PPP que atende as aspirações do governo e do povo de Moçambique, que deve ser imitado por outras empresas …” Manuel Guimarães, administrador do distrito de Moatize , 1 de Novembro de 2012

Os projectos sociais sendo implementadas durante 2013, a um custo de US $ 340.000, incluem:
• Financiamento 4 alunos de pós-graduação para estudar Geologia e Engenharia de Minas, em Coimbra, Portugal
• Reabilitação clínica em Mameme 2
• Ambulância por Ncondezi Ceta
• Apoio Institucional para distrito
• Kit médico para Ncondezi Ceta
• Dois furos de água para Ncondezi Ceta
• Programa Educativo de Água e saneamento
• Campanha Provincial de Alfabetização de Adultos
• Regime de apoio agrícola

4. A Vale Moçambique
A Vale está em Moçambique desde 2004, quando ganhou uma concorrência internacional para a exploração de uma das maiores bacias carboníferas do mundo, situada no Distrito de Moatize, na Província de Tete. Em 2007, a Vale assinou o contrato de concessão, em seguida inaugurou a construção da mina de carvão de Moatize e, um ano depois, em 2011, a produção foi iniciada.

As operações em Moçambique estão concentradas na mina de carvão de Moatize, na operação da Linha Ferroviária de Sena e no Terminal de Carvão Cais 8, bem como nos projectos de expansão de Moatize e do Corredor Nacala. Ao todo, são 17.320 empregados no país, sendo 87% moçambicanos.

A mina de carvão de Moatize possui uma capacidade nominal de 11 milhões de toneladas por ano de carvão metalúrgico e térmico. As operações são realizadas em uma área de concessão de 23.780 hectares, dos quais 16 mil são utilizados. No segundo ano de operação, a mina produziu cerca de 4 milhões de toneladas, das quais 3 milhões foram transportados pela Linha Ferroviária de Sena e exportados pelo Porto da Beira. No terceiro trimestre de 2014, a mina produziu 1,296 milhão de toneladas.
A capacidade de produção da mina será duplicada para 22 milhões de toneladas no fim de 2015, quando será concluído o Projecto de Expansão de Moatize.

4.1 Responsabilidade Social Empresarial

A Vale tem investido em actividades de promoção do desenvolvimento social e económico, com destaque para a formação profissional, a contratação de PMEs locais, investimentos em projectos de geração de renda e em acções de sustentabilidade. Pelo sétimo ano consecutivo, a Vale publica o Relatório de Sustentabilidade para mostrar o compromisso com a transparência e os avanços e desafios nessa agenda e os resultados apresentados no relatório são agrupados em três grandes pilares: Pessoas, Planeta e Criação de Valor.

Em 2013, no global aonde opera (Austrália, Brasil, Canada, China, Oman, Indonésia, Japão, Moçambique, e Nova Caledónia) a Vale aplicou US$1,280 bilhões em sustentabilidade, 21% em acções sociais e 79% em projectos ambientais. Cerca de US$6 bilhões é o valor que foi investindo no desenvolvimento e implantação de processos inovadores para o aproveitamento de minérios até então não utilizados devido ao baixo teor de ferro. É a “terceira onda da mineração”, mais eficiente e tecnológica. Das 33 metas estabelecidas no Plano de Acção em Sustentabilidade (PAS), 29 foram alcançadas, um percentual de sucesso de quase 90%. (Vale 2014)

4.2 As comunidades

A Vale tem o compromisso de respeitar e compreender as comunidades próximas a suas operações e projectos, incluindo sua diversidade cultural, e apoiar o seu desenvolvimento sócio económico, deixando para elas um legado positivo.

Em 2013, foi aperfeiçoado a aplicação do Modelo de “Issues and Stakeholders” que orienta o planeamento de investimentos sociais a longo prazo. Já aplicada em dez estados do Brasil, o modelo foi levado também para Moçambique. Foram 122 mil pessoas de povos indígenas e comunidades tradicionais que foram beneficiadas por acções da Vale.

Foi destinado cerca de US$ 3 milhões, em acções de combate à malária desenvolvidas por instituições em Moçambique e no Malawi. Em 2013, a Vale tornou-se signatária do Fundo Global de Luta contra a HIV&SIDA, Tuberculose e Malária, apoiado pela ONU. E 63% é o índice global de contratação local, dois pontos percentuais acima na comparação com 2012.

Cerca de US$415 milhões foram destinados a financiamentos e créditos por meio do Inove, que é um programa de desenvolvimento de fornecedores locais da Vale. Por outro lado, o programa Acreditar, capacita trabalhadores em Moçambique, e cerca de 1,3 mil pessoas foram formadas pela Vale em Moçambique entre 2012 e 2013. A iniciativa permitiu a elevação da qualificação profissional local, já que os formados poderão actuar como agentes multiplicadores e transferir para outras pessoas o conhecimento adquirido. O nível de contratação local da Vale em Moçambique é superior a 80%.

4.3 Saúde e Segurança

Para a Vale, a vida é mais importante do que a produção e, por isso, investe em políticas e procedimentos elaborados para minimizar riscos e proteger vidas. Durante os dias de reflexão, é disseminado internamente o conceito do Cuidado Activo Genuíno, que tem como princípio a interdependência em saúde e segurança e significa cuidar de si próprio, cuidar do outro e permitir que os outros cuidem de terceiros.

4.4 Áreas Protegidas e Biodiversidade

Da concepção até o fechamento de uma mina, a Vale busca a conservação da biodiversidade e o uso sustentável dos serviços ecossistêmicos. Um dos destaques desse trabalho é a manutenção de áreas naturais, que contribuem para o equilíbrio ambiental, para a conservação dos recursos naturais e para a captura e o armazenamento de gases causadores do efeito estufa (GEE). Também utilizam tecnologias que visam à recuperação efectiva das áreas degradadas e a sua transformação para o uso colectivo.

A Vale tem um compromisso de contribuir para a conservação e uso sustentável da biodiversidade e dos serviços ecossistêmicos, promovendo o engajamento com comunidades, governos e actores relevantes nesse desafio. A estratégia em biodiversidade baseia-se na adopção de boas práticas através de Planos de Gestão e contínuos investimentos em inovação e tecnologia.

4.5 Reconhecimentos

Pelo 4º ano consecutivo, a Vale foi listada no Índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (ISE/Bovespa). A Vale obteve a maior pontuação de transparência entre as empresas da América Latina na avaliação do questionário do Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) integrando pela quarta vez o índice CDLI (Climate Disclosure Leadership Index). A Vale está entre as 20 empresas com melhores práticas ambientais no Brasil, de acordo com o Premio Época Empresa Verde. A Vale recebeu o Selo Verde do Premio sócio ambiental Chico Mendes, concedido pelo Instituto Internacional de Pesquisa e Responsabilidade Sócio ambiental Chico Mendes

5. A Anadarko

A Anadarko, segundo as suas fontes, está empenhada em conduzir os seus negócios da maneira certa. Ao gerenciar e operar os activos em todo o mundo de uma maneira consistente com valores fundamentais de protecção da saúde e segurança, e para cumprir com saúde aplicável, a segurança e as leis ambientais, normas e padrões internacionais.

A Anadarko, busca continuamente formas de melhorar operações nas áreas de saúde, segurança e meio ambiente. Isto foi evidenciado quando Anadarko ganhou Certificação LEED e designação ENERGY STAR da EPA para os esforços de conservação de energia em sua sede e outras instalações.

A cultura da segurança em primeiro lugar é um modo de vida em Anadarko. Sempre que realiza um novo projecto, trabalha para entender as considerações ambientais e culturais locais. Fundamentalmente para a nossa filosofia de funcionamento é o compromisso de adesão com os mais rigorosos padrões: o estado individual ou regulamentos do país, as nossas próprias políticas e princípios, ou normas internacionais do sector.

5.1 Gestão da Água

Anadarko reconhece que a gestão eficaz da água e conservação da água são essenciais para o desenvolvimento de todos os recursos energéticos para o nosso mundo. A disponibilidade de água combinado com diferentes demandas municipais, industriais, agrícolas e outras afecta governos, empresas e indivíduos em muitas partes do mundo. Anadarko respeita água como um recurso natural, e sempre que possível, recicla a água em nossos processos.

5.2 Envolvimento da Comunidade

Anadarko está empenhada em realizar melhor a exploração e produção da empresa, e igualmente empenhado em ser parte integrante das comunidades onde actua, através do envolvimento de voluntários e contribuições para organizações sem fins lucrativos.

6. Impactos de projectos de responsabilidade social e empresarial

Na secção anterior foram descritas actividades de 4 companhias da industria extractiva, porém a sua escolha foi aleatória e nem se pretendeu desvalorizar outras iniciativas de RSE de demais companhias não menos importantes tais como a Eni, Kenmare ou a Companhia de Hidrocarbonetos de Moçambique (CMH)

Aquelas iniciativas tem vários impactos, como é o caso da Vale em Moatize que influenciou a configuração das relações económicas e sociais, tanto no Município de Moatize, com menos de 30 mil habitantes, como na capital da Província, a Cidade de Tete, como 155 870 habitantes. De acordo com o levantamento (Mosca e Selemane 2011) a Vale em Moatize absorvia 3 008 trabalhadores, sendo 2 684 nacionais e 324 estrangeiros. E no geral verificou-se ainda que entre a 2013 foram criados de 4418 a 12 725 trabalhadores (DNM 2009) industria mineira
Enquanto que as actividades de filantropia e de responsabilidade social aumentam em vários lugares aonde ocorrem os investimentos, as instituições públicas são obrigados a acompanha-los e de preferência em todo o ciclo (planificação, implementação, monitoria e avaliação). Contudo, aquelas instituições continuam na mesma, ou seja, com falta de pessoal capacitado e recursos de vária ordem, o não ajustamento da capacidades e a estagnação institucional face às novas exigências e comparativamente as capacidades dos investidores, ficam em situações delicadas e tornam-se parceiros diminuídos das multinacionais. Uma situação similar se verifica até entre as companhias e as universidades nas negociações de programas de educação superior.
O impacto e a sustentabilidade só pode ser garantido pela continua participação de todos tanto as companhias, das autoridades locais e dos beneficiários sejam as comunidades, as escolas e os agentes de saúde, a todos os níveis e esta articulação não se realiza.

7. A Participação Nacional no Projecto de Gás Natural Liquefeito

7.1 Anadarko

Princípios Orientadores para a Participação Nacional Moçambique e Anadarko no projecto de gás liquefeito de Moçambique se baseiam numa Visão Comum que inclui:

• Contribuir para melhorar a Assistência Social honrando compromissos em Moçambique;

• Estabelecimento de rigorosas Avaliações dos impactos, baseados em risco, do ambiente, social e de saúde (ESHIA);

• Alinhamento com boas práticas internacionais (Princípios de Equador e Padrões de desempenho do Internacional Financial Corporations);

• Em trabalhar com a mão de obra nacional e seus negócios para se beneficiar do Projecto GNL;

• No Desenvolvimento de um currículo de Engenharia Petrolífera na UEM; e

• Expansão da reputação de Moçambique como um país atraente para se investir.

Desta forma para o projecto de desenvolvimento de gás, a participação nacional se verifica quando há contratação de mão de obra nacional, formação de força de trabalho, aquisição local de bens e serviços e envolvimento local de negócios

7.1.1 Antecedentes de participação nacional

Em Moçambique os antecedentes de participação nacional com o envolvimento da Anadarko, já tem cerca de 3 anos

Ano 2014

Foi criada a função de Gestor de Participação Nacional e a estratégia de Participação Nacional foi aprovada.
A Anadarko continua a ajudar as empresas nos processos de “due diligence” legais, realiza estudos de financiamento para as PMEs, ajuda no processo de facturação e a AMA1 realiza mais eventos de informação ao fornecedores da Beira, Tete, Nampula, Nacala e Quelimane.
O Documento de Estratégia de Participação Nacional apresentado ao governo, foi aprovado e publicado. Ainda neste ano Planos de Participação Nacional de 3 empreiteiros avaliados e classificados.

Ano 2013

Iniciou o desenvolvimento e formação de PMEs através da criação da base de dados de fornecedores, realização do processo de “due diligence”, e consciencialização de fornecedores em Pemba e Maputo

Foram desenvolvidas instruções para 3 possíveis empreiteiros na formulação dos seus planos de Participação Nacional como parte do concurso comercial do EPC. A Participação Nacional é obrigatória para ser elegível no concursos. E foi feito o esboço do documento de estratégia de Plano Nacional.

Em 2012, foram desenvolvidos os indicadores de Painel mensal para a Participação Nacional

Entre 2011-2012, foi feito o estudo de base de capacidades de PMEs em Moçambique pela Pyxera & LCS.

7.1.2 Estratégia de Participação Nacional da Anadarko

A estratégia de participação nacional da ANADARKO pretende: promover negócios, alinhar-se com as políticas do Governo, cumprir as obrigações legais sobre a participação nacional, formar cidadãos moçambicanos, recrutar e capacitar moçambicanos , e envolver fornecedores locais e comprar localmente, envolver demais interessados, executar e monitorar planos de participação nacional nos contratos principais.

A Estratégia de Participação Nacional do Projecto define os termos abrangentes por meio dos quais o Projecto contribuirá para o desenvolvimento e a consecução de uma base de dados industrial sustentável, em cada uma das diferentes fases do Projecto, com forte destaque para a formação e o desenvolvimento de capacidades, através do desenvolvimento de pequenas e médias empresas (PME).

7.1.3 O Papel da Participação Nacional durante a adjudicação de contrato

A Participação Nacional está incorporada na adjudicação dos três contratos principais do Projecto: Obras Iniciais, Offshore (no mar) e a Empreitada de Engenharia, Aprovisionamento e Construção (EPCC).

Como parte da proposta competitiva, para a adjudicação dos três principais contratos do projecto, os empreiteiros licitantes devem facultar uma projecção dos níveis realizáveis de participação nacional, na execução do contrato, assim como um plano detalhado de participação nacional.

7.1.4 A formação de cidadãos moçambicanos

Neste momento a Anadarko esta a apoiar um programa de mestrado em engenharia de petróleo que é ministrado pela Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.
Para além de formação em prontidão de trabalhar através de Viva bem e trabalhe bem em Afungi – Baía de Palma, enviou seus engenheiros e técnicos para formação na Europa, Reino Unido e Canada.
E ainda apoia do treinamento de PMEs através Pyxera Global para prepara-las para concursos.

E futuramente, irá formar artesãos liderada pelo construtor da fábrica de GNL, estabelecer centros de formação, trabalhar continuamente com os institutos de formação técnico profissional na preparação da força de trabalho para a construção faseada, investir na educação vocacional, secundaria e terciária, e continuar a apoiar o desenvolvimento de fornecedores com o Instituto de Promoção de Pequenas e Médias Empresas (IPEME).
7.1.5 O Recrutamento e capacitação de nacionais

O empreendimento irá precisar de 10 milhões de Homens/hora cumulativas com forte presença em postos altos e qualificados. Para tal será necessário um plano de nacionalização da força de trabalho que deverá orientar o estabelecimento de postos
para crescimento futuro e as expectativas claras de participação nacional com os subcontratadas.

7.1.6 O desenvolvimento de fornecedores locais e a aquisição local

Para desenvolver os fornecedores locais e contratados localmente serão realizados eventos Informativos para fornecedores em Maputo, Pemba, Beira, Tete, Nampula,
Nacala, Quelimane

Neste momento e futuramente esta sendo desenvolvido uma base de dados de Fornecedores e mais de 964 fornecedores foram identificados e registados até este momento, o que poderá suportar a construção do AMA1 e o inicio um processo de certificação de fornecedores

A Formação/aconselhamento irá responder a questões tais como “Como fazer negócios na Industria de Óleo e Gás”, “Due diligence” Legal e orientar na preparação de requerimentos para contratos e facturação
O Micro-financiamento irá estar disponível através de assinatura de Memorando de entendimento (MdE) com IPEME, para ajudar na identificação de provedores de serviços para as PMEs e orienta-las para serem elegíveis a contratos da Anadarko.

7.1.6 A visão de Participação Nacional do Projecto de GNL em Moçambique

A visão do Projecto para a Participação Nacional em Moçambique é de adoptar a perspectiva de investimento de capital a longo prazo e o desenvolvimento
de instalações e infra-estruturas de GNL em terra e indústrias associadas a jusante (downstream) e intermediárias (midstream). Assim como as despesas operacionais cumulativas na produção e processamento de gás, a oportunidade da criação progressiva de uma força de trabalho nacional sustentável e especializada e, uma indústria local e competente de fornecedores em Moçambique.

Adicionalmente, o Projecto, através dos seus empreiteiros, subempreiteiros e fornecedores, direccionará as oportunidades económicas, originadas pelo desenvolvimento da Participação Nacional, tanto quanto possível para os Distritos de Palma e de Mocímboa da Praia e a Província de Cabo Delgado, assim como ao longo de todo o país.

O Projecto está empenhado em aumentar a participação nacional em cada fase de desenvolvimento das instalações de GNL, à extensão máxima possível, sem comprometer os cronogramas de desenvolvimento ou os padrões de qualidade, saúde e segurança.

7.1.7 A Participação Nacional nos Contratos

Possivelmente estaremos perante a maior competição alguma vez vista no
mundo sobre a Participação Nacional de um único contrato de petróleo e gás

As instruções aos concorrentes ao EPC exige previsões múltiplas em 8 categorias de participação nacional, e um plano de participação nacional como parte da submissão do concurso. E trata-se de concursos semelhantes disponíveis para grandes contratos em terra e no alto-mar.

7.2 ENI

A Eni tem como missão:

Somos uma grande e integrada companhia de energia, comprometida com o crescimento através de actividades de descobrir, produzir, transportar, transformar e fazer o marketing de petróleo e gás. As mulheres e homens da Eni tem a paixão em desafios, melhoria contínua, excelência e, particularmente, valorizar as pessoas, o meio ambiente e à integridade.

7.2.1 Princípios Orientadores

A Eni adoptou um sistema de regulação para identificar papéis e responsabilidades para garantir sua funcionalidade e eficiência, de acordo com um quadro de referência que consiste em: requisitos legais, por leis, Código de Ética, Modelo 231, código de Governação Corporativa e COSO Report.

Cada componente desse sistema está integrado no Código de Ética da Companhia, que identifica os valores fundamentais, entre outros, da legitimidade formal e material da conduta dos membros dos órgãos sociais e todos os funcionários, a transparência da contabilidade e da difusão de uma mentalidade dirigido para o exercício do controle.

O Código de Governação Corporativa e soluções Eni, em 2012, o Conselho de Administração concluiu o processo de cumprimento do novo Código de Governo das Sociedades Cotadas.

O Código de Governo das Sociedades, juntamente com o Estatuto Social, regula as funções e relações entre os órgãos de administração da Companhia e controle, além de delinear os princípios gerais de transparência que devem ser respeitadas nas relações com os accionistas e ao mercado, enquanto descrevendo ainda as estruturas principais do sistema de controle e gestão de risco interno.

7.2.2 Gestão Responsável

Ser sustentável para uma empresa de energia, riscos gerenciamento e mitigação dos impactos de suas actividades operacionais, criando valor acrescentado para os seus intervenientes.

O Eni é inspirado por princípios de correcção, transparência, honestidade e integridade (como previsto no Código de Ética da empresa) e adoptou os mais altos padrões e directrizes internacionais na gestão de actividades em todos os contextos em que actuam.

O desenvolvimento do modelo de negócio da Eni tem como objectivo integrar os princípios e objectivos de sustentabilidade nas estratégias empresariais, também, a fim de favorecer o crescimento económico da empresa e o reforço da sua reputação.

A Eni está comprometida com a realização de acções destinadas a promover o respeito pelas pessoas e seus direitos, para o ambiente e, mais em geral, os interesses generalizados das comunidades em que actua através da criação de oportunidades para as pessoas e as empresas locais.
Moçambique, que é um novo operador na indústria, a maximização de conteúdo local é uma das prioridades da estratégia de cooperação com o País. Para cada concurso, uma análise de mercado a nível local é realizada a fim de maximizar o número de empresas moçambicanas adicionadas a lista de fornecedores da Eni, além disso, quando se trata de empresas internacionais quando considerado necessário, a Eni introduziu critérios de avaliação específicos que incluem respeito de um certo percentual de conteúdo local e um plano para o seu desenvolvimento.

7.2.3 Formação e educação

A Eni está a implementar um projecto de formação com uma filosofia de empresa sustentável e educação. O Projecto chama-se «Eni Professors@UEM» e tem como objectivos e actividades o seguinte:

• promover e compartilhar os valores da Eni;
• recrutar e seleccionar pessoal;
• desenvolver o know-how profissional, técnico e de gestão dos funcionários da Eni através de programas de formação; e
• desenvolver e implementar cooperação com o sistema educacional (escolas e universidades)

Neste projecto a Eni recebeu cerca de 2000 candidatos dos quais 150 foram seleccionados. Os seleccionados iniciaram a sua formação de 12 a 18 meses, começando localmente, seguirão para o curso básico na Itália (Petróleo e gás; saúde, segurança e ambiente; e competências sociais) e ainda na Itália serão sujeitos a um programa de formação avançada em reservas, exploração e perfuração
Ao mesmo tempo a Eni está a trabalhar com as faculdades de engenharia no desenvolvimento de um curriculum para os novos estudos em engenharia de gás e geologia de petróleo.

Como forma de criar apetência nesta área a Eni promoveu olimpíadas de ciências nas escolas secundárias, através do projecto Eni Student. Este projecto visa, orientar os jovens a se interessar pelos estudos energéticos e ambientais ainda na escola secundárias.

A Eni embarcou nestas iniciativas, porque acredita que a educação é o núcleo de desenvolvimento e é crucial a participação de nacionais

C. Principais constatações

A Política de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial (PRSE), não é um instrumento mandatório e permite que outros instrumentos internacionais possam ser usados pelos investidores da industria extractiva. Desta forma, a SASOL (Madale) usa simultaneamente a PRSE e o Responsabilidade Corporativa (CR) do Banco Mundial, por sua vez, o Projecto Ncondezi aplica paralelamente as regras nacionais (PRSE) o Equator Principles (EP). Enquanto que o Eni desenvolveu a sua própria estratégia com base no código de Governação Corporativa.

As empresa que actuam na industria extractiva e que desenvolvem iniciativas de responsabilidade social actuam na filantropia, investimento social, conservação ambiental, serviços básicos (educação, saúde, saneamento), formação superior, capacitação, formação técnico profissional e vocacional e assistência técnica a PMEs.

Empresas como a Sasol e a Anadarko estão a desenvolver o conteúdo local ou participação nacional e participam na elaboração da lei. Porém, a Eni globalmente actua no desenvolvimento sustentável, governação, direitos humanos e trabalho; biodiversidade e recursos naturais; mudanças climáticas e energias sustentáveis, desenvolvimento local e inovação. Sendo que muitas destas áreas não são implementadas em Moçambique.

Questões como sustentabilidade das acções e expectativas das organizações e populações beneficiárias, de acordo com a Sasol (Madale) são resolvidas através de continua consulta (através de encontros directos com a população beneficiárias) e adopção de esquemas e o reforço de fora (conselho de pais nas unidades hospitalares e conselhos de comunidades nas unidades sanitárias, observatórios de desenvolvimento) participativas já estabelecidos. que aquela multinacional e outras adoptam através da suas unidades de responsabilidade social empresarial. A participação no ciclo de projectos de responsabilidade social é uma premissa da RSE.

A PRSE da Industria Extractiva foi recentemente aprovada e ainda a sua implementação carece de definição de critérios de avaliação periódica e sobretudo do seu guião. E o uso de outros instrumentos internacionais na implementação da RSE exacerba uma avaliação objectiva da proximidade ou afastamento das intervenções preconizadas pela política. E o facto da política prever que uma avaliação periódica da implementação das acções de RSE cria condições para que as OSC construam campanhas de consciencialização e de educação cívica focado as populações localizadas no local dos investimentos.

Existem teóricos que estudaram a evolução da RSE e desenvolveram as chamadas pirâmides Carrol e Visser (Thomsen B, 2010), tal é importante saber, porém o facto de se estar ainda na infância do desenvolvimento do sector da industria extractiva e ainda haver possibilidade de juntamente com as autoridades desenvolver instrumentos legais não só do RSE mas também do conteúdo local ou participação nacional coloca os intervenientes deste sector num lugar privilegiado para influenciar positivamente o legislador.

D. Conclusões e Recomendações

Com o crescimento da industria extractiva no país, o estabelecimento de multinacionais que aplicam regras de RSE internacionalmente aceites e alinham-se com a PRSE as actividades de filantropia e de responsabilidade social aumentaram em vários lugares aonde ocorrem os investimentos, e as necessidades de acompanhamento pelos locais aumentaram. Enquanto que as multinacionais tem departamentos e pessoal específico desta área o mesmo não acontece com as instituições públicas, só por isso, a sustentabilidade é questionada a todos os níveis, seja com as autoridades locais, OSCs, universidades, etc.
Mesmo assim, as actividades de responsabilidade social são acordadas com os beneficiários e as autoridades, e no caso de serviços básicos para garantir continuidade e sustentabilidade. Na construção de infra-estruturas de educação, de saúde e outros serviços básicos que precisam de ser pessoal para ser contratado pelo governo e manutenção local a consulta e participação é crucial. E a sua sustentabilidade é garantida pela intervenção do governo e dos beneficiários.
A PRSE da Industria Extractiva foi recentemente aprovada em Fevereiro passado de corrente ano pelo Conselho de Ministros (resolução nº21/2014) e ainda carece de definição de critérios de avaliação periódica da sua implementação. A PRSE deve ser seguida de definição critérios de avaliação periódica da implementação das acções de responsabilidade social empresarial contidas nos contratos e memorandos de entendimento conforme preconiza a Política e a Estratégia dos Recursos Minerais. Sendo assim, 2015 se apresenta como uma oportunidade para acompanhar e influenciar a preparação do guião orientador para as acções de RSE da industria extractiva. Por isso, os interessados deveriam procurar participar activamente de várias formas, desde disseminação de informação, pesquisa, lobby e advocacia. Bem como a sua monitoria e avaliação.
No ano de 2015, as Cs tem uma oportunidade para acompanhar e influenciar não só o surgimento de futuros instrumentos legais que irão guiar a PRSE , mas também a lei de conteúdo local..
A RSE e o capital humano, operacionaliza o conteúdo local ou participação nacional. Porém, todos estes instrumentos possuem um denominador comum em evidência, trata-se das PMEs, ao proporem critérios avaliação periódica e regulação esta devem incluir medidas de RSE focadas nestas entidades.
As OSCs que se interessarem por participar nos processos de seguimento de PRSE Conteúdo Local ou Participação Nacional deveriam faze-lo de uma forma apaixonada e visionária e procurar que o sector da industria tenha uma forte liderança, responsável, transparente e boa governação. E que o sector siga uma caminho mais desafiador de incluir Moçambique na rota do aço, alumínio, metanol, fertilizantes, petroquímicos.
Por fim, deve se ter em conta de que a RSE, Conteúdo Local ou Participação Nacional não estão isoladas, são subsectores de uma política de recursos naturais e esta também é guiada por imperativos de desenvolvimento.

Listas de entrevistadas
Abdul Adamo, 823080514, Gestor de Responsabilidade Social Vale, abdul.adamo@vale.com

Alberto J Tsamba, 21478700, aj.tsamba@uem.mz, Director Faculdade de Engenheira UEM

Benjamim Cavel, 823085794, benjamim.cavel@sasol.com, Gestor de Conteúdo Local

Benjamim Chilengue, 823050800, benjanim.chilengue@mirem.gov.mz, Director Nacional, Direcção de Planificação e Desenvolvimento, Ministério dos Recursos Minerais

Benjamim Pequenino, 823158520/843158520, Instituto de Directores de Moçambique

Cassimo Ginaby, Revista G

Carlos dos Santos, 0044 7702 847803, Alto Comissário, csantos@mozambiquehc.co.uk

Danilo Nhantumbo, Academia de Petróleo e Gás, 827270226/844126559

David Taiĺlant, 823034913, Fugro Mozambique d.taiĺlant@fugro.com

Derek Bultitude 0027723776376 Derek.bultitude@honeywell.com

Donald Tulcidas, 824350620, Investment for Global Development (IDG)

Estêvão Rafael Pale, 823038790, epale@cmh.co.mz, Companhia Moçambicana de Hidrocarbonetos, Director Executivo

Eva Pinto, Eva.Pinto@anadarko.com, Gestora de Responsabilidade Social – Anadarko.

Hélio Mahanjane, 823086620, heliomahanjane@lismocambique.com, PCA Lis Moçambique (PME)

Gisela Nhambi, ENI, gisela.nhambi@eni.com

Godinho Alves, 824433410, CPI, Director Adjunto.

Gonçalves Boa, 841847221, Associação dos Camponeses de Jonasse – Beluluane

Inês Zandamela, 829888846, izandamela.62@gmail.com, Ministério dos Recursos Minerais

Iva Sheila Gaŕrido, 843137720ANADARKO, iva.garrido@anadarko.com, External Affairs Coordinator,

Jocelyne Machevo, 824866740, Jocelyne.machevo@eni.com, Eni east Africa spa Mozambique Branch, Engenheira civil

Marina Madale, marina.madale@sasol.com, Responsabilidade Social Empresarial

Mi Sook Park, Nabi Consulting, 846893084

Misério Clemente, Mestrando de Engenharia de Petroleo, 848887282/8601000128, miserioclemente@gmail.com

Nelson Zumbene, zumbenenelson@yahoo.com.br, Ministério dos Recursos Minerais

Pete Jeffreys 00255767129675 OneSubsea

Rui de Vasconcelos, 828616900, GMD-Tete, cruidevasconcelos@yahoo.com.br

Sérgio Fotine, 823055712, Director Comercial PETROMOC

Silvana Virgilia Ferrão Sustainability, 842057438 Environmental Consultancy and Project Management, ferrao-silvana@hotmail.com

Vasco Nhabinde, 84451150, vcnhabinde@gmail.comMinistério de Plano e Desenvolvimento

Yara Gomes, yara.gomes2@sasol.com

Wedisson Rodrigues Masquil, wqmm@yahoo.com.br, Ministério dos Recurso Minerais

Referências

Cavel B. Creating Shared Value to Enable Socio-Economic Development. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Código de Governação Corporativa, http://www.eni.com/en_IT/governance/governance-model-policies/eni-corporate-governance-code/eni-corporate-governance-code.shtml
Crane, A. Matten, D. and Spence, L. (2008) Corporate Social Responsibility: Readings and cases in a global context, Routledge

Encontro RES. (2014). http://www.vale.com/mozambique/PT/aboutvale/news/Paginas/debate-responsabilidade-social-em-mocambique.aspx
Estudo de Dignostico da Integração de Comércio (EDIC) 2014. Ministério da Industria e Comércio
Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com/
Forbes Magazine, (2014), Mozambique: New Wave of Growth, http://www.forbescustom.com/economicdevelopment.html
Furlan S. Empresa Sustentável e Educação: O projecto «Eni Professores@UEM». Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Mosca J. & Sememane T. (2011). El Dorado Tete Os mega projectos de mineração. CIP
Nhabinde V. Fundamentação para a Elaboração de um Instrumento Legal Sobre o Conteudo Local. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Nhantumbo F. Princípios Orientadores para a Participação Nacional. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Política de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial para a Industria Extractiva de Recursos Minerais (2014)
Política e Estratégia dso Recursos Minerais (Resolução nº89/2013)
Tamele V. (2013). Riscos e Oportunidades da Liberalização de Serviços. https://viriatotaamele.wordpress.com/2013/10/02/opportunities-and-risks-of-liberalizing-trade-in-services-in-mozambique-banking-insurance-tourism-and-transport-and-communications-update/ )
The Ncondezi Project, http://www.ncondezicoal.com/aboutus.aspx
Thomsen B. (2010), How do foreign companies understand and practice Corporate Social Responsibility in Mozambique?, Master Thesis, University of Agder, Denmark
Topping J. ideas on Positive Impacts on Local Communities from Gas Operations in Mozambique. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Tsamba A & Zita U, (2013), Capacitação Institucional na Formação de Geocientistas e Engenheiros da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, UEM-Faculdade de Engenharia, Maputo
http://www.vale.com
Valy A. Local Content Development Strategy. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Williams E. Local Content: Lets have an Honest Conversation. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.
Zimba C. O processo de Promoção e inclusão das PME´s Moçambicanas nas oportunidades do Sector de Gás. Comunicação em MOZAMBIQUE GAS SUMMIT. 2014. Maputo.

Economic and Social Impacts of the Mozambique / EU Fisheries Agreements

July 15, 2013

reports, Uncategorized

Nomenclature

ACP Afro Caribbean Pacific

CFFA Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements

EC European Community

ECU European Currency Unit (parity with Euro)

EU European Union

FA Fisheries Agreement

FPA Fisheries Partnership Agreement

FTE Full Time Equivalent

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoM Government of Mozambique

GRT Gross Registered Tonnes

GT Gross Tonnes

ILO International Labour Organisation

IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission

JE Joint Enterprise

MCS Monitoring Control and Surveillance

MoF Ministry of Fisheries

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organisation

SADC Southern African Development Community

SWIOFC South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

VMS Vessel Monitoring System

WTO World Trade Organisation

WWF World Wildlife Foundation

1. Introduction

Since independence Mozambique has signed three fisheries agreements with the European Community, which have provided some significant economic benefits to the country as well as raised questions about impacts on national fisheries, environmental costs and secondary benefits such as employment.

This report presents a brief overview and history of the three agreements and the protocols that have defined the technical and financial details during execution. Focussing on the last two agreements (2004-6 and 2007-11) an analysis is made of the economic and social impacts of the agreements, and areas are identified where improvements could be made, including increased partnership options, enhanced participation of civil society and strategic / policy issues. The terms of reference for the study are presented in Annex 2.

Most of the study has been compiled on the basis of data from public sources, as only a very limited amount of information was made available through the Ministry of Fisheries.

2. The Fisheries Sector

The fisheries sector in Mozambique is very important both in terms of contribution to GDP, protein supply for national consumers as well as employment. Some 80.000 Mozambicans are mainly occupied with fisheries related activities, while coastal communities all along the 2500 km coastline rely on fisheries as their main economic activity[1].

Structure of the Marine Fishing Industry

The industry is divvied into three sub sectors, namely Artisanal, Semi-Industrial and Industrial the differential being made primarily on the technical characteristics of the means of production.

Table 1 – Fisheries Sub sectors

Sector	Vessel size	Propulsion	Conservation	Max range
Artisanal	< 10m	Sail, oar, motor <100hp	None, some with ice	12nm
Semi-industrial	10-20m	Motor <350hp	Ice	30nm
Industrial	>20m	Motor <1500hp	On board freezing	EEZ

The principle fisheries in each sector are as follows:

Table 2 – Principle Fisheries

Sector	Fishery	Location	Product	Market
Artisanal	Beach seine Handline	Shoreline: Sofala Bank Near shore: Sofala Bank, Nampula, C-Delgado	Small pelagic fish Demersal fish	National National
Semi-industrial	Bottom trawl	Near shore: Sofala Bank (South of Beira)	Shallow water shrimp	National + Export
Industrial	Bottom trawl Bottom trawl Seine Long line	Near shore: Sofala Bank (North of Beira) Offshore: Inhaca, Sofala Bank Offshore: Cabo Delgado, Nampula Offshore	Shallow water shrimp Deep water shrimp Tuna Tuna, Swordfish, Sharks	Export Export Export Export

Note that there are no national vessels exploiting large pelagics (tuna, swordfish and sharks) and the fishery is utilised by foreign flagged vessels fishing either via direct license or under a fisheries access agreement. None of the vessels in this fishery (whether under private license or a fisheries agreement) have any interaction with the national economy, neither providing employment, fish for national consumption, raw material for processing or any other form of added value. The fleets are generally unseen, as they operate some distance from the shore, and they will generally only use Mozambican port facilities for emergency repairs. Their catch is transhipped at sea to a supply vessel which will renew on board supplies and even change crews.

Production

Official production statistics for 2005 and 2006 are shown in the following tables. Total catch (all subsectors) is reported as 83,000 – 91,000 tonnes but it should be noted that the artisanal sector is not completely covered by the statistical system and officers estimate total catch (all subsectors) to be in the region of 100,000 – 120,000 tonnes per year.

Table 3 – Artisanal Fisheries Catch

	Tonnes		US$’000
	2005	2006	2005	2006
Crab	161	175	482	508
Fish	50,024	57,457	125,060	143,643
Shallow water shrimp	1,759	1,367	8,795	6,835
Cephalopods	240	247	600	618
Sharks	892	776	2,230	1,940
Lobster	12	5	132	35
Others	4,660	3,946	2,330	1,973
Total	57,748	63,973	139,629	155,552

Source: Ministério das Pescas, Relatório do Balanço do PES 2006

Table 4 – Industrial and Semi-Industrial Fisheries Catch

	Tonnes		US$’000
	2005	2006	2005	2006
Lobster	1	8	11	88
Crab	158	107	474	321
Deep water shrimp	1,774	1,803	8,870	9,015
Fish	660	665	1,650	1,663
Shallow water Shrimp	8,520	7,393	68,160	59,144
Nephrops	149	94	1,490	940
Cephalopods	165	114	413	285
Kapenta	12,991	16,017	15,589	19,220
Bycatch	1,830	1,725	915	863
Total	26,248	27,926	97,572	91,539
Tuna	5,396	6,691	10,792	13,382

Source: Ministério das Pescas, Relatório do Balanço do PES 2006

Contribution to GDP

The fishers sector makes a small contribution to GDP but shrimp exports make an important contribution to total national exports:

Table 5 – Structure of GDP and Exports

Sector	Av GDP 2000-6 10⁹MT		Principle Exports by Sector, 2004
Agriculture	25,864	23%
Manufacturing	16,022	14%
Trade	11,302	10%
Transport	10,839	10%
Rents	10,800	10%
Water/Electricity	5,431	5%
Financial sector	4,514	4%
Administration and defense	4,110	4%
Education	3,839	3%
Construction	3,680	3%
Fisheries	2,109	2%
Hotels	1,675	1%
Heath	1,355	1%
Mining	787	1%
Other	2,364	2%
ISFIM	-2,582	-2%
Total	102,109	91%
Tax	10,057	9%
Grand Total	112,167	100%

Sources: INE, EIU Mozambique Country Report 2006

3. Genesis of Agreements

Justification

The justification for Fisheries Agreements lies in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. The Convention gave States control over the waters within 200 miles their coast, as a step to stop a recognised decline in global fish stocks and limit the ability of one country to fish the resources of another without management or rent. In Article 62, the Convention simultaneously opened up the possibility that a coastal State may concede access to another State in order to fish surplus, subject to conditions which may include compensation:

“Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements…… give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch” [2]

Article 62 provide the founding justification for the negotiation of access agreements (Fisheries Agreements) on behalf of European industrial fishing vessel owners, the first of which was concluded in 1979.

Typology

The model for Fisheries Agreements changed little between 1980-2003. Essentially the European Commission negotiated access for a certain number (or Gross Tonnage) of vessels for the period of the agreement and compensation was negotiated on the basis of a reference catch, detailed by fishery. The reference catch was an estimate of how much the fleet was predicted to catch during the period. Catches above the reference catch would result in additional compensation and license payments, but there would be no refund for catches below the reference weight. Financial contributions were divided up into Compensation proper and Support for Targeted Actions. Through the latter the Commission sought to contribute directly to sustainable fishing practises, and other development related goals. In addition to compensation and support for targeted actions, Fisheries Agreements carried obligations related to:

Vessel licensing
Fishing zones
Reporting of catch, entry and exit, position
Allowable by-catch
Taking on of observers
Satellite based vessel monitoring
Landing and transhipment of product
Employment of national crewmembers
Committees related to the Agreement

It should be noted that the license fees paid by vessel owners under the FA were generally lower than those that would be paid by an owner operating outside of an access agreement and often linked to reference catches (in the first instance) and catch declarations (should catch surpass reference values). The financial contributions effectively subsidised vessel operators and provided an environment that was attractive to EC owners.

The resource rent that accrued to the third country was therefore partly made up of license revenues and partly of the financial contributions. The basis of the rent is guaranteed through the use of a reference catch value, which dictates not only compensation but also license fees. Additional compensation and license fees are however payable should catches exceed reference levels: if the TOTAL fleet catch exceed the reference catch, additional compensation will be payable by the commission; if an INDIVIDUAL vessel’s catch exceeds the reference amounts implicated in the license payment, then additional license fee will be payable by the vessel owner. Payments of both incremental compensation and license fees are integrally linked to catch declarations – should catches be incorrectly declared, there is a real risk of underpayment of revenues due. The seriousness of this risk is determined by the ability (or lack thereof) of the coastal state to independently verify declared catches and the level at which the reference catch has been set. If the latter is very low then it becomes very important that the coastal state has the ability to verify catches.

From 2003 the Commission started to replace Fisheries Agreements with Fisheries Partnership Agreements partly as a response to criticisms of lack of sustainability[3] and negative impacts on the development of local fisheries[4]. Anticipating new WTO rules on fisheries subsidies, the Commission also changed the perspective of the financial contribution which now “cannot be considered as a subsidy to the European fishermen. For the future, the Community financial contributions will have to be regarded as investments for the improvement of responsible and rational fishing and therefore based on new considerations”.[5] Whilst differential (preferential) licensing conditions still prevail between vessels licensed under a FPA and those licensed by direct individual application it is difficult to see how the subsidy has in reality changed.

The main changes between FAs and FPAs are summarised in Table 6 below[6]^,[7]:

Table 6 – Changes from FAs to FPAs

Main elements	FAs	FPAs
EU fleet operations	For the determination of the level of fishing opportunities, no reference was made to international scientific recommendations. No exclusivity clause (stipulating that all EU-flagged boats fishing in the zone should operate under the FA). General principle of EU fleets accessing only surplus stocks that cannot be caught by local fleets (so de facto discrimination between local and EU fleets).	For the determination of the level of fishing opportunities, reference is made in tuna agreements to RFMOs’ scientific recommendations. Existence of an exclusivity clause. Principle of non-discrimination between different fleets fishing in the fishing zones concerned, although the principle of access to surplus was reiterated in the Council’s conclusions.
Financial contribution	Determination of the level of the financial compensation based on fishing opportunities, and including specified amounts of the financial compensation to be devoted to particular initiatives (‘targeted actions’), often unconnected from the fisheries policy of the ACP country concerned. The ACP country concerned sent an annual report about how money had been spent to implement targeted actions. A reduction or an increase in the fishing opportunities granted to EU vessels leads to a reduction or increase in the financial compensation.	Determination of the level of the financial compensation based on fishing opportunities, and including EU financial support for the definition and implementation of a sectoral fisheries policy in the ACP country concerned. The EU and the ACP country concerned undertake prior consultations, in particular as regards implementation of the ACP sectoral fisheries policy. The EC monitors the results against the objectives, rather than looking at the spending of the monies. A reduction or an increase in the fishing opportunities granted to EU vessels leads to a reduction or increase in the financial compensation.
Shipowner contributions	Shipowners pay for licences. Mixed agreements: amount varies; Tuna: €20-25 per tonne	Shipowners pay for licences. Advance payment generally higher than FAs. Mixed agreements: amount varies; Tuna: €35 per tonne
MCS	MCS activities may be supported under targeted actions	MCS activities may be supported under partnership actions
VMS	Few FAs include a VMS protocol for satellite monitoring of EU vessels	Most FPAs include a VMS protocol for satellite monitoring of EU vessels (although the necessary conditions for implementation do not always exist)
Scientific cooperation	Not formally included.	Provisions for a joint scientific committee.
Seafarers’ employment	Employment of local crew; no social clause included.	Employment of local or ACP crew; a social clause is included defining minimum employment conditions (ILO).
Provisions for investments	No	Yes, particularly through the setting up of fishing joint ventures, transfer of technology, vessels, etc.
Impact evaluation	No ex-ante impact evaluations. Ex-post impact evaluations carried out since 2003 (not public)	Impact evaluations carried out for all FPAs (not public)

Rational

To understand why the European Community and third countries might be interested in entering into Fisheries Agreements it is necessary to look at some of the key problems facing both European and third countries, and the potential benefits that an agreement could bring to both parties:

European Community:

Dwindling fisheries resources, and increasing demand for fish products

During the latter part of the 20^th century there was a significant decline in some key European fish stocks, notably North Sea Cod. Demand for fish products however continued to rise, not only due to population growth but also due to greater awareness of health related benefits from increased fish consumption. Economic growth also fostered demand for important higher value products, the most significant of which is shrimp.

Underutilisation and over-capitalisation in European fleets

As part of management measures to adjust to dwindling resources, attempts were made to reduce effort in key European fisheries, whilst at the same time subsidies were available to encourage investment in other fishing sectors and maintain national shipbuilding interests. A partial solution to the problems associated with capital & investment, growing demand and dwindling local resources is to secure access to resources further a-field through such instruments as Fisheries Agreements.

Important employment and added value derived from the fisheries sector

In addition to the economic value of the employment opportunities created in the European fleet, there are significant benefits from employment and added value derived from to the processing of fish products. Many third countries, especially developing nations do not have the capacity to process products for EC markets and the assurance of supply of raw material for European processing industries thus becomes an important benefit associated with a fisheries access agreements.

Private sector interest

FA’s have established a preferential environment for European vessel owners, including licensing costs, conditions regarding product origin and administrative assistance amongst others. It is therefore in the financial interest of the owners to operate under an FA and benefit from such subsidies.

Third Countries:

Underutilised Resources

The basic tent of Article 62 is that a third country may have resources that it does not have the capacity to harvest, and this in turn will represent an economic loss for that country. An access agreement should be an opportunity for the third country to extract some form of rent from an otherwise under utilised asset. Compensation payments made under an access agreement may be an important contribution to third country government income and balance of payments.

Under capitalised fishing industries

Third countries which lack the technical and capital resources to fully exploit their own fisheries resources often aim to encourage investment in national fishing enterprises through the terms of an access agreement. Should this be successful, the agreement becomes a means to its own end.

Under / Un Employment

Un and under employment is a serious problem in developing nations and the creation of employment opportunities either on board vessels licensed via conditions stipulated in access agreements or in associated shore based industries is seen as an important potential benefit to third countries. Through this there may also be some additional benefits of training and transfer of know-how..

Difficulties in managing and controlling access to resources

The alternative to an access agreement may be to grant a series of individual licenses to foreign vessels. This may be seen as administratively more onerous than dealing with one single entity in order to give and control access to a whole fleet. This is perceived to be the case with respect to licensing and infractions, where the third country will not, in the first instance, deal directly with vessel owners.

Cooperation in resource management

In principle both vessel and resource owners will have vested interest in sustainable management of a given fishery. However rational self interest and a compliance quandary similar to the classical prisoners dilemma[8] results in very limited self compliance with rules when owners are left to act individually. The situation is improved when there is some level of group responsibility, where an entity (in this case the Commission and the Owners Associations) acts for the collective (rather than individual) interests of owners. This has been manifested through the linking of access agreements with support for resource management and research via targeted actions.

Existing agreements

The agreements in force at the time of writing are detailed in Table 14, Annex 1 and illustrated in Figure 1 below. Note that there is no protocol currently in force in Angola, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal.

Figure 1 – Existing Fisheries Agreements

Source: MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements 2007

Comment

Fisheries Agreements have been the subject of extensive criticism from various agencies including NGOs and public pressure groups. The most prominent of these being the World Wildlife Fund and the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA). In addition critical issues have been raised in documents commissioned by the European Commission itself. Points that are raised include:

The existence of under exploited resources is the basis of UNCLOS Article 62. A costal state should have information related not only to the potential yield of the resource but also current levels of exploitation before such a conclusion can be reached. Not only may this analysis be illusive but, as indicated in Table 6, fishing possibilities under FAs have been negotiated without reference to international scientific recommendations – a critical issue in the case of highly migratory species;
There has been inadequate financial and political support for RFMOs both through FAs and directly by Coastal States. Their role is fundamental to the management of highly migratory species;
Unsustainable fishing practices by fleets licensed under Fisheries Agreements, including non-reporting of catch data, non reporting of position, entry and exit, non adherence to fishing zones, poor by-catch management practices. The under declaration of catches will affect resource management, and potentially result in underpayment of compensations and license fees;
Inadequate will amongst coastal states to establish & enforce regulatory frameworks and information management systems to ensure sustainable fishing practices. This may be further exacerbated by a fundamental lack of human and technical capacity in the costal state to effectively manage & monitor foreign fishers in their waters, including the ability to deploy observers and implement VMS systems. In spite of this, agreements still go ahead. WWF takes an explicit stand on the issue:

“Fisheries partnership agreements should only be granted under the auspices of a fully developed fisheries management plan and after conducting environmental impact assessments”[9]

Financial contributions have a triple focus, and cover (i) compensation for access granted to the resource, (ii) contribution to the cost of sustainable management and (iii) development aid. These three objectives are not necessarily coherent, and touch on the fundamental dilemma as to whether FAs should be seen as a trade agreement or aid;
Subsidies inherent to the FAs result in unequal access conditions between operators under the FA and those from other nations;
Negative impacts on national fisheries, both at artisanal and industrial levels. This is especially the case when exclusion zones for artisanal fisheries are either not defined or not observed;
Coastal states have found it difficult to account for expenditures on targeted actions, and the allocations set out in the FA may not necessarily reflect the priorities of the beneficiary government through out the life of the agreement. Changing of budget allocations was a drawn out administrative process. The net result was that targeted action were not as effective as they should have been and there were often significant delays in disbursement;
There is a general lack of transparency regarding the terms and benefits of FAs. Contrary to various recommendations[10]^,[11] the evaluations of individual fisheries agreements made by the Commission remain outside of the public domain;
The distribution of employment and added value benefits is very skewed and estimated at between 10:90[12] and 23:77[13] in favour of the European Community.
In spite of the negative criticisms cited above, FPAs may yet be preferable to other alternatives: “from a development perspective FPAs are largely preferable to private arrangements between developing countries and companies. FPAs are a better deal for development than the agreements which are offered by other nations, such as China”[14].

History of Mozambique / EC Fisheries Agreements

There have been three fisheries agreements between Mozambique and the European Community, the first of which entered into force on 1 January 1987. This was subsequently renewed twice, but each time with a different protocol, changing some of the technical conditions, including the fishing opportunities made available. The second renewal expired at the end of September 1993.

Figure 2 – Timescale of Mozambique / EU Fisheries Agreements

There was then a space of 10 years with no agreement, the second agreement only coming into force on 1 January 2004 and lasting three years. The third, a Fisheries Partnership Agreement, entered into force in January 2007, but was only passed through the European Parliament in October of the same year, some 10 months later.

The principle difference between the three agreements (and their protocols) is in the fishing opportunities that each made available to EC fishers and the financial contribution:

The 1987 Agreement on Fisheries Relations and its first protocol (1987-9) allowed for 40 tuna vessels (with no differentiation between longliners and purse seiners), an annual average of 3700 GRT/month of capacity (equivalent to about 15-18 vessels) in the shallow water shrimp fishery and 1100 GRT/month of capacity (equivalent to 3-4 vessels) in the deepwater shrimp fishery. Financial contribution: 2.5m€/yr (2.3m€ compensation, 0.2m€ targeted actions)

The second protocol (1990-1) increased the opportunities for tuna vessels to 44, without change to the opportunities for shrimp vessels. Financial contribution: 3.425m€/yr (2.15m€ compensation, 1.275m€ targeted actions)

The third protocol (1992-3) reduced the opportunities for tuna vessels to 42 and withdrew all shrimp opportunities for both shallow and deep water. Financial contribution: 0.275m€/yr[15] (0.172m€ compensation, 0.103m€ targeted actions)

The 2004 Fisheries Agreement established opportunities for 49 tuna vessels (35 seines + 14 longliners) and 10 deepwater shrimp vessels. Financial contribution: 4.09m€/yr (4.09m€ targeted actions)

The 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement reverted again to only tuna, but increasing the number of opportunities to 89 vessels (44 seiners + 45 longliners). Financial contribution: 0.9m€/yr (0.65m€ compensation, 0.25m€ targeted actions)

The most fundamental change in the evolution of the protocols was the withdrawal in 1992 protocol of shallow water shrimp opportunities, after Mozambique passed a new fisheries law (3/90) which set aside the shallow water shrimp fishery for exploitation by national individuals or companies.

The details of the opportunities and compensations are set out in the following table:

Table 7 – Agreement Details

Execution 1987-93

Very few details are available regarding the execution of the first agreement and protocols (1987-93), although it can reasonably be assumed that the uptake of shallow water shrimp opportunities (1987-91) would have been high. The execution of the agreement would have been influenced by the establishment of joint venture companies in the shallow water shrimp sector (notably Pescamar, a JV between Mozambique and Pescanova of Spain and Efripel, a JV with Taiwo of Japan). Pescamar has existed in Mozambique since 1980 and it would have been in the interest of both the company and the State to strengthen the position of Pescmar and other JVs in the sector rather than rely on a fisheries agreement for full exploitation of the resource. By 1990 Mozambique had tabled a new fisheries law (3/90) which included a specific clause setting aside the shallow water shrimp fishery for national exploitation only. As a result of this the third protocol to the agreement included no shallow water opportunities and Mozambique proposed that national companies should charter EU vessels in order to carry on fishing, but the EU did not agree. The agreement was then terminated in 1992[16], before it had run its course.

Following the withdrawal of shallow water shrimp opportunities, it became important to establish national capacity to exploit the resource and the Fisheries Law now allowed the of leasing (afreitamento) of vessels, which become commonplace amongst smaller quota holders in the fishery. Meanwhile the larger companies continued to invest to maintain and expand capacity. Of note is the 6m€ loan for the renewal of Pescamar’s fleet made by the European Investment Bank in 1994, sponsored by the Government of Mozambique[17].

The first fisheries agreement will have brought both positive and negative benefits for the economy of Mozambique:

ü The total rent payable, being the financial contribution plus licence fees, was at or above expected values for government rents on the basis of estimated value of reference catches and full utilisation of fishing opportunities. Normally these might be expected to be in the order 7-10%, plus other added value from employment, port services and processing:

Table 8 – Rents 1987-93

From	1/1/87	1/1/90	1/1/92
To	31/12/89	31/12/91	30/9/93
Total Rent as % of catch value	16%	29%	10%

It is worth noting that the second protocol was a very much improved deal for Mozambique, whereas the third, following the withdrawal of shallow water shrimp from the opportunities was less attractive. In the light of the fact that the financial contribution + license revenue was the only economic benefit from the agreement (there being no appreciable on-shore value added and limited employment opportunities), 10% could be considered low total economic rent.

ü The shallow water shrimp fleet will have contributed some by-catch to national markets, although this would probably have been in very limited quantities as by-catch collection was not widespread amongst artisanal fishers at that time. In addition the agreement states that by-catch should be landed in Maputo, and it is most unlikely that this took place in the shallow water shrimp fishery considering the distance from the main fishing grounds.

û Reference catches in the shrimp fishery (1500t) are considered low in the context of the capacity allowed. 3700 GRT/mth implies an average of 15-18 vessels and these would have be able to catch about 1650-2000tonnes total catch per year. Although there is an allowance for incremental compensation for catches above the reference catch, this is at a very low rate (50€/t, about 0.6% of catch value)

û Reference catches in the tuna fishery at 6000t/yr for the first protocol and then 3000 and 3400 for the subsequent protocols are considered low, especially if the deployed fleet consisted of many seiners. For the 1990 protocol the tuna reference catch is a mere 68t/vessel, equivalent to 4-5days of fishing in Mozambican waters per vessel per year. Although this value appears low, there is no data to indicate whether it is in fact unrealistic.

û There will have been competition for resources between vessels licensed under the FA and national fleets, to the detriment of both parties.

û At the time the area set aside for the exclusive use of artisanal fisheries was only 1nm from the coastal base line and the presence of additional industrial vessels will have aggravated conflicts. Typically these would be in the form of interruptions to artisanal fishing operations, whereby artisanal fishers would be unable to set gear in the area where shrimp trawlers are operating, or gear conflicts. In the latter case, artisanal fishing gear could be damaged or destroyed by shallow water trawlers. No information was available as to whether this actually happened.

û Penalties were set at a maximum of 100 000 ECU, rather than making reference to a penalty scale defined in national legislation.

û The employment of Mozambican seaman was not obligatory.

û Although the protocol stipulates that all vessels should take a (compliance?) observer on board, it is unlikely that this ever happened in the tuna fishery due to logistic considerations, as the main tuna fishing grounds are in the extreme north of the country, and the fisheries administration was based in Maputo/Beira.

û No entry or exit inspections were required and all catch declarations in the tuna fishery were therefore not subject to any verification by national authorities.

4. Analysis of Agreements (2004, 2007)

The second and third agreements with the European Commission were quite different in nature not only from the first agreement (set out more than 15 years earlier) but also from each other. The 2004 agreement followed the pattern of the later Fisheries Agreements, whereas the 2007 agreement is a Fisheries Partnership Agreement (see Table 6). In addition to the change in the typology of the agreements, the 2004 agreement created fishing opportunities in the tuna and deepwater shrimp sectors, whereas the 2007 agreement only allows for tuna fishing.

Provisions, obligations and fulfilment

In this section the principle provisions of the two agreements are outlined, together with any available information on the execution of those provisions.

Opportunities, uptake and catches

Table 9 – Uptake and Production 2004-7

Segment	Year	2004	2005	2006	2007
Seiners	Uptake/Opportunities	33 / 35	35 / 35	35 / 35	39 / 44
Longline	Uptake/Opportunities	10 / 14	14 / 14	14 / 14	27 / 45
	Catch	11,213	2,000¹⁸	1,500[18]	2,000¹⁸
Deepwater shrimp	Uptake/Opportunities	0 / 10	0 / 10	0 / 10	–
	Catch	0	0	0

Sources: MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

Delegation of the European Commission, Mozambique

The uptake of tuna fishing opportunities under the 2004/6 agreement was very high, with an average utilisation of 94%. This reflects not only the favourable conditions set out in the protocol but also the importance of the Mozambique protocol to the EU fleet in the Western Indian Ocean completing the puzzle of available fishing areas in the region. High uptake will also have been influenced by the western shift in stocks in the region seen in the 2003-4 and high concentrations of pelagic mantis shrimp (natosquilla investiatoris) leading to increased catchability[19], both of which significantly increased the importance of fishing opportunities in Tanzania, Mozambique and to a lesser extent Kenya.

Production in the tuna sector exceeded the reference catch (8,000t/yr) in 2004 and would have resulted in additional license and compensation payments (see below), but in 2005 returned to normal level of around 2,000 tonnes.

In contrast, the uptake of the deepwater shrimp fishing opportunities was zero, suggesting that the agreement was not well negotiated and opportunities did not reflect the demand from EC vessel owners[20]. The unduly high proportion of compensation attributable to the deepwater shrimp opportunities (see below) indicates that either negotiators really believed that the deepwater fishery was of great importance to EC operators or they were somehow mistaken. The reasons attributed to the lack of uptake are as follows:

High license fees payable by EC operators. The original protocol set license fees at 600€/t and this is certainly very high in the context of the landed value of deepwater shrimp (around 5,000€/t) and the high operational costs.
Most of the national operators who fish the deepwater shrimp fishery usually do so on the back of a shallow water shrimp license. When productivity in the shallow water fishery declines mid year, vessels are taken out to the deepwater fishery, returning inshore towards the end of the year. Operators report that this is the only way that they are able to maintain viable operations and it would be difficult or impossible to fish all year round only on a deepwater license, especially in the light of rising fuel prices. It appears as if the Commission’s negotiators did not appreciate this, and negotiated fishing opportunities that were financially unviable.
The agreement imposed a sanitary inspection on Community vessels, to the same standards as those imposed by the EC on the Mozambican national fleet fishing for export markets. It is possible that this may have discouraged vessel owners.
EC legislation regarding subsidies payable to EC vessel owners for the transfer of ships to distant water fisheries[21] made participation in the fishery less attractive. In particular, the legislation established a deadline of 31 December 2004 for the ending of such benefits and it is unlikely that an operator would have been able to get a transfer affected within the first year of the agreement.

For the 2007/11 agreement, the opportunities in the tuna segment were increased by 25% for seiners and tripled for longliners. This appears to be a direct consequence of the inclusion of an exclusivity clause in Fisheries Partnership Agreements, forbidding EC vessels intending to fish in the waters of a third country with an FPA with the European Community to enter into direct agreements outside of the FPA. Mozambique has long standing contracts with the European tuna associations (Anabac and Opagac) and issued private licenses in addition to those under the 2004 FA[22], a practise that is now not permissible.

The uptake of fishing opportunities for 2007 was low relative to the previous years (74% compared to 94% under the previous agreement). Although it is impossible to make any genuine analysis on such a short term piece of data, this may be due to factors including: natural variations in the migratory cycle of target species temporarily reducing the interest in fishing in Mozambican waters; the increased costs on vessel owners under the current protocol (43% increase in initial license fees as well an increase in incremental fees from €25/t to €35/t); over estimate of the interest of vessels previously licensed under agreements with Anabac/Opagac.

Reference catches

The correct estimation of reference catches is of great importance as it is used as the key multiplier in the calculation of base compensation and licence fees.

For the 2004 agreement the reference catches in the tuna average at 163t per vessel per year which would be high for longliners and probably low for seiners. Without access to the actual catches for the sub-segments of the tuna fleet, the reference catch seems to be a reasonable starting value for compensation estimates.

The deepwater shrimp reference catch of an average of 100t (plus 54t of by-catch) per vessel per year is again considered reasonable.

The per vessel reference catch for tuna was reduced for the 2007 agreement. The total increased by 25% over 2004 values to 10,000t/yr, reflecting an equal increase in the number of seiner fishing opportunities. However the number of opportunities for longliners increased three fold and this not reflected in the reference catch. The annual catch of a longliner will however be only about 1/8 to 1/6 of that of a seiner and a more appropriate figure for the reference catch would have been about 11,000 tonnes per year.

Financial contribution & licensing

The revenues from the financial contribution and licensing are important to the Mozambican Fisheries Agreements as they are the only economic benefits that the country gains through the agreement.

The financial contribution under the 2004 agreement was unusual in that the total payment was allocated against targeted actions. Under these condition, the agreement pre-defined how the base contribution was to be spent and any variations had to be previously agreed with the Commission. In the 2007 partnership agreement, the Government of Mozambique has gained much greater autonomy in the application of the financial contribution. Part of the payment (72%) is set against access and not subject to control via the agreement, whilst the balance is for “objectives identified by common accord…. in the context of the sectoral fisheries policy”.

The level of compensation in the 2004 agreement is extraordinarily high in the context of the value of reference catches (especially in the deepwater shrimp sector), and even higher still considering that there was no uptake of opportunities in the deepwater shrimp sector.

Table 10 – Rents 2004-7

Segment	Year	2004/6 protocol	2004 actual	2005 actual	2006 actual	2007/11 protocol	2007 actual
Seiners & Longliners	Compensation increment	600,000	600,000 241,000	600,000 –	600,000	900,000[23]	900.000
	License fees Est increment	126,000 86,000	114,000 171,000	126,000 –	126,000	300,000[24] 133,000	234,000[25] –
	Total	726,000	1,126,000	726,000		1,333,000	1,134,000
	Est Catch Value	7,000,000	9,700,000	1,750,000		9,700,000	1,936,000[26]
	Rent as % of catch value	12%	12%	42%		14%	59%
Deepwater shrimp	Compensation	3,490,000	3,490,000	3,490,000	3,490,000	–
	License fees	600,000	0	0	0	–
	Total	4,090,000	3,490,000	3,490,000	3,490,000	–
	Est Catch Value	4,000,000	0	0	0	–
	Rent as % of catch value	101%	–	–	–	–
Total	Rent as % of catch value	44%	47%	240%		14%	59%

For the 2004/6 protocol, the level of rent in the deepwater shrimp sector was extremely high, and marginally exceeded of the value of the reference catch. High tuna catches in 2004 kept the overall rent at 47%, a little above the overall rent foreseen in the protocol. However in 2005 low declared tuna catches and no uptake of deepwater shrimp opportunities implied that Mozambique received a rent almost two and a half time the value of the catch.

The conditions set out in the 2007/11 protocol imply a rent of about 14% of value based on the reference catches which is considered reasonable. This should be considered a minimum value as should catches exceed the reference catch the rent will rise slightly. If catches fall below the reference values, the rent as a percent of catch value will be considerably higher as the minimum compensation does not change with catch. In 2007 unconfirmed catch declarations (circa 2000t) are considerably below the reference value of 10,000t and imply a payment to Mozambique of 59% of catch value.

For the European Community as a whole it makes no economic sense at all to pay such high percentages of catch value for access to fish in Mozambican waters. The fact that the situations seems to be perpetuated over the years indicates that the Mozambican agreement has other value to EC, most likely linked with under or non-declaration of catches either systematically or periodically (i.e. every few years when there is a significant boom in productivity in Mozambican waters, such as 2004).

Between the 2004 and 2007 agreements here has been a slight change of the sharing of costs on the European side with the Commission reducing payment from 75 to 65€/t whilst owners have an increased licensing burden up from 25 to 35€/t. This results in a slightly improved agreement from Mozambique’s perspective as additional payments under the licence conditions will be payable at lower total catches than under the compensation conditions. The change is illustrated in Figure 3 which compares the variation of rent with total declared catch in the tuna sector for the two agreements:

Figure 3 – Comparison of rents from tuna fishing, 2004 and 2007

The figure indicates that for this sector the 2007 agreement represents a better deal for Mozambique than the 2004 agreement especially at lower catch levels, but neither are considered unreasonable. The down side is that benefits accruing to Mozambique are now more dependant on correct catch reporting, thus increasing the risk of underpayments described in section 3.

Although overall rents appear reasonable, both the 2004 and 2007 agreements apply similar fees (license and compensation) to seiners and longliners whereas the market value of their catches are very different. Seiners catch yellow fin and skipjack tuna in bulk for canning industries and have catch values estimated at around 800€/t. Longliners will catch considerably less per vessel as indicated above, but the catch is made up of higher values species (swordfish and better quality tuna) with an average value per tonne 3-5 times that of purse seiners. With such significant differences in values it would be justified to establish differential licensing and compensation rates for the two fleet segments to ensure that rents are a true reflection of catch values (see section 5 below).

Reporting

Reporting is a key aspect of compliance within the fisheries agreement and will have direct implications for resource management and compensation payments. Reporting obligations in the 2004 and 2007 agreements cover entry and exit, catch and position information. According to the Ministry of Fishers there has been very limited compliance with any of the reporting obligations from the EC fleet. Catch reports should have been communicated directly to the Ministry, but appear to have been communicated to member states, then the Commission / Delegation and finally to the Ministry. In some cases the format of the catch reporting was not as defined in the conditions of the agreement. Entry and exit reports were not made, making it impossible to cross check catch data.

It is interesting to note that these constitute infractions under the terms of the agreement and could have resulted in license suspension. The Ministry however took no such initiative.

The long line segment made no declarations either to Mozambique or to the IOTC (the IOTC database of long line catches[27] has no data from Spanish vessels at all for the period for Mozambican waters). It seems contradictory that the 2007 agreement enhances long line opportunities whereas there is apparently no fishing taking place. It is considered that either activity is unreported, or the fleet finds it worthwhile to pay for opportunities that it does not use, probably due to current low swordfish catches in Mozambican waters. This may change whereupon the opportunities would become very valuable.

It should be noted that the basic structure of the agreements encourage un- or under reporting of catches[28] as, should reference levels be surpassed, additional license and compensation amounts are payable. The increase of financial burden on the vessel operator in the 2007 agreement will aggravate this problem. The agreement sets out deadlines for the submission of catch data to the Commission (31^st July of the following year) and the payment f additional compensation & license fees to Mozambique (30^th August), but it is clear that these are not being adhered to – at the time of writing of this document (December 2007) the delegation was not able to confirm final catch data for 2005 or 2006. Not only is this breaking the provisions set out in the protocol, but it also makes it impossible to quantify any additional compensation or license payments that may be due.

Legislation recently proposed by the Council[29] (modifying the 2007 agreement) includes a provision that “The Commission shall evaluate each year whether Member States whose vessels are covered by the Protocol have complied with reporting requirements. Where this is not the case, the Commission shall withhold their requests for fishing licences for the following year”. This is considered to be a significant step forward in the promotion of sustainable fishing.

VMS

Both the 2004and 2007 protocols require the use of satellite based vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and the passing of such information to Mozambique’s VMS centre. This is an important way to confirm the presence of vessels in the country’s fishing zone, compliance with fishing areas and as a basis of catch estimates. In addition it can be used to target surveillance activities. During the 2004 agreement this was never successfully implemented and no data was successfully passed to the Mozambique system. This was due to long standing problems with Mozambique’s VMS system, which has never become fully functional, and the lack of development of an interface between Mozambique’s system (based on Inmarsat) and the system used by EC vessels (based on Argos). The issue has not yet been resolved and to date there is still not data being received by the national VMS centre. It should in principle be possible to back up an automated system with faxed or emailed positions, but again this has not happened.

Employment

Both the 2004 and 2007 agreements open up the possibility for employment of Mozambican seamen on EC vessels. During the 2004 agreement no crewman was employed and it is considered unlikely that any will be employed under the 2007 agreement. Principle problems include:

the migratory nature of the resource and hence unpredictable and transitory presence of EC tuna vessels in Mozambican waters, making pre-planning very difficult. Had there been uptake of deepwater shrimp opportunities it would have been considerably more likely that jobs for Mozambican seamen would have been created;
Language;
Lack of suitable experienced seamen;
The cost in terms of lost fishing days of coming to port to pick up seamen. However this could be made part of entry inspection requirements.

Infractions

There are no infractions registered under the 2004 agreement.

Compliance

As indicated above, the key areas of non-compliance by the EC with the agreement were:

Non or late reporting of catches
Deficient entry/exit declarations
Handing over of VMS information

No infractions were reported.

From the Mozambican side, unconfirmed reports indicate that Ministry had difficulty in complying with the reporting requirements on the application of targeted actions.

Resource management aspects

The 2004 agreement is clear that although the level of fishing opportunities made available under the protocol may be reassessed by the Joint Committee, (Article 11, §4 of the Agreement), the protocol is makes it clear that the review will be the competence of Mozambican authorities (Article 4 of the Protocol). It is therefore not considered that the agreement takes away any dominion of Mozambique over its own resources.

Deepwater shrimp resources in Mozambique are estimated to have a potential yield of 3,500t/yr[30] whilst current levels of exploitation are around 1,000-1,800t/yr[31]. The attribution of a reference catch of 1000t to the EC via the 2004 agreement is therefore in keeping with UNCLOS Article 62.

Resource management in the tuna sector does not effectively fall under the dominion of Mozambique per se, although there are principles which should be followed in order to avoid contributing to unsustainable fishing practices. The highly migratory nature of the target species of seiners and longliners (tuna, swordfish and sharks) makes it in practise impossible for any one State to effectively manage the resource, both in terms of scientific research and catch or effort management.

In the case of the Indian Ocean this responsibility falls to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) which coordinates scientific research, publishes stock analysis & recommendations and retains a list of vessels authorised to fish in the area. This list is the basis for regional effort management. The EC is a member of the IOTC and thus any vessel fishing under an agreement will have to be already on the IOTC’s list of authorised vessels and therefore within the current allowance for regional effort.

It is important to note that unlike all of its immediate neighbours, Mozambique is neither a member of the IOTC nor cooperating party (a lesser but still binding form of membership) and is therefore not obliged only to license IOTC authorised vessels. In this respect the agreement has indirectly improved tuna resource management, especially since 2007 whereby it became impossible for Mozambique to license EC vessels by private agreement (outside of the FPA). Whilst the country remains outside of IOTC membership, Mozambique continues to have the ability to licence vessels in excess of the IOTC’s approved list (thus undermining regional resource management) as well as license vessels considered illegal by IOTC.

Observers are a key tool for biological monitoring of catches as well as to ensure compliance. The 2007 agreement introduces a new clause that observers taken on board shall be appointed by the IOTC (Annex to the Protocol, Chapter 7, §1). This is somewhat strange considering that Mozambique is not bound by any IOTC resolution and that IOTC observers would not have any legal powers over the vessel whilst in Mozambican waters, unless the IOTC appoints observers from the Ministry of Fisheries. The agreement therefore opens up the possibility that there will only be biological observation, and no onboard compliance monitoring. The ex-post evaluation of the 2004 agreement concluded that the continued absence of an effective observer programme contributed to the “limited” impact of the agreement on improved MCS[32]

Summary of costs and benefits

The following table summarises the key costs and benefits for both the EC and Mozambique during the execution of the 2004-6 agreement, and makes projections for the 2007-11 agreement. It is worth noting that the Commission makes a detailed final evaluation of each agreement shortly before it expires but these are not made public, contrary to the recommendations of ADE’s evaluation[33]. The Commission was requested to grant access to the Mozambique ex-post evaluation for this study, but this was refused.

Table 11 – Summary of Principle Costs and Benefits

Mozambique Costs	2004-6	2007-11	Comment
MCS	Increased direct costs	Increased direct costs
Impact on national fisheries	Very limited	Very limited	EC fleet fishes resources unused by national fleets, beyond area of interaction with artisanal fishers
Mozambique Benefits
Compensation	€4.10m/yr	€0.90m/yr	Varies with declared catch, negatively influenced by under declaration
License Fees	€0.13m/yr	€0.43m/yr[34]	Negatively influenced by under declaration of catches, more so under 2007-11 FPA
Employment	None	None	Protocol tries to guarantee employment, not practicable at present
Other Value Added	None	None
EC Costs
Compensation	€4.1m/yr	€0.90m/yr	Paid to MoF by European Commission
License Fees	€0.13m/yr	€0.43m/yr	Paid to MoF by vessel owners
EC Benefits
Projected Fish supply (t) Projected Fish supply value (€)	9,500t/yr Est €11m/yr	10,000t/yr Est €9.7m/yr	On basis of reference catch
Actual Fish supply (t) Actual Fish supply value (€)	Av 4,700t/yr Est €4.2m/yr	Unknown (no declarations to date)	Declared data from EC fleet. Unverified by GoM
Employment	280 FTE	390 FTE	On basis of reference catch
Value Added	€3.3m/yr	€4.6m/yr	On basis of reference catch

Table 12 – Detailed Costs and Benefits

	2004-6	2007-11
Mozambique Costs
Negotiation and execution costs	Partly covered by targeted actions	Now an overhead, supported by national budget
Increased MCS Costs	Difficult to quantify, but direct increment not high as there were no inspections of EC vessels. There may however be direct VMS related costs	Likely to be the same
Impacts on other Fisheries	Some increase in competition within the tuna fishery, though most vessels licensed outside of the EC FA are longliners, whilst most reported fishing effort under the FA is from Seiners. The two fish very different áreas. No competition with National Tuna fleet (non-existent) No deployment of deepwater shrimp vessels, therefore no impact on national deepwater shrimp fleet No direct impact on artisanal fisheries as tuna vessels should have been operating well outside the range of artisanal vessels. Artisanal fisheries also do not target the same stocks as the tuna fleet No catch was landed locally, thus there were not impacts on national markets	Less competition as more EC vessels have been brought into the FPA who were already fishing in Mozambican waters. No deepwater shrimp opportunities, therefore no impact on national fisheries As before, no impact on national artisanal fisheries providing there is adherence to stipulated fishing zones.
Increased Illegal Activity	Possible. Deficient catch reporting is an IUU infraction. The lack of entry/exit and VMS information implies that illegal activity could have happened. Most likely infractions: un/under reporting of catch, non-adherence to fishing zones, transhipment without notification	Catch reporting should improve, but the lack of VMS continues to be an issue

Mozambique Benefits
Compensation	At least 4.1m€ per year	0.9m€/yr at reference catch levels
Targeted Actions	As part of the above: 1.5m€ MCS 1.0m€ Instructional development 1.0m€ Research 0.4m€ Training 0.1m€ Quality control 0.06m€ Joint Committee & International Meetings Application almost all base compensation directed via the protocol. Inflexible and not always in keeping with current priorities. Hampered by delayed disbursements. Although not conformed by the MoF, it is reported[35] that funds have been reserved for the purchase of new MCS vessels and for the construction of a new building for the Ministry, with any balance being allocated to training – a significant variation on the allocation of funds under targeted actions foreseen in the protocol.	As part of the above: 0.25m€ Policy implementation support More general support, following plan approved by the Joint Committee
License Fees	0.13m€ or more per year Influenced by non or under declaration of catches	About 0.43m€ per year at reference catch levels Even more influenced by non or under declaration of catches
Employment	None	Likely to be none
Added Value	Very small There is no added value related to the processing of product as catch is not landed in Mozambique. The protocol obliges EC vessel owners to have local licensing agent who would have received commissions.	Further reduced There is still no added value from processing / marketing and the protocol now permits, but does not oblige, owners to have a local agent.
Total rent	47%-240% of value of declared Extremely beneficial for Mozambique in the context of declared catches, but raises doubts on the fidelity of declared catch data	14% of catch value at reference catch levels Reasonable. The % increases if fleet fails to make reference catch

EC Costs
Agreement Administration	Unknown but real	Unknown but real
Compensation	At least 4.1m€ per year	0.9m€ at reference catch levels
Targeted Actions	4.1m€ per year (as part of compensation)	0.25m€ (as part of compensation)

EC Benefits
Fish Supply	11,000-2,000t/yr	10,000t/yr at reference catch levels
Employment[36]	280	390
Value Added36	3.3m€ (excl processing industry)	4.6m€ Note the difference in scale of total benefits between Mozambique and the EC under the 2007 agreement, and the implications for corresponding interests in its maintenance.

EC Owner Costs
License fee	0.13m€ or more per year	About 0.43m€ per year at reference catch levels
Observers	0 (none were placed onboard)	Unknown

EC Owner Benefits
Reduced licence fees	If tuna vessels had been fishing outside of the agreement a license would have cost 16,000€/vessel, total 0.78m€/yr for the fleet. This could have been reduced to 0.45m€ through the use of local agents. The agreement thus represents a subsidy of up to 0.65m€/yr to the EC fleet (about 13,000€/vessel/yr). In the (unutilised) deepwater shrimp sector, a license outside of the agreement would have cost around 89€/t plus 30€/t for the permitted by-catch, compared to 600€/t under the agreement. The agreement thus represented an additional cost per vessel of about 48,000€/yr. Under the agreement vessels were afforded levels of by-catch of 54% above the shrimp quota, considerably more than the norm of 10%(max)	If tuna vessels fish outside of the agreement a license will cost 14,000€/vessel, total 1.25m€/yr for the fleet. This could be reduced to 0.68m€ through the use of local agents. The agreement thus represents a subsidy of up to 0.82m€/yr to the EC fleet (about 9,000€/vessel/yr).

Contribution to Sustainable Fishing
MCS	+ 1.5m€/yr was allocated to MCS via targeted actions. No information is available as to how this was actually spent. – The non-functioning of VMS will have contributed negatively to MCS	+ But only through policy implementation support (0.25m€/yr total) ? The use of only IOTC appointed observers implies that the Agreement has excluded on-board compliance observation
Research	+ 1m€/yr was allocated to research via targeted actions. No information is available as to how this was actually spent.	+ But only through policy implementation support (0.25m€/yr total)
Management	– Deficient catch and entry/exit reporting will have contributed negatively to the promotion of sustainable fishing practices – The non-functioning of VMS will have contributed negatively to management, possibly allowing negative interactions with other fisheries. – The failure to deploy onboard observers will have had negative compliance and management consequences and made way for economic losses to Mozambique through the under declaration of catches.	+ But only through policy implementation support (0.25m€/yr total) + Exclusivity clause will minimise the number of non IOTC authorised vessels that can be licensed. + Proposed Council legislation[37] will put more pressure on non-reporting vessels

Joint enterprises

Both the 2004 and 2007 protocols make reference to the establishment of joint enterprises, being “a commercial company set up in Mozambique by vessel owners or national enterprises from the Parties to carry on fishing or related activities”. Such enterprises imply the transfer of vessels from the EC fleet to the national fleet.

From the Commission’s perspective joint enterprises are attractive as they would reduce fishing capacity and be seen as part of a genuine economic partnership with the third country in question. From Mozambique’s perspective they may be attractive as JEs would bring investment and would create more job opportunities and value added than European enterprises fishing under an agreement.

On the negative side, the establishment of a JE would imply total exposure of the EC vessel owner to the national regulatory framework, including conditional access to the European market dependant upon Mozambique’s current status on the lists of DG SANCO, and resource monitoring obligations. The latter, specifically the requirement to report VMS data directly to the Ministry was cited as one of the causes of the collapse of the Angolan fisheries agreement as it is contrary to EC policy[38]. In addition, the employment of foreigners would be subject to national regulations, and financial operations would be more difficult (increased license and fuel costs, tax burden etc). JEs have in the past brought with them old and inefficient technologies that can become an economic burden rather than a benefit.

Although the agreement sets out that the two parties will work towards the facilitation of joint enterprises, it is not clear exactly how this integrates with the fisheries agreement itself. Should an owner set up a JE in Mozambique, it would no longer be able to fish under the benefits of the agreement, and would therefore lose the benefit of implicit subsidies and market access.

The establishment of JEs in the tuna sector is considered highly unlikely. Not only is the fleet is highly mobile, but it also spends a relatively small part of the season in Mozambican waters. Mozambique can offer very limited facilities in terms of marketing, maintenance and bunkering and there is no obvious reason why it might be in the interests of an EC owner to set up a tuna JE in Mozambique.

Although no joint enterprises were established under the 2004 agreement, it is worth noting that the presence of Pescamar in Mozambique and the establishment of the joint venture between the Mozambique and Pescanova was a result of the 1987 fisheries agreement[39] and a previous bilateral agreement with Spain.

Impacts on other National Fisheries

Both the 2004/6 and 2007/11 agreements are considered to have had no significant direct impacts on national fisheries, either in the industrial or artisanal sectors. In the 2004/6 there could potentially have been some competition with national operators in the deep water shrimp fishery, but no vessels were deployed into this fishery under the FA, and there was therefore no negative impacts. Tuna seiners and longliners deployed under both agreements should have no impact on national fisheries as their principle fishing grounds are outside the fishing grounds exploited by national artisanal and industrial fleets. However the lack of VMS information means that it is not possible to verify whether EC vessels actually kept to the fishing grounds set out in the protocol[40].

5. Compensation Mechanisms

This section discusses the nature of compensation payments and proposes measures that might improve effectiveness.

Objective

Compensation payments are perceived to serve three distinct objectives, namely:

Payment for access;
Support for resource management and sustainable fishing, and
Contribution to social and economic development.

In the absence of a fisheries agreement, fishery managers would generally aim to recover the access fees and resource management costs via license fees charged to vessel owners. Financing for social and economic development objectives might come from central funds or donor support.

Total payments due under an agreement take three separate forms, not necessarily related to the objectives outlined above:

Compensation, calculated as a function of the expected value of finishing opportunities
Support for targeted actions (either in addition to or as part of Compensation)
License fees

The compensation is normally a direct payment by the EC to the third country as a general fiscal receipt. Under many agreements the EC did not seek detailed accounts as to how this money was applied, but tried to ensure that it was on-budget. The support allocated for targeted actions is made against specific objectives set out in the protocol which may cover both management and development related issues. Payment for targeted actions is normally made by the EC to accounts under the control of the Ministry of Fisheries, each disbursement being conditional on adequate reporting on the spending of the previous disbursement. License fees are paid by the vessel owners, usually in advance and at a rate lower than that paid by owners operating in the same sector outside of a fisheries agreement. Licenses form part of general sectoral fiscal receipts and the agreement does not seek to control how the revenue is applied.

From the 1980s, Fisheries Agreements evolved to allocate progressively more of the compensation against targeted actions, in response to pressure from parties including the European Parliament which sought to strengthen links between agreements and both sustainable fishing, and development agendas. In spite of the change of dogma from FA to FPA, such pressure is still very much in evidence today[41]. The 2004 agreement with Mozambique is typical of the final form of Fisheries Agreements, and all of the compensation was indicated against targeted actions. The 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement returned to allocating most of the EC payment to Compensation, and defining a smaller part to general policy support, rather than detailed actions. The agreement is also clear that the part of the compensation payment which is not destined for policy support is an access payment.

The inclusion of conditionality (such as targeted actions) in the fisheries agreements has both positive and negative outcomes:

ü It allows the Ministry to retain control of part of the total payments, rather than surrender all into central revenues and await disbursement.

ü It should increase the likelihood of an agreement contributing to specific ends, as per the details of the targeted actions set out in the protocol.

Targeted actions become a way of “making commercial agreements contribute to [the EC’s] development objectives”[42]. This appears to have little justification especially in the light of the fact that similar rents would have accrued to the sector if vessels had fished under private agreements and these would have been at the entire disposal of the government of the third country, without conditionality.

û The fact that payments are made into accounts controlled by the Ministry rather than into central funds increases the possibility that they become off-budget

û The existence of targeted actions overrides national planning and budgeting processes.

û There are signs that in practise targeted actions seldom actually result in objectives set out in the protocol, and the 2004 FA with Mozambique is a good example. As indicated in Table 12 above, the final application of the revenue for targeted actions is very different from that set out in the protocol. As the Commission’s review of the relationship between country programmes and FAs pointed out “Targeted compensations dedicated to natural resource management or fisheries development at the request of the EC are less likely to fit in with government priorities”[43]

Fundamental to the issue of compensation and the details of form or delivery is the question of the objective of Fisheries Agreements. Should they be treated purely as a trade deal, and revenues be made available in the same way as any other commercial contract (such as the private sale of licenses outside of a FA)? Or should agreements be viewed as a means of delivering mixed “trade plus aid” benefits? The fact that FAs ventured to support specific objectives in the sector implies some lack of confidence that the government would, in the absence of targeting, allocate resources to promote the basic objectives of sustainable fishing and responsible resource management. So should the Commission take responsibility for national resource management? The answer is clearly no, and in this context the presence of targeted actions in FAs can be seen as a challenge to national governance.

The agreed structure of the 2007 FPAs is somewhat improved with only compensation (specifically in payment for access) plus general support for policy execution remaining, and no reference to either detailed targeted actions or development related initiatives. The Commission however will still have some influence as to how the monies allocated to policy execution are spent as this must be done against a plan approved by the Joint Committee. The Council to the European Parliament, which recently obliged the Commission to report on the impacts and whether “the compensation paid by the EU… does in fact promote the sustainable use of fishery resources in Mozambique”[44] clearly see that this is how the money should be used. The same Council proposal also sets out a conflicting objective for the same money:

“The European Community’s financial contribution should be used for the development of coastal populations living on fisheries and the creation of small industrial fish freezing and processing enterprises at local level”

This is an alarming return to the rhetoric of targeted actions and Fisheries Agreements, and more alarming still as such a change appears not to have been negotiated with the Government of Mozambique. More than anything else it hints at the existence of very divergent opinions in Europe as to the basic function of compensation.

Effectiveness

The Cotonou agreement requires that there is compatibility between fisheries agreements and development aid, but this does not necessarily mean that an agreement should take the role of or substitute aid delivered via the indicative country programme. Should an aim of the EC be to support development initiatives via an agreement certain steps can be taken to make this a more likely outcome:

Ensure that the compensation is delivered in a way which results in it being clearly on-budget. Monies will therefore be subject to normal levels of accountability and by default will be integrated into national sectoral programmes and policy.
Ensure that an adequate sectoral policy exists. Support for the development of this (if necessary) should be part of the Indicative Country Programme. In the case of Mozambique key documents exit (Masterplan 1994, Sector Development Plan 2002-6, Five year government programme 2005-9 and the Plan for the reduction of absolute poverty 2006-9) but both the MasterPlan and the Sector Development Plan require updating.

In principle, if policy reflects priorities such as the promotion of responsible fishing and the reduction of poverty (which is the case in Mozambique) then providing compensation is on-budget it should inevitably be used for this end. There is a certain dilemma in that if compensation is paid directly to the Ministry, there is a higher possibility that it will be off-budget but an equally higher possibility that it will be retained within the sector.

Fair rent?

Levels of compensation under the FA and the FPA are considered to be reasonable, and minimum total economic rents of 11% (2004 FA) and 12% (2207 FPA) are acceptable especially as the structure of the agreement is such that at below reference catches the rent remains fixed and therefore higher relative to actual catch values (see Figure 3).

The rate of compensation for both seiners and longliners in the tuna sector is considered to be an area where the basis of compensation could be improved. The value of the catches of the two sectors differs radically with that of seiners fetching approximately 880€/t[45], whilst longliners achieve 2,800€/t[46]. Overall rents of approximately100€/t (Compensation plus License Fee) is reasonable for Seiners (11%), but very low for Longliners (4%). If the same rate of rent were applied, together with the current 65/35 sharing between compensation and licenses, longliners should pay 318€/t total, being 207€/t in compensation plus 111€/t in license fees. Current overall rents from the FA are only reasonable because, as referred above, there are no declared catches from the long line sector.

From the owners perspective it could be argued that it is necessary to maintain low advance payments in the long line sector as vessels need to retain a large annual portfolio off licenses in order to be certain that annual fishing operations will not be interrupted, no matter where good fishing is to be found. It would be better to increase the rates of payment for the longliner sector to those indicated above but decrease the level of the reference catch / advance tonnage for these vessels such that there is no change in license and compensation at reference levels. At least in this way, reference compensation would be the same but should there be catch from this segment of the fleet, Mozambique would gain a more just rent.

A revised scenario might be similar that that set out in Table 13.

Table 13 – Scenario for differential tuna compensation

Note that the base costs of licenses for longliners remains constant compared to the 2007 FPA, but the basis catch weight is lowered to 32 and 15 tonnes respectively for large and small longliners. The rate of incremental compensation for the long line segment is raised to 320€/t and incremental license fees raised to 110€/t. The reference catch has been divided between the longliners and seiners, which together with differential levels of compensation for the two segments, implies a rise in base compensation from 650,000€ to 905,000€ per year. Under this scenario Mozambique would earn rents of at least 11% from both fleet segments.

A disadvantage of such a change would be that it would considerably increase the incentive for longliners to under or not declare catches, and it would therefore have to be accompanied by improved independent catch verification.

Alternatives to financial compensation

There are few viable alternatives to financial compensation, and the principles set out under the current 2007 FPA are considered to be favourable. The Ministry has indicated that it is beneficial to be able to control the application of revenues via targeted action and thus it might be desirable, from their perspective, to increase the percentage allocated to policy support. A primary concern however would be the retention of these value on-budget.

Apart from financial compensation, other options include :

Reciprocal Access

The Northern European Fishing Agreements (with Norway, Iceland and Faeroe Islands) are compensated in the form of reciprocal access to EC resources. This type of compensation is not considered relevant as Mozambique has no specific interest in making EC fish resources available for national consumption, nor is there any national fleet that could fish European resources.

Programme Aid

It would, in principle, to be possible to remove any form of compensation from the agreement and replace it with increased programme aid under the EC’s indicative country programme. Although this could result in greater impacts on poverty alleviation, this would detract from any sectoral based cost recovery objectives and reduce the possibility that monies would be available for fisheries policy implementation.

6. Negotiating Capacity

In principle there is a very great difference in capacity of the two teams that sit down to negotiate a fisheries agreement. On the European side, the team will be composed of officials whose work focuses on fisheries agreements, including both technical and legal aspects. They will bring with them an immense amount of specialised experience, covering not only Mozambique but also all other agreements in the region. On the Mozambican side the team was lead by the Permanent Secretary and composed of senior officials from the Ministry of Fisheries, who will sit down to negotiate an agreement only very rarely (see Figure 2, depicting the timescale of EC fisheries agreements with Mozambique).

The principle technical resource available to the EC negotiators was the Ex-post Evaluation of the 2004-6 FA, which under normal circumstances is not made available to either the third country or the public at large. The evaluation will normally include a sectoral analysis, a review of the costs & benefits of the outgoing agreement and projections of costs & benefits on the basis of various scenarios for a new agreement. The Ministry reported however that they managed to obtain access to the document, but it is unknown whether this was a complete version. Whatever the case it will have helped their negotiating position for the 2007 agreement.

The actual negotiation of the 2007 FPA was reported to have been very difficult, with several rounds of meetings without agreement. Major issues were:

Low levels of financial contribution relative t the previous agreement
No guarantee of jobs for Mozambican seamen
Lack of reference to other regional management bodies apart from IOTC, such as SWIOFC and SADC
A dispute with France over EEZs, resulting in the agreement refereeing to Fishing Zone rather than EEZ.

During the final phase of negotiations the Ministry of Fisheries did not reach agreement with the EC, the final issue being the amount of financial compensation. In the end it was decided at the level of the Council of Ministers that the agreement should be signed as it was, “taking into account the wider vision of partnership between Mozambique and the EC”[47].

What is clear is that Mozambique was well aware that the European Community had a much greater interest in the 2007 agreement than Mozambique, as is illustrated by the differential benefits outlined in TablesTable 11 and Table 12, even though they may not have been aware of the scale of potential EC benefits. The negotiating team maintained its position as far as they were politically permitted. The resulting agreement has similar rates of total benefit (100€/t) as Comoros, Madagascar and Seychelles.

The generally competitive atmosphere surrounding negotiations really does bring into question the concept of an agreement based on partnership. If both parties were serious about partnership they would at least share the available information and projections, and come to a mutual agreement on this basis. The fact that the Commission does not reveal key analytical documents not only raises questions as to whether the full story is being put on the table but also fosters doubts in Mozambique as to whether they have opted for a scenario that is truly pareto-optimal.

7. Participation & Partnership Options

The nature of agreements and the technical and legal level of negotiations makes for very few opportunities to increase the participation of civil society in the process. As indicated above the EC strengthens its negotiating position by keeping baseline information out of the public domain. If Mozambique were to take a position in negotiations based on a public process it is very likely that, under present circumstances, it would weaken its own position and come away with a less favourable outcome.

There may however be some scope for public participation in the evaluation of an outgoing agreement, and it could be seen that this should in fact be done as part of the governments accountability to civil society. This could take the form of either public consultations analysing any impacts of activities carried out under the outgoing agreement on stakeholders or more focussed meetings with representative bodies such as fisher associations or co-management groups. Towards the end of the 2004-6 agreement the Ministry did not conduct a wide reaching internal evaluation, and did not consult representative groups on the issue.

There are civil society organisations, such as WWF, with representations in Mozambique who have access to a considerable amount of international information and experience related to issues surrounding fisheries agreements and, if the appropriate opportunity were to be created, they could make positive contributions to a preparatory process prior to new negotiations. It was not possible to confirm whether the Ministry would consider taking such a step, and the way ahead might be to organise the meeting unilaterally but take care to ensure that there is participation from the Ministry. Note that WWF have sponsored a similar meeting[48] with a regional dimension, held in Dar es Salaam in 2005 under the East African Marine Ecoregion Project and Mozambique participated.

There are several changes that could be effected that would improve the partnership dimension of the current FPA:

The Commission should make ex-post and ex-ante evaluations publicly available. This may only be possible though direct lobbying in Brussels.
The recent move by the Council to introduce a clause obliging the Commission to take action against vessels which do not report catches is very welcome, but this should be extended to cover VMS and Entry/Exit related infractions;
The recent move by the Council to dictate how compensation should be spent is against the partnership principles set out in the agreement and should be withdrawn;
The distribution of benefits between the two parties would be more fair if differential rates for seiners and longliners were introduced, along the lines of those set out in Table 13;

8. Policy and Strategy options

The key policy and strategy options that could improve the execution and net benefits from the fisheries agreement with the European Community are considered to be as follows:

Preparation

Towards the end of the current agreement it would be advantageous to make a thorough evaluation of the execution and impacts of the 2007-11 agreement and protocol. This should include civil society consultations with associations and other relevant focus groups and even create a forum whereby international organisations such as WWF might be able to participate. The danger that public consultation may weaken Mozambique’s negotiating position should be acknowledged.

Negotiations

It is clear that the Ministry has adopted a strong stance during 2006 negotiations for the 2007 agreement, made stronger by the knowledge of greatly differing interests in the FPA between Mozambique and the EC. It may however still have been possible to have achieved a marginally better position, especially considering the difference in information and experience available to two parties. In the past the World Bank has supported technical assistance to third countries specifically to help in FA negotiations and if available this sort of assistance could be beneficial to Mozambique.

Regional cooperation

At some stage there may be benefit in trying to develop a regional stance in the definition and negotiation of fisheries agreement conditions. A representative regional body could present a stronger negotiating position to the EC than individual countries. It would be worth investigating such possibilities via SADC and / or the SWIOFC .

Agreement conditions

Some agreement conditions could be improved in order to improve net benefits and to minimise the likelihood of unsustainable fishing practises. These include:

Entry / Exit Inspection: In the absence of on-board observers Entry and Exit Inspection is the only way to cross check the accuracy of catch declarations. Although inconvenient for ship owners, entry and exit inspections should be made mandatory through an appropriate clause in the protocol. In the case of seiners, it would be most convenient if capacity to carry out such inspections could be installed in Pemba.

Differential treatment of longliners and seiners: As discussed above fairer rents would be obtained from the agreement if there were differential treatment longliners and seiners, reflecting the differing catch values. However the increased incentive to under declare catches (especially in the longline segment) implies that such a change could only be effective if it were founded on a system which enable Mozambique to independently verify catches. This would include adequate surveillance, observation and inspection.

Observers: The 2007 agreement only makes allowance for IOTC appointed observers who will probably be biological rather than compliance focussed. It is considered that the agreement should make provisions for the boarding of Mozambican compliance observers, something which would be greatly facilitated by Entry/Exit inspections.

Infractions

The Ministry has so far failed to act against catch reporting infringements. Under the terms of the protocol vessels failing to report could be have their licenses suspended. It is considered that the Ministry should take a stronger position against this infraction not only to support sustainable resource management but also to ensure that correct compensation and license fees are being paid.

The complete commissioning of the VMS system is already a priority in the Ministry, but after more than two years, the system is still not working adequately. The Ministry should be encouraged to continue with efforts to get the system fully operational, and it should be noted that this may have direct impacts revenues (as a basis for verification of catch declarations) as well as interactions with other fisheries.

Management

Mozambique has a very limited remit in the management of highly migratory stocks, and within the Western Indian Ocean this is charged to the IOTC – an organisation of which Mozambique is not a member. It would be in the interests of the promotion of sustainable fishing if Mozambique could be encouraged to become at least a cooperating party. Should this happen Mozambique would then be obliged to submit catch data and comply with effort management and counter-IUU measures.

9. Bibliography

A Bioeconomic Analysis Of The Ghanaian Tuna Fishery (1980 – 2000). Mabel Borteley Bortier-Verstraaten Norwegian College Of Fishery Science 2002

A Handbook for Negotiating Fishing Access Agreements. WWF 2001

ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements – Fisheries. CFFA/CTA. European Centre for Development Policy and Management 2005

An Examination of Fisheries Relations between the European Union and ACP Countries. Béatrice Gorez and Brian O’Riordan. COMSEC / CTA 2003

Bycatch in the tuna purse-seine fisheries of the Western Indian Ocean. Romanov E. Southern Scientific Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography (YugNIRO). Crimea Ukraine. Fish. Bull. 100(1): 90–105 (2002).

Case of West Africa (ECDPM Working Paper No. 52). European Centre for Development Policy and Management 1997

Coherence Between EU Fisheries Agreements and EU Development Cooperation: The

Coherence in ACP fisheries and EU market access: Report of Expert Meeting . EU Coherence. 2007

Comparative Study Of The Impact Of Fisheries Partnership Agreements Executive Report. MRAG 2007

Comparative Study Of The Impact Of Fisheries Partnership Agreements Technical Report. MRAG 2007

Economic Performance Of Selected European Fishing Fleets Annual Report 2004

Economic Performance Of Selected European Fishing Fleets Annual Report 2005

EPAs and Fisheries Negotiations,. Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute. SEATINI Bulletin 2006

EU Fisheries Subsidies. Significance for Development Countries. CFFA 2005

European Distant Water Fishing Fleet: Principles and data. DG Fisheries, European Commission 2001

Evaluation Of The Fisheries Agreements Concluded By The European Community. IFREMER 1999

Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements. ADE 2002

Experiences With Subsidies And Fisheries Management: The Case Of Eu-Acp Fisheries Access Agreements. B. Gorez. CFFA. nd

Fair Fishing Deals, June 2005. WWF.

Fisheries Access Agreements: Trade and Development Issues, ICTSD Natural Resources, International Trade and Sustainable Development Series Issue Paper No. 2, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland. 2006

Fisheries Agreements with Third Countries – is the EU moving towards Sustainable Development? N Sporrong et al for WWF European Fisheries Campaign. 2002

Fisheries Partnership Agreements – Rebranding or a real step towards sustainability? WWF Demark 2003

On-Going Research Activities On Trophic Ecology Of Tuna In Equatorial Ecosystems Of Indian Ocean. Potier e al. IOTC Proc 5 2002

Profile of the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique: with emphasis on tuna fisheries. Lichucha et al. IOTC 2003

Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries (Partnership) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique for 1987, 1990, 1992, 2003, 2006

Report of the Third Special Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. IOTC 2006

Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). European Parliament 2007

SADC’S EPA Position On Fisheries. NFDS 2006

Seafood Price Indices SNF Working Paper 58/05. Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration 2005

Subsidies To The European Union Fisheries Sector. Institute for European Environmental Policy 2002

Summary report of the contributions to the ACP E consultation on IUU fishing issues. CTA/CFFA 2005

Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements – Phase Three* Rules of Origin in the Southern African Development Community Group 2006

The Economics of Fisheries Access Agreements: Perspectives on the EU-Senegal Case. Johnstone N. DP 96-02 IIED 1996

The European Tuna Sector. Economic Situation, Prospects and Analysis. Megapesca 2005

The plunder of bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean and East Atlantic in 2004 and 2005. WWF 2006

The Promotion of Sustainable and Equitable Fisheries Access Agreements in the Western Indian Ocean Region. WWF EAME 2005

Towards Sustainable and Equitable Fisheries Access Agreements in the Western Indian Ocean Region. East African Marine Ecoregion / WWF 2005

Tuna longline catch rates in the Indian Ocean. Polacheck. Journal of Marine Policy. 2005

Western Tuna and Billfish Fishery Joint Mac And Sag Workshop. Fremantle 2004

Annex 1 Detailed Tables

Table 14 – EC Agreements currently in force

Country	Duration of protocol	Type	EC contribution per year	Earmarked for support of sectoral fisheries policy (FPA) / targeted actions (FA)
Cape-Verde	5 years (30.3.2007-29.3.2012)	Tuna FPA	385 000 €	80 %
Comoros	6 years (1.1.2005-31.12.2010)	Tuna FPA	390 000 €	60 %
Côte d’Ivoire	6 years (1.7.2007—30.6.2013)	Tuna FPA	595 000 €	100 %
Gabon	6 years (3.12.2005-2.12.2011)	Tuna FPA	860 000 €	60 %
Greenland	6 years (01.01.2007 – 31.12.2012)	FPA	15 847 244 €	3 261 449 €
Guinea	5 years (1.1.2004-31.12.2008)	Mixed FA	3 400 000 €	1 400 000 € targeted actions
Guinea- Bissau	4 years (16.6.2007—15.6.2011)	Mixed FPA	7 000 000 €	35 %
Kiribati	6 years (16.9.2006 – 15.9.2012)	Tuna FPA	478 400 €	30 % to be increased to 40 % the first year, later to 60 %
Madagascar	6 years (1.1.2007 – 31.12.2012)	Tuna FPA	1 197 000 €	80 %
Mauritania	2 years renewable (1.8.2006 -31.7.2008)	Mixed FPA	86 000 000 €	11 000 000 €
Mauritius	4 years (3.12.2003—2.12.2007)	Tuna FA	487 500 €	195 000 € targeted actions
Micronesia	3 years (26.2.2007 –25.2.2010)	Tuna FPA	559 000 €	18 %
Morocco	4 years (28.2.2007-27.2.2011)	Mixed FPA	36 100 000 €	13 500 000 €
Mozambique	5 years (1.1.2007 – 31.12.2011)	Tuna FPA	990 000 €	100 %
São Tomé and Principe	4 years (1.6.2006 – 31.5.2010)	Tuna FPA	663 000 €	50 %
Seychelles	6 years (18.1.2005 – 17.1.2011)	Tuna FPA	1 425 000 €. from 2008: 5 355 000 €	36 %
Solomon Islands	3 years (26.02.2007 –25.02.2010)	Tuna FPA	400 000 €	30 %

No protocol currently in force in Angola, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal

The following countries have fisheries agreements based on an exchange of access to resources, rather than financial compensation:

Country	Period
Faeroe Islands	2.2.2006-1.2.2012
Iceland	15.12.2003-14.12.2009
Norway	2003-2009

Figure 4 – Designated fishing area (2007/11)

Source for EEZ data: Flanders Marine Institute, VLIZ Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase. http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound/

The above figure shows the deepwater limit of fishing areas (black line) defined in the 2007/11 protocol set against the Mozambican EEZ. The coastal limit is defined as 12nm from the costal baseline (not illustrated). The coordinates used in the protocol appear to permit fishing under the Mozambican FPA in parts of French EEZs of Bassas da India (c,b)and Juan de Nova, at the same time prohibiting fishing in a substantial areas of Mozambique’s EEZ between these two and between the EEZs of Juan de Nova and the Comoros EEZ (a).

Annex 2 – Terms of Reference

Project Objectives

To examine the existing legal and practical parameters of mandates of each part, identify institutional competences

To give an overview of the overall policy sectorial context that pertains to EU engagement in fisheries.

To examine the social, economic and geopolitics interest of the EU and Mozambique

To expose few EU member states which have a huge dependency on exploiting Mozambican marine resource at the environmental expenses

To expose the subsidies practices linkages with transitions to sustainable fisheries and responsible fishing practices

Reposes the control of the natural resources and the trade dialogue

To improve the understanding of the linkages between marine resources in the coastal waters and deep waters

To contribute for basis to compensate the loses of the folk fisherman caused by the deep sea catches by the EU large vessels

To contribute to secure folk fisherman’s and other stakeholders food security, employment and livelihood

To facilitate the interactions between the negotiators and the folk fisherman in order to create a path for sustainable fishery agreements

To facilitate the engagement of the fisherman organizations in EU and ACP relations and EPAs negotiations

Expected deliverables

Economic justice Coalition will deliver the following:

Establish a Reference Group (RG). EJC will select national organisations and/or individuals to act as a Reference group on the basis of established linkages with the trade unions, fisherman organizations and other relevant popular social movements that’ll will provide the popular participatory outreach of the project. Both government and the UE representatives will be invited to join the RG.

Convene and coordinate meetings/consultants with the Researchers and the reference group and keep OWA updated

Planning the implementation of national report back workshop as provided in the implementation plan and budget

Coordinate participation of the researcher team and the reference group in the consultations meetings

Researchers

The Economic Justice Coalition and the Reference group have the responsibility of identifying and contracting experienced researcher/academics to undertake the researcher component of the project

The paper

Will be 50-60 pages in length, single-spaced with a comprehensive bibliography

Will discuss the main national development issues pertaining to the topic using accepted theoretical paradigms an analytical analysis

Will be presented in a manner that will allow a general audience to grasp key issues and foster a sound discussion of possible alternative solutions to the problems and challenges raised

Will explore and suggest mechanism to enrich and develop the concept of creative Policy making at national level through alternative development strategies

The study will give a compare analyse of different fisheries agreements celebrated by the EU in three regions: north Europe, Mediterranean countries and the sub Saharan countries. In the last region, the sub-Saharan deep analyse 2 agreements compared with the current EU – Mozambican on its social, economic impacts.

The author will play a leading role during report back and RG and contribute to efforts to draw conclusions from each one.

Methodology

The project is not a defensive response fishery agreements but a broad initiative to root an alternative development paradigm within the achievements and lessons draw from earlier agreements and with other countries. Within this perspective we do not counter pose the state role but rather focus on defining appropriate role of all stakeholders in fighting against poverty.

At the same time EJC coalition would like to locate this project within civil society participation in Cotonou Agreement. In this sense it is more than a study and more than just a process of desk researcher but a project that combines desk research, with participatory research process.

The study is rigorous based on sound research, which combines it combines a national survey, with sectorial illustration that punctures the claims of trade liberalisations as well as responding to key issues and concerns in relation to development, the rights of people and their welfare.

The EJC intends by this work to set up a dialogue on the fishing sector, searching to raise joint contributions and build up an agenda of dialogue among the stakeholders, to share information and “network,” and in this way, to empower the policy-makers, activists and other actors of the civil society so that their participation is much more proactive.

The fishing sector has a potential to support the economic growth and the combat against poverty. The Mozambican government has been negotiating fishing agreements with the European Union (EU) and one of the challenges is related to the formulation of suitable negotiation positions and securing environment diversity, and also set up a legal framework to assure development based on the people’s needs.

Part of these challenges can make the policy and decision-makers, legislators, producers, and fishermen to be involved. The agreements´ provisions should be respected by the contracting parties, taking into account especially what the Cotonou Agreement prescribes on the participation of non-state actors in the relations between the ACP and the EU, which should be applied on that context.

Yet as part of challenges one should take into consideration the international trade regime run by the WTO, where the country should show a certain dynamism and rapidity at that level, but without colliding with the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the SADC Protocol on trade or other regional arrangement, as well as the movements of offers and applications from countries involved in trade negotiations at those levels.

In order to make a study like this to be much more valued it should not disregard an analysis of technical barriers and trade effects as well as the SPS (sanitary and pithosanitary measures) both countrywide and the constraints they cause to Mozambican fishing exports.

In this way, one should consider the following chapters:

Fishing sector in the economy and its production and productivity capacity;

Genesis of the agreements;

Negotiation capacity between the parties;

Analysis of the agreements and their evolution;

The EU subsides to the fishing sector and its impact on the competition between local and European fleets;

Participation and partnership options;

New areas of research;

Political recommendations;

Within chapters one should also analyze the following points:

Check the link with national development plans;

Present the profile of the nature of agreements on the scope of other agreements that the EU celebrates with other countries;

The compensation: its nature, effects and alternatives to it;

Lifting of the agreement provisions fulfilment level between the contracting parties and its impact in the relations between them;

Tentative analysis and comparison of compensations in toto and the fleet activity revenues in Europe, including the contribution on the economy, employment, and primary services;

Consultations between the parties on the reason why the agreements were fulfilled or not fulfilled and what have they produced;

Analysis of the existing or non-existing conservation measures on the light of Biodiversity Convention;

Analyze the joint enterprises. Did they exist? What did they do? What is their value?

Analyze the Joint committee. Does it meet? What does it discuss? Which conclusions? What has changed from negative to positive and vice-versa?

Analyze the EU policies on fishing agreements;

Type of benefits Mozambique could search to celebrate:

– Compensation

– Reciprocal agreements (rights)

[1] NORAD: A Study of the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique. 2001

[2] http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

[3] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002

[4] www.eucoherence.org “Fisheries Partnership Agreements: An empty shell for development?”

[5] CTA Agritrade: “ACP-EU fisheries relations: Executive Brief” 2007

[6] Idem

[7] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[8] Poundstone, W. (1992) Prisoner’s Dilemma Doubleday, NY NY.

[9] WWF: Fair fishing deals 2006

[10] WWF: Fair fishing deals 2006

[11] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002

[12] www.eucoherence.org “Fisheries Partnership Agreements: An empty shell for development?”

[13] European Commission: European Distant Water Fishing Fleet, Principles & Data 2001

[14] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002

[15] Pro rata calculation. The protocol period was 1 year, 9 months.

[16] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[17] European Investment Bank Projects http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/sectors/agriculture/loan.htm?id=3301216

[18] Unconfirmed data

[19] Report of the 8^th session of the scientific committee of the IOTC. 2004

[20] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[21] Council Regulation (EC) Nº 2792/1999

[22] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[23] Including policy support

[24] Estimate based on full uptake of fishing opportunities. The protocol stipulates different fees for large and small longliners and the profile of the fleet has been estimated.

[25] Estimate, based on actual uptake

[26] Estimate based on unconfirmed declaration of catch (2,000t)

[27] http://www.iotc.org/English/data/databases.php

[28] CFFA: Summary report of the contributions to the ACP E-consultation on IUU fishing issues. CTA 2005

[29] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007

[30] NORAD: A Study if the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique. 2001

[31] Ministerio das Pescas

[32] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[33] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002

[34] On basis of full uptake of fishing opportunities (which did not happen in 2007)

[35] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[36] Estimated on basis of global EC tuna sector indicators, taken from Megapesca: The European Tuna Sector Economic Situation, Prospects and Analysis of the Impact of Liberalisation of Trade. SC 12. 2005. Note that these values do NOT include added value and employment benefits from the processing industry

[37] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007

[38] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[39] Source: Ministry of Fisheries

[40] Beyond 12 miles and bounded by the coordinates set out in the protocol, illustrated in Figure 4, Annex 1

[41] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007

[42] ADE, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements, Final Report 2002

[43] idem

[44] Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique (COM(2007)0472–C6 0284/2007 –2007/0170(CNS)). 2007

[45] Based on values in Megapesca: The European Tuna Sector Economic Situation, Prospects and Analysis of the Impact of Liberalisation of Trade. SC 12. 2005

[46] Economic Performance of Selected European Fishing Fleets, Annual Report 2005.

[47] MRAG: Comparative Study of the Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, Technical Report. 2007

[48] WWF: The Promotion of Sustainable and Equitable Fisheries Access Agreements in the Western Indian Ocean Region. Dar es Salaam 2005